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Abstract
Risk management became an important element of the modern society. Being aware of risks
and take appropriate actions to handle them are crucial elements in most industries, especially
the ones for which the consequences of undesired events reach disastrous extents. To do this,
risk management techniques were developed to systematically identify hazardous elements
and assess the related risks.
Accidents occurring at universities can lead to serious consequences, even though their scale
is often smaller when compared to industry. However, most of the well-established risk
management techniques are not applicable for the research and teaching environment. These
techniques require clearly defined processes and resources, which are not easily provided for
the academic setting. Moreover, the research setting differs significantly from the industrial
due to its peculiarities (high turnover of personnel, scarce statistical data, equipment in
experimental state, etc.).
The intention of this dissertation is to further investigate these topics and to present a solution
to fill the gaps. Thus, different risk management approaches are reviewed and the demands
of an ideal method for risk management applicable to research setting are postulated. These
requirements are met by development of the Laboratory Assessment and Risk Analysis (LARA),
a method that was enhanced and tested at different Swiss Universities in the framework of
this dissertation.
The results of the LARA use in the field suggest that this technique leads to suitable results
and allows managing risks at universities, regardless of the character of hazard met. Used
in an existing safety framework, LARA can help to allocate resources in an optimal way by
taking into account the specificities of research environment and therefore help to improve
the occupational safety level significantly.
Key words: Hazard, risk, occupational safety, risk analysis, risk assessment, risk management,
resource allocation, risk mitigation.
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Zusammenfassung
Risikomanagement gewann in den letzten Jahrzehnten immer mehr an Bedeutung. Für die
meisten Bereiche der Wirtschaft ist das Erkennen möglicher Risiken und die Erarbeitung von
Abwehrdispositiven überlebensnotwendig geworden, insbesondere wenn der mögliche Scha-
den desaströse Ausmasse annehmen könnte. Um Risiken zu erkennen und daraus resultieren-
de Gefahren zu evaluieren, wurden in den letzten Jahrzehnten verschiedenste systematische
Methoden entwickelt.
Auch wenn Unfälle an Universitäten nicht die gleichen Ausmasse haben wie in der Industrie,
können sie doch zu ernsten Konsequenzen führen. Die meisten Risikomanagementmethoden
sind im universitären Umfeld jedoch kaum anwendbar. Die Voraussetzungen sind zu unter-
schiedlich; denn die Methoden benötigen klar definierte Prozesse und Ressourcen, welche
an Universitäten kaum verfügbar sind. Auch weitere Faktoren sind sehr unterschiedlich, wie
beispielsweise die hohe Fluktuationsraten, kaum verfügbare Statistiken, Gerätschaften in
experimentellem Zustand, und weiteres.
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, diese Problematik zu untersuchen und Lösungsansätze zu
entwickeln. Dazu werden verschiedene gängige Risikomanagementmethoden besprochen
und die optimalen Eigenschaften einer Methode für Universitätslabore postuliert. Diese
werden mit der Entwicklung der Laboratory Assessment and Risk Analysis (LARA) erfüllt, einer
Methode, die im Rahmen dieser Dissertation erweitert und getestet wurde.
Die Resultate dieser Tests lassen darauf schliessen, dass diese Methode tauglich ist, Risiken
an Universitäten zweckmässig zu analysieren, unabhängig in welchem Forschungsgebiet
sie angewendet wird. In Verbindung mit einem umfassenden Sicherheitskonzept kann die
LARA Methode knappe Ressourcen optimal verteilen, indem sie die vorhandenen Eigenheiten
berücksichtigt. Dadurch können die Risiken an Universitäten deutlich gesenkt und damit das
allgemeine Sicherheitsniveau verbessert werden
Stichwörter: Gefährdungen, Risiko, Arbeitssicherheit, Risikoanalyse, Risikobewertung, Risiko-
management, Ressourcenverteilung, Risikoverminderung.
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Résumé
La gestion du risque est devenue un élément important de la société d’aujourd’hui. Il est
crucial d’être conscient des risques afin de prendre les mesures appropriées afin de les gérer
dans la plupart des industries, et plus particulièrement dans celles où les conséquences
d’évènements néfastes peuvent prendre des dimensions désastreuses. Ainsi, les techniques
de gestion du risque ont été développées afin d’identifier systématiquement les éléments
dangereux et évaluer les risques qui leur sont liés.
Les accidents survenant dans les universités peuvent avoir de graves conséquences, bien
qu’a une échelle moindre que ceux survenant en milieu industriel. Toutefois, la plupart des
techniques classiques de gestion du risque ne sont pas applicables au milieu de la recherche
et de l’enseignement. Ces techniques reposent sur des procédures clairement établies, et
nécessitent des ressources qu’il est difficile de pourvoir en milieu académique du fait de
ses spécificités intrinsèques (changements fréquents du personnel, données statistiques
insuffisantes, équipement au stade expérimental, etc.)
Cette dissertation a pour but d’approfondir cette problématique et de proposer les solutions
qui répondraient aux besoins identifiés. Ainsi plusieurs approches de gestion du risque sont
analysées. Cette étude aboutira à la proposition de critères idéaux en vue de développer une
méthode d’analyse du risque spécifique au milieu académique. Ces critères ont alors été
rassemblés au sein de la méthode Laboratory Assessment and Risk Analysis (LARA). En plus
de son développement, LARA a pu être optimisée et testée dans différentes universités suisses.
Les résultats de l’utilisation de LARA sur le terrain ont démontré l’adéquation de cette méthode
qui permet de mieux gérer les risques au sein des universités, et ce indépendamment du
type de dangers considères. Intégrée a une organisation existante de sécurité, LARA permet
d’allouer les ressources de manière optimisée en tenant en compte des spécificités du milieu
de la recherche et donc aider à améliorer le niveau de la sécurité au travail.
Mots clefs : Danger, risque, sécurité, analyse de risque, priorisation des risques, gestion des
risques, allocation de resources.
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Introduction
With the technical progress during the industrial revolution in the 18th Century, humans got
hold of the instruments to increase the size of accidents to disastrous extents. Especially the
chemical industry is responsible for numerous catastrophes, claiming thousands of lives and
polluting the environment on a large scale. Reasons for these accidents to happen were either
ignorance or misjudgment of an imminent danger. Some accidents however were severe
enough to shake up the public and led to regulations, which forced the industry to manage
their risks.
An example of such an accident is the disaster that happened in 1976 in the Italian town
Seveso, just 20 km away from Milano [Bertazzi, 1991]. On the 10th of July, an overpressure in a
chemical production site of the company ICMESA caused the release of an unknown amount
of the compound 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), better known as dioxin. The
poisonous gas contaminated a densely populated area of 6 km2, affecting the villages Seveso,
Meda, Desia, and Cesano Maderno. The nature suffered tremendous damages, leaves withered
within hours and approximately 3’300 cadavers were found in the surrounding area. Until
today, the dimension of the human damage is unknown; the public authorities failed to
provide evidence in order to call the chemical company to account. However, experts estimate
that thousands have suffered from short and long-term effects of this disaster [Bertazzi, 1991].
This disaster raised the public awareness and the pressure on the industry and legislation
began to rise. As a direct consequence of the Seveso disaster, the European Union enacted the
Seveso-directive in 1982, successed by the Seveso-II-directive in 1997 [Council of the European
Union, 1998]. The Seveso-directive regulates the use of dangerous chemical compounds, for
which stipulations need to be met. These include, that the operation has to be registered,
regular safety reports, internal and external emergency plans are mandatory, and safety
measures need to be published. Since Switzerland is not directly affected by the laws of the
European Union, own regulations were introduced in order to avoid such accidents (e.g. the
Ordinance on Protection against Major Accidents [Swiss Confederation, 1991]).
Another example of a man-made disaster is the chemical spill in Schweizerhalle in 1986. Near
Basel, a storage depot of the pharmaceutical company Sandoz storing 1350 tons of chemicals
burned down. The reason for this fire is assumed to be a wrong manipulation during the
boxing of a compound. The firefighters managed to get control of the fire, but the forge water
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Figure 1 – A scene on the boarder of the evacuated zone in Seveso [Indymedia Ireland, 2013].
containing large quantities of various pesticides entered the river Rhine, which caused severe
pollution. The contamination annihilated a large part of the river’s fauna on the length of
several hundred kilometers and had a serious impact on the ecological system of the river.
Some of the effects are still present today.
As the Seveso disaster, the incident in Schweizerhalle shook up the public and authorities,
which initiated an extensive program to protect the river Rhine. The International Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) has the mandate to avoid these kinds of disasters
and to protect the ecological system of the river. This includes strict controls of chemical
concentrations and the pursuit of the polluters. The monitoring of the river Rhine also gives
valuable insights on ecological effects of chemicals and has important implications on the
legislation for the use of chemicals.
However, not only external pressure in form of legal consequences provoke companies to
be aware of their risks; also other considerations, such as unacceptable financial losses in
case of a disaster increased the importance of accident prevention. Regardless of whether
a systematic risk management is the results of legal obligations or other considerations, it
became an important aspect of the modern industrial sector.
Risk Management at Universities
What is daily business and widely applied in numerous fields of industries, is uncharted terrain
for most universities’ research and teaching laboratories. The accidents in this surrounding
might not be as disastrous as the ones occurring in the industry, but still take place all over the
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world [Marendaz et al., 2013; Ouédraogo, 2011c]:
• Darthmouth college (Hanover, USA), 1996: fatal intoxication of a scientist after a contact
with the highly poisonous compound dimethyl mercury.
• University of Mulhouse (France), 2006: one death and several injured due to a blast in
the university’s chemistry building.
• Technical University of Delft (Netherlands), 2008: a short circuit caused a fire, which
completely destroyed the building of the architecture faculty.
These are just a few examples of accidents happening at universities and indicate that the
accident potential is present, but might be underestimated. Other than in the industry,
universities lack structures to promote a safe environment:
"We find that the accident rate in universities is 10 to 50 times greater than in the chemical
industry. In DuPont, if a guy hits his thumb with a hammer in Singapore, the chairman of the
board has a report on his desk. Imagine if that happened in academia." –James Kaufmann
[Peplow and Marris, 2006]
Figure 2 – As a consequence of a short circuit, a building of the architecture faculty in Delft
burned down [Minh, 2008].
It is probably a question of time until an accident happens at a university that has similar
implications as the ones described above. It should in each university’s interest to actively
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avoid such incidents from happening, to be aware of risks in their operations, and to manage
them accordingly. However, risk management needs a systematic method and resources. Most
existing risk management approaches, such as the Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) or Hazard and Operability analysis (HAZOP) were designed for a specific application
in the industry. HAZOP for example was invented as a tool to analyze processes in the chemical
process industry. The scientific research differs from these operations significantly and many
times the existing approaches are not feasible. Additionally, the provided resources are often
not sufficient to perform such a risk management approach; they require special training,
manpower and expertise.
Not only the difference of the processes and the lack of provided resources make an application
of widely used techniques difficult; also the peculiarities of the research environment hinder a
successful application. Equipment is often only in experimental state, processes are not fully
discovered and described, and emerging technologies might involve unknown risks. Other
than in the industry, universities can be considered as a conglomerate of micro-companies
rather than a single company. Research groups rarely share similar goals and operate with
minimal interference between each other. Moreover, responsibilities are often not clearly
defined and shared guidelines are not always established. Another important aspect are social
factors, which create a challenging environment for safety management: high personnel
turnover, a multitude of different cultures, and a culture of disregard when it comes to safety.
Intention and Goal of this Dissertation
Widely used methods are not applicable to manage risks in the research and teaching envi-
ronment; at the same time, a systematic risk management is necessary in this setting to avoid
serious accidents. The goal of this dissertation is to further investigate the topic and to present
a solution to fill this gap. In order to do so, this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 1: Risk Management explains concepts related to risk and how these concepts can
be linked together to manage risks. A basic risk management workflow is explained in detail
and the important aspects are discussed. Furthermore, the most common risk assessment
techniques used in the industry are explained, their advantages and disadvantages reviewed,
and their feasibility for the research environment investigated. Based on this comparison,
ideal specifications of a risk management technique for research and teaching laboratories
are postulated. Few specific methods for the research environment exist, but none of these
methods can be used as a holistic method for all aspects of research laboratories. These
methods are explained, their benefits pointed out and assessed based on the postulated
specifications.
Chapter 2: LARA – Laboratory Assessment and Risk Analysis presents and discuss the
LARA approach. This method was developed by the Group of Chemical and Physical Safety
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(GSCP) of EPFL and was enhanced during the studies, on which this dissertation is based on.
LARA is a holistic risk management method for research and teaching laboratories. The main
goals of LARA are as follows:
• Provide a risk management technique for all types of academic research laboratories.
• Allow a less resource demanding risk management, to fit the provided resources of the
research environment.
• Development of a software application, allowing user-friendly and intuitive risk analysis.
• Consideration of the particular setting of the academic research environment.
In this chapter, the development history, cornerstones, and main principles of the LARA
method are presented. Based on the general workflow of risk management presented in
Chapter 1, the complete workflow of the LARA method is explained in detail with examples.
Chapter 3: Application Examples of LARA shows how the enhanced LARA method can
be applied and if this method is capable of introducing adequate risk management to the
research environment. In order to do so, a choice of different processes is evaluated in LARA
and the strengths and the limitations of this method is discussed. In order to have a broad
range of applications, the processes do not only differ in their focus or their branch of study,
the evaluations were also performed at different Swiss universities.
The results of these applications suggest that LARA leads to suitable results and allows manag-
ing risks at universities, regardless of the specific field of application. Used in an existing safety
framework, LARA can help to allocate resources in an optimal way by taking into account
the specificities of this environment and therefore improves the occupational safety levels
significantly.
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1 Risk Management
The concept of risk has been a subject of change during history of mankind and is strongly
related to the religious beliefs of an epoch [Bernstein, 1998]. Religion was always used by
mankind as an approach to explain the world. Future events were linked to fatalistic beliefs
and were often seen as a whim of the gods. Oracles and soothsayers were one manifestation of
these beliefs, showing the need of the people to know what they are facing in the future. During
the age of enlightenment, cultural and religious changes cleared the way for scientific progress,
which influenced the way how western civilizations explained and saw the world. Probability
theory, first used as a gambler’s tool, linked events with different possible outcomes and their
relative probabilities. For a simple game with defined rules and defined possible outcomes,
this might be sufficient to predict and estimate the future; for more complex scenarios however,
this approach is not enough. For real life situations, one has to determine possible outcomes
and estimate how probable these outcomes are. In a similar way how gamblers could think
about turning the odds to their favor, it is possible to optimize those probabilities and therefore
being better prepared for the future. This approach comes close to the modern conception of
risk analysis, which deals with following fundamental questions:
• What can go wrong?
• How likely can it go wrong?
• What can be done about it?
Even though risk analysis has become an important factor in modern society and economy
and reached a high level of complexity, it satisfies the basic need of humans to be aware of the
unknown, just like the oracles in ancient times did.
Risk Management in Occupational Safety And Health
When applied in occupational safety and health, the main goal of risk management is to
reduce the accident rate. Traditional approaches for safety management tend to overlook
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some important factors, since they mainly build on experience rather than on a systematic
determination of hazards and risks. Especially unusual accidents are rarely determined by the
traditional approaches; risk management is more likely capable to detect them, due to the
systematic approach. Additionally, risk management is well-established in various fields of
application, which gives a certain guarantee about the effectiveness of a method. Furthermore,
an adoption into an organization and its workflows can promote different collaborations,
which were not existing before. As a results, the method delivers evaluated hazards and risks,
a recommendation of safety measures and a better general understanding of processes. This
documentation helps to keep track of the safety related issues and gives the management a
measurable component.
There are various reasons to adopt risk management into an organization. Knowing about
efforts to reduce the risks can have a positive impact on different stakeholders of an organiza-
tion. This includes the employees, which work in a safer environment, as well as customers,
legislators, neighbors of the production site and insurance companies. Furthermore, applying
risk management and reducing the accident rate can also be a legal obligation, depending
on the local legislation. Risk management also brings economical benefits: even if the re-
duced accident rate does not bring direct advantages (e.g. less work interruption), the risk
management can lead to indirect advantages (e.g. lower insurance premium).
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1.1 Definitions
Risk management as a scientific approach lies in the intersection of various different sciences
and has countless applications in most sectors of a modern society. It highly benefits from
this variety of influences, but it can also lead to misconceptions. Different scientific, cultural
and personal backgrounds of involved people are a source of these misconceptions. Due to
this, clear definitions of important concepts are crucial for an objective and unbiased risk
management. For this thesis, the most important concepts and terms are defined as follows:
Risk
The most important concept for risk management is risk itself. Risk management has count-
less fields of application and risk might have different uses in these fields, therefore many
definitions of this term exist. Attempts to grasp the concept can lead to rather complicated
definitions, such as the risk definition of the U.S. Department of Defense:
An expression of the impact and the possibility of a mishap in terms of potential mishap
severity and probability of occurrence [U.S. Department of Defense, 2000]
In most basic definitions, risk is a concept containing three aspects: events, their possible
outcomes and the their occurrences [Fishkin, 2006]. For a simple gambling example (e.g.
flipping a coin), the outcome can be separated into success or failure. Even though not all
sources agree on it [Adams, 2012; International Organization for Standardization, 2009], a
majority of definitions relate a failure (negative) to risk, whereas the success (positive) is seen
as chance. However, outcome is not the only aspect, which leaves room to interpretation: risk
can also be defined through the statistical aspect of the occurrences:
Risk is the semi-variance of the distribution of all consequences, taken over negative
consequences only, and with respect to some adopted reference value [Vlek and Stallen, 1981]
Other definitions are pointing in a psychological direction and focus on the event aspect of
risk. An event can be seen as a conscious decision and therefore risk judgements are:
Intuitive value judgements which express a diffuse negative evaluation of a decision alternative
[Singleton and Hovden, 1987].
Aven [2011] classifies the definitions into “risks defined through probabilities" and “risk de-
fined through uncertainties". The first class of definitions includes the three aspects events,
consequences and associated probabilities. The second class of risk definitions includes
uncertainties, for example:
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Risk is uncertainty about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with
respect to something that humans value [Aven, 2009]
Uncertainty however is an object of discussion itself [Rogers, 2003] and increases the complex-
ity and the level of abstractness of the concept risk. In order to focus on the subject rather
than the definitions, for this thesis the risk will be used in its general sense:
Possibility of an undesired consequence [Harms-Ringdahl, 2003]
Hazard
For risk management, the term hazard can hardly be avoided. For most definitions, hazards
are the sources for risk [Fishkin, 2006] and the concepts are inseparably linked to each other
(see Figure 1.1). Ericson [2005] describes hazards as prerequisite for an accident, where risk
acts as a possible route from one to the other. For this thesis, hazards are defined as follows:
A condition that is prerequisite for a risk [Harms-Ringdahl, 2003]
Exposure
Not only a source (hazard) is necessary to establish a risk. Exposure of a possible target is
required as well to form a risk situation (see Figure 1.1). If both target and hazard are present,
a risk exists, even though it is negligibly small.
Hazard ExposureRisk
Figure 1.1 – Schematic representation of relation between hazard, risk and exposure.
Uncertainty
Risk management aims to reduce risks and uncertainties about future events. There are several
kinds of uncertainties, which origin from different phenomena [Rogers, 2003]:
10
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• Uncertainty in the effect: uncertainty in the realization of the harm that may result from
the exposure to the hazard. In this kind of uncertainty, the hazard is known and the
possible adverse effect is known as well. There is an uncertainty about the probability of
the adverse effect due to the stochastic nature of this process. Taking the harm “infection
with the HI virus" and the cause “unprotected intercourse" as an example: the event can
lead to an infection or a non-infection, and the uncertainty is related to the probability
of these two outcomes.
• Uncertainty in the cause: the adverse effect is known, but several causal relationships
are leading to this adverse effect, which generates uncertainty. An example for this kind
of uncertainty is the harm “lung cancer" and the cause “smoking". Hardly any source
disagrees about a correlation between these two phenomena. However, since other
effects can lead to this illness as well, it is impossible to determine with certainty the
cause of a specific case.
• Uncertainty in the cause-effect relationship: uncertainty in the degree of correlation
between the hazard and the harm. For example, the harm “brain tumor" and the cause
“use of cell phones": there are speculations about the causal relationship, but it is not
scientifically proven. The uncertainty describes the degree of truth of this postulated
relationship.
Additionally to these three types of origins, other influences (e.g. language) can lead to
uncertainties as well [Pluess et al., 2013]:
• Lexical uncertainty: caused by different personal interpretation of an expression (e.g.
often).
• Informal uncertainty: induced by a subjective interpretation of a concept (e.g. severity).
Other authors describe the concept of uncertainty in a statistical context and distinguish
between following types: [Zio and Pedroni, 2012]
• Aleatoric uncertainty describes the relative probability of future events, which are deter-
mined by random physical processes. These uncertainties are not reducible by default.
• Epistemic uncertainty describes a lack of knowledge about a phenomena. Other than
aleatoric uncertainties, those kind of uncertainties are reducible.
Uncertainty in its basic meaning describes not being sure about something. The concept is not
interchangeable with ignorance. Not knowing something is a different phenomena, slightly
related to the concept of uncertainty, but important for risk management as well [Paté-Cornell,
2013].
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Accident
An accident is an undesired event that causes damage or injury. Harms-Ringdahl [2003]
differentiates between four types of accidents:
• Accidents with a direct and sudden consequence, which is triggered off unintentionally.
The consequences are observable within a short period of time.
• Accidents, which are giving an increased probability for injury or damage, but without
directly observable consequences. An example for this type of accident is cancer due to
short-time exposure to carcinogenic chemicals.
• Slow deterioration and degeneration, caused by continuous exposure to a hazard.
Sources for this could be chemicals as well, but other than the second type, it is not
necessarily a question of probability but severity.
• Sabotage, which can appear in form of the other three types of accidents. The main
difference is the intentional triggering of the the event.
The border between these types of accidents can be blurred and the distinction is mainly
based on the time passed. The difference between the first type and the third type is the
amount of time necessary to lead to the consequences: seconds to hours for the first one,
years to decades for the third one.
Accidents are defined as incidents leading to a certain loss or damage. If an incident happens
without any loss or damage, the term near miss is used. Different models describe the relation-
ship between near miss and accidents [Meyer and Reniers, 2013]. These models established
the connection between near miss, property damaging accidents, minor accidents and major
accidents. An often used approach to illustrate the relation is the use of a pyramid form; a less
severe level is always prerequisite for a more severe level and the occurrences depend on each
other.
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1.2 Risk Management Process
The risk management process coordinates activities and efforts to direct and control an
organization with regard to risk [International Organization for Standardization, 2009]. Various
different approaches were suggested; main differences between these approaches is how they
are adopted into existing workflow and safety structures. Figure 1.2 shows a suggestion of a
risk management workflow based on the ISO 31000:2009 norm [International Organization
for Standardization, 2009]. The workflow has three main parts: the adoption into an existing
organization (definition of context and monitoring), risk assessment (identification, analysis
and evaluation of risks) and risk treatment.
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Figure 1.2 – Risk management workflow.
1.2.1 Definition of the Context
The first step of the workflow is the definition of the context for the risk management pro-
cess. On an organizational level, the framework of the process, the resources, roles and
responsibilities need to be delineated. External influences must be taken into account as
well; stakeholder’s expectations and legal regulations similarly shape the aims of the risk
management process.
In order to measure the performance of the processes, quantitative approaches using key
indices (e.g. the accident rate) can be used. To reach a high level of effectiveness, clear
responsibilities and system limits are a crucial part of the process, independently if it is a
single activity or a larger project. Inconsistencies in responsibilities can lead to undetected
risks. In order to compare the different risks with each other, the criteria to evaluate them
must be determined including the dimension of these criteria. Severity for example might
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not be measured in the same dimension for a pharmaceutical supplier as for an aviation
enterprise. Once the measure of comparison is defined, limits of acceptability are set before
the risk assessment takes place; in order to have an objective tool for decisions, those limits
are valid for the defined system.
1.2.2 Hazard Identification
The first step of the sub-workflow risk assessment has the goal to identify possible hazards.
Most systematic risk assessment techniques differ mainly in their approach on how to do this.
Some might focus more on the components of a system, some examine the activities involved.
However, all those systematic techniques rely on information. Statistical data about past
accidents and near misses are an important source for those techniques. Standard operation
procedures and schematics of the process can help to understand a system and therefore
to be aware of the possible hazards occurring when performing an activity. A complete
identification of all possible hazards however is not realistic, independently which method
is applied. Reasons for this are random effects (aleatoric uncertainty), a lack of knowledge
(epistemic uncertainty), or influences from outside of the studied system. These unidentified
hazards decrease the significance of a risk assessment and should be eliminated as much as
possible.
1.2.3 Risk Analysis
The goal of this step is to understand the risk and to estimate its magnitude. This includes the
rating of each single risk present according to the predefined criteria (e.g. severity, probability,
detectability). All of those criteria involve a certain amount of uncertainty. The rating of sever-
ity for example can be determined in various ways, depending on the assumed consequences.
It has to be clearly defined, if the worst case scenarios or the most probable consequence is
assumed for this rating. These considerations must be followed for all risks present, otherwise
the comparison of them will be biased. Additionally, the already applied corrective measures
for a risk must be known in order to analyze the risk correctly.
Once the hazards are described with the predefined criteria, the risk estimation takes place.
In order to compare the risks, a common risk scale is established for this step. This can be
achieved using quantitative approaches (e.g. probability values as risk dimension), semi-
quantitative approaches (e.g. risks values on a predefined scale) or qualitative approaches (e.g.
high risk). Since the concept of uncertainty is highly related to the concept of risk, they need
to be analyzed as well in this step of the risk assessment. This includes studying the different
sources, such as different expert opinions.
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1.2.4 Risk Evaluation
Risk evaluation is the last step of the risk assessment process; in this step, decisions are made
about how to deal with the specific risks. A basic question needs to be answered for every
single risk:
Is it necessary to treat this risk?
A risk does not necessarily need to be treated, accepting it might be an option as well. If it is
treated or not, cannot be answered by the analyst alone, the board of an institution needs to be
involved as well. Usually, acceptability levels are set independently from a single analysis when
defining the context of the risk management process. For risks, which are not unacceptable,
the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) principle can be used:
ALARP is a widely used principle in risk management [Melchers, 2001]. When a risk level
is neither unacceptable nor acceptable (Fig. 1.3), it should be reduced as low as reasonably
practicable; this means that the costs to reduce a risk should not be grossly disproportional
to the gains obtained [Aven, 2011]. However, neither disproportion nor gains of a measure
are a clearly defined term. The limits for these regions (acceptable, ALARP, unacceptable) are
usually predefined by the board of an institution in order to have the same scale for all risk
analyses.
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Figure 1.3 – A sample risk matrix illustrating the three regions of risk treatment.
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1.2.5 Risk Treatment
As a result of the risk assessment procedure, priorities are set in which order the different
risks need to be treated. As a next step of the risk management workflow, possible corrective
measures are identified and the resources for risk treatment are allocated.
When the decision is made to treat a risk, possible corrective measures must be determined
and evaluated. How numerous the alternatives of measures are relies highly on what moment
the risk assessment is performed: if the assessment is done in an early design stage, different
alternatives exist compared to a late assessment. Usually, a prevention of an accident is
more favorable than the protection from possible consequences. Corrective measures try to
influence one factor contributing to the risk, for example lower the probability or reducing the
severity of an unwanted event. A systematical determination of the factors can be achieved by
the Strategical, Technical, Organizational and Personal (STOP) approach:
STOP is a systematic approach to determine possible corrective measures for a hazard
[SUVA, 2004]. Four different classes of measures help to find possible alternatives:
• Strategical measures aim to modify a process to reduce a risk (e.g. substitute a hazardous
element of a process to a less hazardous one).
• Technical measures can be applied to protect an exposed target against the conse-
quences of a hazard (e.g. sprinkler system against fire) or to reduce the occurrence of an
adverse event by technical installations.
• Organizational measures modifying the organizational elements around a certain pro-
cess; evacuation plans, response techniques, work instructions and training can lower
the occurrences of unwanted events and their possible consequences.
• Personal measures are directly applied to the persons involved in a process. This could
be personal protective equipment or training of the exposed personnel.
Once the alternatives for all risks are found, the allocation of the resources is done. A common
approach to do so is to decide based on the risk scores and reduce the most important risks
present. However, a risk reduction only based on risk scores is not leading to ideal results;
financial concerns need to be considered as well to have a optimal resource allocation [Aven,
2011]. Additionally, the risk reduction potential of every corrective measure can be taken into
account to reach a better allocation of measures [Cox, 2012]. Other approaches are using
optimization algorithms to achieve an optimal resource allocation [Reniers and Sörensen,
2013]. A more detailed discussion about resource allocation can be found in Chapter 2.6.
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1.2.6 Risk Control
In order to ensure that the corrective measures are effective and efficient, they must be
controlled regularly. This includes obtaining further information about the hazard, the risk,
and the control itself. This information can improve further risk assessments and show if the
measure works as intended. Accident data and especially near misses are of high importance
to do so. The results must be periodically analyzed and the insights recorded in a systematic
way.
1.2.7 Risk Documentation
Risk documentation is a central element in the iterative risk management process. On one
side, the documentation is necessary for giving information to all roles involved in the process.
This includes all the details of the evaluation and the action plan to implement corrective
measures. On the other side, an effective documentation helps to re-use information for future
analyses, training, and helps keeing track about costs and efforts.
1.2.8 Risk Communication
Risk communication is of high importance for every risk management approach and has a
superior function. By communicating evaluations results to all the involved roles, it helps them
to understand the decisions made and to include the expertise of all stakeholders. However,
the communication is not only limited to the distribution of information, but also allows
external knowledge to influence the context of a risk management approach.
1.2.9 Continuous Improvement
As for most management approaches, continuous improvement is an integral part of risk
management. A widely applied principle of continuous improvement is the Deming wheel
(see Figure 1.4), also known as PDCA cycle (Plan – Do – Check – Act). This principle describes
process optimization based on following four iterative steps:
• Plan: development of objectives and actions necessary to achieve these objectives.
• Do: execution of the planed actions and collection of data.
• Check: monitoring of the actions to check their effectiveness (e.g. with audits and
inspections) and evaluation of the results.
• Act: carrying out of improvements, if the results of the planed process and the results
differ.
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Figure 1.4 – Continuous improvement can be achieved by iteration of the Deming wheel and
consolidating through standardization.
The continuous improvement is achieved by iterating the steps of the Deming cycle and
consolidating the achieved results through standardization. For risk management, the results
are of the procedure are analyzed and decisions to improve the process are defined. According
to the PCDA principle, the optimization is performed in an iterative process and guarantees
the suitability of a risk management approach.
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1.3 Risk Assessment Methods
Most steps of the risk management process are important on an organizational level only: how
to define the system, how the risks are treated and monitored. These steps are not bound to a
specific application and are interchangeable on many levels. In contrary, the risk assessment
acts as a core part and should be suited for a specific application. Many approaches have
been suggested to perform this process; they mainly differ in their focus. Some methods
concentrate on components of a system, whereas others point out possible deviations. Most
of these risk assessment approaches were specifically created for a certain field of application;
the use in another environment was not intentioned. However, most methods spread from
one field to other fields of application and were successfully applied. In this section, various
widely used approaches will be discussed and their feasibility for the research environment is
explained in detail.
1.3.1 Classification of Methods
Even though most risk assessment approaches share similar goals, the approaches differ
significantly. This includes not only the result obtained by the different methods, it also
includes the inputs, requirements, workflows, and other aspects. Some methods focus on the
consequences of an event (inductive), where other methods are are trying to determine the
influence factors leading to this specific unwanted event (deductive). Some use statistical
reliability data to calculate possible scenarios (quantitative), others rely on linguistic expert
judgements (qualitative). The qualitative approaches require more data, but usually provide a
higher level of detail. Thus, the complexity of the analysis and the demands for the analyst
are increasing. Most factors are somehow connected, but not all of them are necessarily
dependent. A method can provide a high level of detail without giving exact probability
estimations. Besides of the mentioned attributes, the methods differ as well in their scope:
some target components of a process, others aim to find hazards and risks in the activities
involved. The required performance or level of detail can also vary depending on other
considerations: either the method is used as a primary safety tool or is used as a backup to find
unknown hazards. Another important factor is in which phase the risk assessment method
is involved during the development cycle of a process; in the initial design phase, corrective
measures can be applied much more effective than in the operation phase.
To characterize the different methods, they are compared using the criteria represented in
Table 1.1.
1.3.2 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
Overview The HAZOP was introduced by the Imperial Chemical Industry (ICI) in the late
1960s to assess safety risks in chemical process plants. The method as it is known today was
published by Lawley of ICI Petrochemicals in 1974 and became a widely used technique in
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Table 1.1 – Criteria to compare the different risk assessment methods.
Requirements Approach
Data
Difficulty
Complexity
Expertise
Time
Form
Level of detail
Direction
Focus
Phase
the chemical process industry worldwide after the Flixborough disaster in 1974 [Meyer and
Reniers, 2013]. Due to the popularity in the chemical industry, other industries adopted this
technique, such as the petroleum industry, the food industry and many others [Ericson, 2005;
Hashemi-Tilehnoee et al., 2009].
Since the technique is widely used in different fields of industry, commercial software is
available and research is performed to improve the results. Publications about applications of
HAZOP reaches from nuclear engineering to computational methods [Dunjó et al., 2010]. The
research mainly focusses on quantification of the different risks, extending the identification
scope or the integration of human factors in the analysis [Dunjó et al., 2010].
Table 1.2 shows the classification attributes of the HAZOP approach. The main characteristics
are the low amount of data necessary and the low difficulty; on the contrary, a high level
of system expertise is necessary. The effect of the deviations are difficult to estimate and
much expertise is necessary to do so. The strict and systematic approach can lead to a high
complexity level and is therefore relatively time consuming. The approach focusses on the
function of system elements and their possible deviations. It is usually applied in the system
design or in the detailed design phase.
Table 1.2 – HAZOP specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data Moderate
Difficulty Low
Complexity High
Expertise System/technique
Time High
Form Qualitative
Level of detail Moderate
Direction Inductive
Focus Functional deviations
Phase System/detailed design
Principles HAZOP analysis is a technique developed for identifying and analyzing hazards
and operational concerns of a system [Ericson, 2005]. If a system works as intended, the
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situation is expected to be safe and therefore no accidents will occur. In contrast to this, system
deviations are seen as sources of hazards. To systematically determine those deviations, the
system is divided into the different system parameters, such as measurable physical quantities,
operations or actions (e.g. temperature, stirring, stop). Those parameters are combined with
predefined keywords (more, less, no) to find possible deviations of the normal operation. The
basic principle of every HAZOP analysis therefore is:
parameter + keyword = deviation
These conditions will be analyzed for possible causes and consequences and corrective mea-
sures will be defined to avoid the hazardous condition. Usually, most combinations of param-
eters and keywords are not making sense and can be discarded.
Advantages and disadvantages The basic principle of HAZOP can easily be learned and
performed. The application to a system however needs deep knowledge of the system to
estimate the impact of possible deviations. The system needs to be studied with a team of
experts and a HAZOP moderator to reach a complete analysis. This team effort can bring
many different points of view on one hand, but is very resource-demanding on the other hand.
Even though the technique is able to identify a high amount of possible hazards, these hazards
lie in the predefined system boundaries and hazards unrelated to deviations can be overseen.
Table 1.3 – Advantages and disadvantages of HAZOP (from Ericson [2005], p.376).
Advantages Disadvantages
Easily learned and performed
Does not require technical expertise for ap-
plication
Rigor focussing on system elements and
hazards
Team effort with many viewpoints
Commercial software available
Focusses only on single events
Possible overlook of hazards unrelated to a
key word
Training is essential for optimal results
Time consuming und thus expensive
Application at the research environment Even though HAZOP is a very systematic and
widely used approach, it cannot be applied to the academic research environment without
limitations. Some specifications would fit the academic environment well: the moderate
amount of required data and the low difficulty, which makes it easy to learn and perform. On
the other hand, the concept of deviations, which is crucial for the HAZOP procedure is hardly
applicable to the research environment. The equipment is often only in experimental state
and knowledge about possible deviations is often not existing. Additionally, the high demands
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for both manpower and time would not fit the limited resources of this environment. The focus
on key words and single events are another problem when applying this method to research
laboratories, since the accidents are often caused by complex sequences of independent
events.
1.3.3 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
Overview The technique originates from the US Army and was first published as a Military
procedure MIL-P-1629 U.S. Department of Defense [1949] under the name “Procedures for
Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis". From a Military use, the Failure
Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) made its way to the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), where it was used for aerospace and rocket development
[Ericson, 2005]. In the 1970s, FMECA was introduced in the automobile industry by Ford
Motor Company; today, general guidelines developed by the three U.S. auto makers are used
worldwide in various fields of industry [Meyer and Reniers, 2013]. Depending if the approach
is explicitly including the criticality or not, it is called FMECA or Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA). Since the basic structure is similar, most statements in this section are valid
for both approaches.
FMECA is applied in numerous fields, such as the food industry [Scipioni et al., 2002] and
nuclear engineering [Guimarães and Lapa, 2007]. As for HAZOP, this technique is widely
used and commercial and non-commercial software is available. Most research concerning
FMECA goes in the direction of improving the quantification approach, for example with the
implementation of a Fuzzy Logic calculation method [Keskin and Özkan, 2009; Zaili et al.,
2009] or other mathematical improvements [Bluvband et al., 2004].
As represented in Table 1.4, the FMECA approach is a relatively flexible approach, still capable
of providing an in-depth analysis of a system. The complexity and the difficulty of the method
are moderate; however, a high level of system expertise is necessary. Other than HAZOP,
FMECA includes the criticality as a quantitative element; nevertheless, the estimation enables
only rough estimations rather than precise analyses and is therefore a semi-quantitative
method. A main characteristic of the method is the variability of the scope: it is possible to
focus on components, on functions or on both. It is usually applied in the detailed design
phase.
Principles The main interest of a FMECA procedure is what elements of a system can fail,
how they will fail and how frequently these failures will occur. After the system and its limits are
determined, it will be divided into all relevant elements. In a functional approach, the division
is based on the specific functionalities and sub-functionalities. In a structural approach, the
division is focused on the structures of the system, e.g. components and parts, regardless of
their specific function group. Which approach to chose depends on the development progress
and the knowledge of the system: if the function of a specific group of components is not
22
1.3. Risk Assessment Methods
Table 1.4 – FMECA specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data Moderate
Difficulty Moderate
Complexity Moderate
Expertise System (high level)
Time High
Form Semi-quantitative
Level of detail In-depth
Direction Inductive
Focus Variable
Phase Detailed design
known, a functional approach is not possible. After the system elements are determined,
they are usually transcribed into a matrix-like worksheet. Many different FMECA worksheet
formats have been proposed, depending on what field of application the procedure will be
applied. An example of such a worksheet can be found in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5 – Example FMECA worksheet.
Component Failure Failure Causal Immediate System RPN Method of
mode rate factors effect effect detection
Depending on the specific worksheet, different information is collected or estimated for
each single element of the system. This includes possible failure modes, causal factors,
immediate effects and effects on the whole. Once the hazard scenarios are collected, the risks
are evaluated. The prioritization of the risks can be done using the Risk Priority Number (RPN),
which is a multiplication of the risk dimension values (Severity, Occurrence and Detection).
This value however, is more suited for reliability analyses than system safety and has certain
limitations (see Chapter 2.4.2). Another way of expressing the system’s failure probability in
this approach is the failure rate of an element. As a last step, possible corrective measures are
suggested.
Advantages and disadvantages The FMECA approach is easily understood and inexpensive
to perform; nevertheless, it can lead to meaningful results. It can predict the reliability of
the analyzed item by focussing on the different system elements and their influence on the
system itself. Due to the simplicity, various software applications that allow FMECA analysis
exist. Like many other risk analysis techniques, FMECA declines to analyze a combination
of failures. Additionally, hazards that are not related to failure modes are not detected. Since
human errors and other external influences are not considered as failure modes, all hazards
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resulting form those influences are not considered either. Even though the procedure itself
can easily be learned, it requires a certain expertise about the system to be analyzed.
Table 1.6 – Advantages and disadvantages of FMECA (from Ericson [2005], p.255).
Advantages Disadvantages
Easily understood and performed
Inexpensive to perform, yet provides mean-
ingful results
Provides rigor for focusing the analysis
Provides a reliability prediction of the item
being analyzed
Commercial software available
Focuses on single failure rather than failure
mode combinations
Not designed to identify hazards unrelated
to failure modes
Provides limited examination of human er-
ror
Provides limited examination of external
influences and interfaces
Requires expertise on the product or pro-
cess under analysis
Application at the research environment As the HAZOP procedure, the FMECA would fit
the academic environment due to the ease of use and the low complexity of the process itself,
while still producing meaningful results. Additionally, the semi-quantitative character could
be applied in a beneficial way in this environment, since statistical data about accidents or
reliability data are only hardly available for this setting. Even though the approach is not
complex, the requirements are relatively high in terms of time and expertise, which would
make an application in research laboratories difficult. Furthermore, the FMECA approach is
not designed to identify hazards unrelated to failure modes, human error, and external influ-
ences. Human errors however are an important source for accidents in research laboratories.
Other than clearly defined processes, scientific research is often connected to experimental
equipment, unknown processes and other unknown variables.
1.3.4 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Overview The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) approach was developed by Bell Laboratories for
use on the Minuteman Guidance System (intercontinental ballistic missile) [Ericson, 2005].
Boeing realized the potential of the FTA approach and applied it on the whole development of
the Minutemen Weapon System. The technique was so successful in this application, that it
spread to the non-military sector of Boeing and from there to various other fields of industry,
such as the nuclear power industry.
Due to the quantitative aspect of the FTA approach, it is used mainly in industries, where
reliability data is available and a high safety level must be achieved, e.g. nuclear power industry,
aeronautical industry, chemical industry and military industry. The method itself does not
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leave room for substantial changes, therefore the research done concerning FTA is either about
applications [Park and Lee, 2009] or about enhancements [Doytchev and Szwillus, 2009]. A
main characteristic of the approach is the need for quantitative data; for making the method
accessible for less data-based applications, the use of Fuzzy Logic [Markowski et al., 2009] or
semi-quantitative approaches [Hauptmanns, 2004] were suggested.
Table 1.7 – FTA specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data High
Difficulty Moderate
Complexity High
Expertise System (high level)
Time Very high
Form Quantitative
Level of detail Moderate to in-depth
Direction Deductive
Focus Events
Phase System design
Table 1.7 gives an overview of the main characteristics of the FTA approach. A main attribute
is the quantitative part of the approach. This requires a high amount of data and system
expertise, and is therefore able to provide an in-depth analysis of the system. Another crucial
element of the FTA approach is the focussing on events, rather than components or functions.
It is usually applied in the system design phase.
Principles As a first step for the FTA procedure, an undesired top event is defined. In a
treelike structure, events that can lead to this top event are defined and linked via Boolean
logic (e.g. AND, OR, etc.). In the same manner, these events are explained via sub-events, until
a basic level of events is reached. For each basic event, a probability value is assigned and the
probabilities of every event in the tree are calculated. In a next step cut sets are defined. Cut
sets are combinations of independent basic events, which might lead to the undesired top
event. This is the main delivery of the FTA procedure: by knowing the cut sets, an analyst has
a good overview about possible failure paths, can detect weak elements in the system and can
apply corrective measures. In Figure 1.5, a short example of a FTA is given.
Advantages and disadvantages The FTA procedure has numerous advantages and is there-
fore a very solid and widely used method for risk analysis. The approach itself is methodical,
rigorous, structured, and can be learned relatively easily. Even though having clear struc-
tures, the technique allows to perform analysis on various levels of processes and systems.
Another advantage is the visual presentation of the results, which allows to model complex
relationships in an understandable manner. The technique is not limited to process bound-
aries; therefore, it supports to factor in human errors and other influences. Additionally, it
is scientifically sound, since it is based on widely applied mathematical approaches, such
as Boolean algebra and probability theory. On the other hand, the method can easily be-
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Figure 1.5 – Example of a FTA tree including probability calculations (from Meyer and Reniers
[2013], Fig. 4.22, p. 125).
come time consuming and rather the goal than the tool. Additionally, it requires training and
practical experiences to perform the analysis.
Application at the research environment A main reason to apply FTA to the research envi-
ronment is its focus on events and the possibility to include hardware, software, environment
and human interactions. Another benefit of the method is the clear and rigorous structure of
the approach, which would facilitate an adoption into academic safety framework. On the
other hand, the method demands resources, which are usually not available in this environ-
ment. The amount of data which is required does not fit the provided information for this
setting. Furthermore, causal event paths might not be obvious in laboratories, which makes it
hard to generate a fault tree diagram.
1.3.5 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Overview The Event Tree Analysis (ETA) most probably originates from the nuclear power
industry as a side product of a complex FTA analysis [Ericson, 2005]. This analysis became
too cumbersome and the new ETA approach was established to lower the level of complexity.
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Table 1.8 – Advantages and disadvantages of FTA (shortened version of Ericson [2005], p.219).
Advantages Disadvantages
Structured, rigorous and methodical ap-
proach
Can be effectively performed on varying
levels of design detail
Visual model displays cause - effect rela-
tionship
Relatively easy to learn, do and follow
Models complex system relationships in an
understandable manner
Combines hardware, software, environ-
ment, and human interactions
Scientifically sound: based on probability
theory and Boolean algebra
Can easily become time consuming
Can become the goal rather than the tool
Modeling sequential timing and repair is
more difficult
Modeling multiple phases is more difficult
Requires an analyst with some training and
practical experience
Therefore, the ETA approach is often coupled with the FTA approach, also called bow tie
approach.
Due to the relation to the FTA approach, ETA is used in similar industries: for example nuclear
power industry, aeronautical industry, chemical industry and military industry. ETA in general
has applications in fields, where consequence modeling or corrective measure design is of high
importance. As FTA, the method does not leave room for substantial changes. As for many
other quantitative risk assessment techniques, the research is aiming to make the approach
accessible to applications with fewer available data, e.g. with uncertainty improvements and
the use of Fuzzy Logic [You and Tonon, 2012; Ferdous et al., 2011].
Table 1.9 – ETA specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data High
Difficulty Moderate
Complexity Moderate
Expertise Technique (high level)
Time Moderate
Form Quantitative
Level of detail Moderate to in-depth
Direction Inductive
Focus Consequences
Phase Detailed design
Table 1.9 shows the main attributes of the ETA approach. The technique uses an inductive
approach and focuses on consequences of events. As FTA, ETA provides a high flexibility
concerning the level of detail. However, the method requires a high level of expertise and a
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high amount of data, due to the quantitative estimation of consequence probability.
Principles The ETA approach starts at the point, where a FTA ends: the undesired event. In
a binary mode, possible consequences of this event and further consequences are determined.
After the initiating event is defined, pivotal events are identified (see Figure 1.6). Those pivotal
events are often related to safety barriers and describe function or disfunction of them. In this
manner, the event tree is built and probabilities for the pivotal events are determined. When
knowing all the scenarios, the possible outcomes are judged according to their probability and
their severity in oder to estimate the risk. Based on this evaluation, possible improvements of
the safety barriers are suggested and the process is documented.
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Figure 1.6 – Example of an ETA tree (from Meyer and Reniers [2013], Fig. 4.23, p. 128).
Advantages and disadvantages The FTA procedure shares many advantages with the re-
lated ETA approach: a logical, structured approach that is able to display cause and effect
relationships. Like FTA, it is relatively easy to learn and understand, but requires a certain
amount of experience to be applied. It provides a solid probability assessment and is able to
combine hardware, software, environment and human interactions. On the other hand, it
models only single events, which makes it impossible to evaluate consequences that originate
from a combination of events.
Application at the research environment The ETA technique has the same benefits for the
research setting as the related FTA approach: it is a highly structured approach, relatively
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Table 1.10 – Advantages and disadvantages of ETA (shortened version of Ericson [2005], p.233).
Advantages Disadvantages
Structured, rigorous and methodical ap-
proach
Can be effectively performed on varying
levels of design detail
Visual model displays cause - effect rela-
tionship
Relatively easy to learn, do and follow
Models complex system relationships in an
understandable manner
Combines hardware, software, environ-
ment, and human interactions
Permits probability assessment
Unable to model multiple, dependent
events
Possible overlook of system dependencies
Partial successes/failures are not distin-
guishable
Requires an analyst with some training and
practical experience
easy to perform and learn and able to factor in human interactions into the analysis. Other
than the FTA it is less complex and the requirements are lower, which would suit the provided
resources at universities. Additionally, the focus on consequences and on safety barriers could
bring advantages in this result-oriented environment. However, other characteristics makes
the method less suited for research laboratories, such as the quantitative risk estimation or
the fact that is not possible to model dependent events.
1.3.6 Job Safety Analysis (JSA)
Overview Job Safety Analysis (JSA), which is also known as Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), is a
simple risk assessment technique originating from the construction industry [Rozenfeld et al.,
2010]. It is widely used in fields where tasks are standardized and influence factors are limited,
such as construction industry or the steel industry. The simplicity of the method makes it
hardly applicable to complex systems and therefore only few enhancements exist. Checklist
based risk assessment approaches are closely related to this approach.
An overview of the characteristics is given in Table 1.11. Due to the low level of detail provided
by the analysis, the complexity is kept low and the requirements in general are limited as well.
However, the method does require a certain amount of knowledge of the studied system. The
focus is very variable and not limited to a certain systematic approach. It is usually applied in
the operation phase.
Principles The main idea of the JSA approach is to use existing procedures to assign hazards
to a specific job. It is important to develop a complete job portfolio and not only focus on
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Table 1.11 – JSA specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data Low to moderate
Difficulty Low
Complexity Low
Expertise System (moderate)
Time Low
Form Qualitative
Level of detail Low
Direction Deductive
Focus Variable
Phase Operation
single activities. This includes peripheral activities related to a job, such as maintenance,
interruptions, planing and other related tasks. As a first step, different resources are con-
sulted to list all activities, equipment and materials related to a job. These resources are
for example Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), worker information, accident data, and
insurance information. Once all the components are defined, possible hazards are found
using a brainstorming procedure with certain questions (e.g. “Can special deviations occur
caused by this type of equipment?" ). The hazards are then analyzed, the risks evaluated and
possible corrective measures are suggested.
Advantages and disadvantages The main advantage of the JSA is the simplicity of the ap-
proach. Therefore it is inexpensive to perform, but still provides valuable information gathered
from different influences. The method highly relies on experience. On one side, this can be an
advantage, since it is able to focus on more important aspects of safety. On the other hand, this
might be a disadvantage as well: it could happen, that the analysis brings no new information
and it is only done to achieve an illusion of safety.
Table 1.12 – Advantages and disadvantages of JSA [Harms-Ringdahl, 2003].
Advantages Disadvantages
Easily understood and performed
Inexpensive to perform
Based on experience
Inclusion of various influences
No systematic approach to identify hazards
Possible that it provides no new informa-
tion
Application at the research environment Other than the other methods presented in this
section, the JSA approach fits the available resources of the academic research environment:
it is easily understood and learned, inexpensive to perform and not time consuming. Further-
more, it is very flexible concerning the included variables, which would fit the experimental
nature of most processes. On the other hand, the lack of systematics and the fact that it is
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based on experience could make an application cumbersome. A qualitative approach might
not be enough for the complexity of the risks which scientist are facing in the laboratories.
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1.4 Methodological Overview
The selected and discussed approaches differ significantly in how they assess risks. In order
to characterize the methods, the following dimensions are used: inputs (requirements) and
outputs (results). These inputs and outputs are depending on and affecting each other. A
method which requires more data and is more difficult to perform usually leads to a more
detailed analysis; however, a linear relation between these dimensions cannot be established.
They way the approaches deal with the data makes them more or less favorable for a specific
area of application application. In order to evaluate which characteristics suits the academic
research environment, the different aspects of the inputs and outputs are discussed in detail
in this chapter. As a conclusion, the requirements for a risk assessment technique for research
and teaching laboratories are postulated.
1.4.1 Inputs
The first part of the methodological analysis deals with the input of a method. The require-
ments differ significantly and define if the method is suited for a specific environment. Table
1.13 gives an overview of the requirements of the presented methods. The requirements are
interdependent and overlap to some extent.
Table 1.13 – Different risk assessment approaches compared based on their resource require-
ment.
Method Data Difficulty Complexity Expertise Time
HAZOP Moderate Low High System/technique High
FMECA Moderate Moderate Moderate System (high level) High
FTA High Moderate High System (high level) Very High
ETA High Moderate Moderate Technique (high level) Moderate
JSA Low/moderate Low Low System (moderate) Low
A first type of requirements is the information necessary for an analysis. Each method requires
information about the process (data, expertise): for example workflows, SOP, accident data,
or schemes of systems. Some methods require more information, such as the FTA or the
ETA approach, others require less, such as the JSA. The academic research environment does
not provide a high amount of data due to its specificities, such as the experimental state
of the equipment and the use of not completely investigated technologies. For this reason,
approaches such as FTA and ETA are not suitable for this environment a less information
demanding technique should be used.
A second type of requirements includes the qualification of an analyst performing the assess-
ments (difficulty, complexity and expertise). Even if a method is easy to learn and to perform,
it might require a certain amount of experience to detect the most of the possible hazards.
An example of this kind of approaches is the HAZOP technique: the combination of system
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parameters and key words is easy to execute, but it needs experience to estimate the impact on
a system. Usually, the safety related issues in a laboratory are done by scientists as side tasks.
Therefore, training of complex and difficult methods is not realistic in this environment and a
high level of experience in a method is most likely not obtainable by an individual scientist.
A suitable method should be simple to learn and to perform, while not needing too much
experience in performing the method.
A last type of requirements indicates how much time an analysis needs in order to be per-
formed. Most presented techniques require a high amount of time. An estimation of time
required for a single analysis for these methods can be found in Table 1.14 [Harms-Ringdahl,
2003]. For an industrial process, it might be appropriate to use several weeks for a risk as-
sessment, since the process is most likely to be operated for years. In scientific research
laboratories however, processes underlie rapid developments and are constantly changing
their scopes. Therefore, a risk assessment method for this environment should be performable
in a reasonable amount of time.
Table 1.14 – Different risk assessment methods, their time and their information requirements
[Harms-Ringdahl, 2003].
Method Time for analysis Information needed
(rough indication)
HAZOP 1-2w Detailed
FMECA 1d-2w Detailed
FTA 1d-4w Detailed
ETA 4d-2w Detailed
JSA 2h-2d Moderate
1.4.2 Outputs
The second part of the methodological analysis deals with the output of a method. This
includes not only the result of a method but also the way how they identify the hazards and
assess the risks. A first characteristic is the direction of an analysis: approaches are either per-
formed in a inductive or in a deductive way. Inductive methods begin with an initiating event
and evaluate possible consequences of this event. On the contrary, deductive approaches start
with an undesired event and detect possible causes leading to it. For the academic research
setting, an deductive method could be more advantageous, since consequences might be
difficult to determine in this environment. On the other hand, inductive methods facilitate
the application of corrective measures. The most favorable solution is a hybrid-method,
combining both inductive and deductive approaches.
Quantitative aspects are not only related to the inputs of an approach but also to the outputs.
They are interdependent and quantitative results cannot be achieved with qualitative inputs
only. A method such as the FTA approach can be applied without quantitative data; it still
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shows causal relationships between events, but loses the main advantage of delivering accident
probabilities. For the academic research settings, quantitative data (e.g. reliability studies) is
often not available. A method for risk assessment should therefore focus on less quantitative
aspects in order to avoid a lack of data. An ideal compromise is the use of a semi-quantitative
approach, like the FMECA method is using.
The level of detail and the focus of an assessment are the last aspects related to the results of a
technique. The focus defines how the system is divided into its different elements and has a
high impact on what is identified and how this is done. In terms of hazard identification, the
focus of an approach is the most important aspect, since it determines the yield of identified
hazards. Techniques which are too inflexible about their focus can overlook existing hazards.
HAZOP for example is not able to identify hazards outside of the defined system. Such
functional deviations are difficult to determine for research laboratories, since functions are
often not clearly defined for experimental processes. On the other hand, approaches with no
systematic hazard identification are often experience driven, such as the JSA approach, and
tend to overlook hazards as well. An optimal hazard identification process for the research
setting is structured, but flexible, such as the hazard identification approach of FMECA. The
level of detail is affected by the choice of focus and depends on the available information of a
system.
Table 1.15 – Different risk assessment approaches compared based on their technical specifi-
cations.
Method Form Level of detail Direction Focus Phase
HAZOP Qualitative Moderate Inductive Deviations Design
FMECA Semi-quantitative In-depth Inductive Variable Design
FTA Quantitative Mod./in-depth Deductive Events Design
ETA Quantitative Mod./in-depth Inductive Consequences Design
JSA Qualitative Low Deductive Variable Operation
1.4.3 Requirements of the Research Environment
None of the presented methods can be directly applied to the academic research environment
without limitations. Most of them have characteristics which would fit to this environment,
but each of them has drawbacks which makes an application hardly possible. Table 1.16 gives
an overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of the presented methods for
the use in the research setting. The HAZOP approach has the advantage of having a structured
and systematical approach, while not being complicated to learn and to apply. The method
however can become very resource demanding: a trained and experienced expert is necessary
as well as a relatively high amount of time per process. The structured FMECA approach
uses a semi-quantitative scale for risk estimation, which would suit the lack of data in this
environment. Unfortunately, the approach focusses on failure modes and single events and
is therefore not suitable, since failure modes can be hardly determinable for experimental
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equipment. Both FTA and ETA visualize complex relationships and focus on events rather than
components or functions. Nevertheless, both methods demand a high amount of resources
and are not capable of model dependent events, which is crucial for a risk assessment in the
research environment. Concerning the demands of resources, the JSA approach suits this
environment best: it is easy to learn, to apply, and flexible about the focus of the analysis.
However, the method is not very profound and the analysis might lack the required level of
detail.
Table 1.16 – Advantages and disadvantages of the presented risk assessment techniques for
the use in the research environment.
Method Advantages Disadvantages
HAZOP Structured and easy to learn approach Ressource demanding
FMECA Semi-quantitative approach Limited to failure modes
FTA Visualizes complex relationships Resource demanding
ETA Consequence focussed Unable to model dependent events
JSA Flexible and easy approach Superficial
In order to perform a risk assessment in the research environment, an adaption of an existing
method or a development of a new method is necessary. As a deduction of the discussion
in this chapter, the ideal specifications for such a method are represented in Table 1.17.
However, these specifications are interdependent; a method usually requires a certain input
for delivering a specific output. Those considerations influenc the specifications and should
be acquirable by an appropriate method.
The method should be relatively undemanding in terms of resources. For most processes and
pieces of equipment, statistical data only hardly exists due to their experimental disposition.
Additionally, not all the effects on a system originating from these components are fully
determined. The method should therefore deliver meaningful results while not requiring to
much data. The demands for manpower should also be low, since experts are hardly available
and most scientists are not experienced in performing risk assessments. Thus, the complexity
of the the analysis should stay on a lower level; higher levels of complexity are usually time
demanding and often linked to intensive analyses. The required expertise regarding the
system however should be high enough to produce meaningful results, but low enough to fit
the available system expertise in this setting. Scientific research often underlies rapid changes
and is very flexible in terms of reorientation. Due to this, the risk assessment procedure should
be performable in a reasonable amount of time.
The requirements define the results of a method; a quantitative approach is hardly possible
with the amount of delivered data. A semi-quantitative approach is an ideal solution for
this dilemma: delivering a sound base for decision making while not being too resource
demanding. A high level of details is not absolutely necessary for this environment. Procedures
and equipment can change constantly and the level of detail has to be kept low and focused on
the most important components rather than going too much into detail. Since the procedures,
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the equipment, and the material vary depending on the fields of research, the approach needs
a certain flexibility in the focus. This affects the way how the processes are divided into their
components: depending on the situation, the causal chain or the consequences of an event
need to be modeled. Therefore, an ideal approach allows to adapt the focus and to perform an
analysis in an inductive or a deductive way. Additionally, the technique should be effective
when applied in the operation phase, since most processes in this setting are not examined in
a design phase.
Table 1.17 – Ideal specifications of a risk assessment approach for the academic research
environment.
Requirements Approach
Data Low to moderate
Difficulty Low
Complexity Low
Expertise System (moderate)
Time Low
Form Semi-quantitative
Level of detail Moderate
Direction Hybrid
Focus Variable
Phase Operation
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1.5 Risk Management for the Research Environment
For the industrial sector, many risk management techniques have been presented, discussed
and widely applied in different fields. For the academic research environment however, hardly
any method has been suggested and none of them has gained wide acceptance. Universities
as employers have legal obligations to take care of the health of their employees. In most cases,
this is achieved by Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) services and by regulations matching
the particular legislation of a country. As a development of these internal regulations, different
impulses were presented in the literature to systematize safety intentions and to decrease
the accident rates [Foster, 2004; Ferjencik and Jalovy, 2009]. Nevertheless, some impulses
point in the direction of a systematic risk management approach for this environment. In
the following section, these approaches are discussed and their feasibility according to the
postulated specifications is assessed.
1.5.1 Hazard Identification Algorithm (HIA)
Specifications The method originates from the Ohio Coal Research Center and was pre-
sented by Kremer et al. [2009]. The authors locate a problematic combination in the fact, that
there is a necessity for risk analysis due to newly developed processes and the absence of
experience concerning common risk analysis techniques. The main motivation to develop
this method was to give the scientists a simple tool to perform risk analyses without the need
of being trained as safety specialists. The approach is developed for the field of chemical
engineering.
The technique is a checklist-based algorithm, which guides the scientist through a set of
questions. The scope of an evaluation is a new process and the hazards are assessed not as
single hazards, but as a set of hazards. The questions are categorized into five categories based
on Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) guidelines, safety manuals, industry guidelines,
and the existing operational experience:
1. Ergonomics and mechanical hazards
2. Physical hazards
3. Chemical hazards
4. Psychological and organizational hazards
5. Biological hazard
The questions are posed in a general way, such as “Is there any equipment that needs voltage
greater than or equal to 120 Volts?" for the category physical hazards. The algorithm assigns
values to the answers and they are weighted according to predefined prioritizations. The
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mechanism of the algorithm is not visible to the researcher, but the weighting criteria can be
changed according to the needs of a specific institution. The results show critical parts of a
process and point out possible hazards.
Feasibility The approach fits mosts specifications of an ideal risk management technique
for the research environment (1.18). The amount of data required is moderate, the expertise is
limited to the systemic knowledge, and it does not require technical expertise. A scientist with
basic safety knowledge should be able to perform the analysis in a reasonable amount of time.
Additionally, the method delivers a semi-quantitative risk estimation with a reasonable level
of detail. However, the hazard identification is based on regulations and experience in system
safety. Since it is not a systematical approach and based on knowledge, unknown hazards
are hard to determine. The method originates from chemical engineering and is therefore
focused on the application in this field. It should be possible to extend it and apply it in other
fields; this requires changes in the question set according to regulations and experience in
these fields. Important factors, which are implemented in this approach are the psychological
and organizational components. These can become crucial elements, indicating an important
relation between safety culture and hazards.
Table 1.18 – HIA specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data Low to moderate
Difficulty Low
Complexity Low
Expertise System (moderate)
Time Low
Form Semi-quantitative
Level of detail Moderate
Direction -
Focus Hazardous properties
Phase Operation
1.5.2 Lab-HIRA
Specifications The Lab-HIRA method was presented by Leggett [2012] as a method for risk
management in chemical research laboratories. The main procedure consist of three step: a
preliminary hazard analysis called Chemical Hazard Review (CHR), an optional formal risk
review based on the identified hazards, and the development and execution of risk mitigation
measures.
The CHR is a characterization sheet based on properties of the chemicals and the synthesis
involved. As a first part, the physical properties of each single chemical involved are deter-
mined, such as boiling point, legal exposure limits, toxicology information, or the autoignition
temperature. A second part characterizes potentially hazardous conditions related to the syn-
thesis. This includes not only physical conditions but also other aspects, such as formation of
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hazardous functional groups, which are known to lead to an increased instability of a molecule.
According to the information provided in this part, hazardous elements are determined and
thus a basic risk assessment is achieved.
The second step of the approach is an optional formal risk review. This is only recommended
for hazardous elements from the CHR step, which fall into a predefined risk category unac-
ceptable. Lab-HIRA suggest checklist-based methods or HAZOP to do an in-depth analysis of
these elements. The last step of the process is the development of corrective measures, which
are based on the results of the simplified or the enhanced risk assessment.
Feasibility The Lab-HIRA approach has higher requirements than the ones postulated as
ideal for the research setting (Table 1.19). The requirements for the analyst are moderate,
even though the expertise mainly focuses on system knowledge and expertise in the field of
chemistry. The data however is a crucial element of this approach. For basic chemicals data
is widely available, but for intermediate steps of chemical reactions, this data can only be
estimated very roughly. An advantageous characteristic of this approach is the preliminary
hazard analysis which draws attention to potentially more hazardous elements of the system.
A more in-depth risk assessment can evaluate the risks of these elements. The main drawback
of the method is the fact, that it is only focused on and specifically made for laboratory scale
chemical syntheses.
Table 1.19 – Lab-HIRA specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data Moderate to high
Difficulty Moderate
Complexity Moderate
Expertise System (moderate)
Time Moderate
Form Qualitative
Level of detail Moderate
Direction Deductive
Focus Hazardous properties
Phase Operation
1.5.3 Guidelines by the American Chemical Society (ACS)
Specifications The most extensive risk management program for research laboratories was
published by the American Chemical Society [2013] with the title “Identifying and evaluating
hazards in research laboratories". The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
also known as the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) realized the need for an improved risk assess-
ment in research laboratories due to several severe accidents at universities. They asked the
American Chemical Society (ACS) for assistance with developing guidance that would address
this gap. Several factors were considered for this guide, such as follows:
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• To provide techniques to ensure hazard information is gathered and analyzed.
• To aid researchers in recognizing the value of input from others with varying experiences.
• To provide techniques that can be used for a variety of different types of activities.
• To allow for the variable nature of research tasks by providing tools that help researcher
to recognize and response to change - both large and small.
The approach covers the whole risk management process, including the definition of roles and
responsibilities. It also shows the importance of change management in this environment,
since change can be a possible source of hazards. As risk assessment technique, the approach
gives a choice of several methods, which should be applied according to the situation in a
laboratory. The risk assessment methods presented are:
• Control banding: a systematic, qualitative approach which is banding together hazards
and treats them as type of hazards. Chemical safety levels are defined and treated
according to their hazard level. An advantage of this method is the structure which
guides the scientist through the analysis. On the other hand, unknown hazards are
hardly identified with this technique.
• JSA: see subsection 1.3.6.
• What-if analysis: a question-based approach, which guides the risk assessment via
intuitive answering of possible “what-if" questions. To apply some structure to this
approach, a set of questions is provided by the ACS guidelines. The advantage of this
method is the ease of use, while still providing meaningful results for the risk assessment.
• HAZOP: see subsection 1.3.2.
• Checklists: this kind of approach is related to the use of informational job aids called
checklists. The advantage is the ease of use, due to the simple concept of the approach.
On the other hand, the approach highly depends on the quality of the checklists.
The guide gives various templates for risk assessment for these methods, but leaves the
decision, which method to use, to the analyst.
Feasibility The characterization of this method cannot be done in analog way like the other
techniques, since the requirements and the results differ depending on which method is
applied. The risk management from ACS is rather a guidance than a specific risk management
approach. On one hand, this helps the scientist to implement a specific risk assessment
technique according to his needs and gives an overview about the available methods. On
the other hand, the application of industrial risk assessment approaches does not lead to
satisfying results and does not regard the specificities of the research environment.
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Table 1.20 – ACS guidelines specifications.
Requirements Approach
Data Moderate
Difficulty Moderate
Complexity Moderate
Expertise Technique and system
Time Moderate
Form Variable
Level of detail Variable
Direction Variable
Focus Variable
Phase Variable
1.5.4 Conclusions
The risk management techniques differ significantly not only in their approach but also in
their scope. Most techniques focus on a specific field and leave most of the other fields of
academic research unstudied. For the specific field, the methods might work depending on the
available data; however, other fields of the academic research setting are hardly analyzable by
the presented methods. A holistic risk management technique for the research environment
should include all type of laboratories. This is of high importance for the resource allocation:
only if results are comparable, the most important risk of an institution can be evaluated and
the budget can be distributed in an optimal way. Nevertheless, the methods presented in
this section feature important developments which allow the use in this environment. One
example for these development is the use of checklist-like structures for hazard identification
and structuring of the processes. However, a further development is necessary to allow the
identification of unknown hazards.
The existing techniques do not fit the postulated requirements for the research setting. As a
consequence, a holistic risk management method was developed within the framework of this
PhD thesis. This method aims to meet the postulated specifications and includes the most
important features of the methods presented in this chapter.
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2 LARA - Laboratory Assessment and
Risk Analysis
In the previous chapter, the necessity of a risk management technique for the research en-
vironment was explained and the ideal characteristics of such a method were postulated. A
possible solution to fill this gap is the LARA approach. In this chapter, the LARA method will be
explained in detail, including main mechanisms, the cornerstones, and development history.
Supporting information about the method can be found in Appendix B.
2.1 Introduction
Part of the setting for safety management in the research environment is a lack of resources
for safety related issues, no adequate risk management technique, missing statistical data,
and a specific situation, unlike the one in most industries. This specific situation arises from
various influences, which are typical for this environment: constantly evolving processes,
equipment in experimental states, quick changes in research orientation, but also human
factors, such as rapid personnel turnover or a multitude of cultural backgrounds. Furthermore,
universities are not organized like a company in the industry, but rather a conglomerate of
micro-companies; the research groups are not sharing similar objectives and the responsibili-
ties are often not organized on a mutual base. These organizational peculiarities can make
safety efforts cumbersome and less effective. Due to this, a comparison of safety standards
and risks in this environment is complicated and often unsuccessful. To provide a tool for risk
management for universities, the LARA method was initiated and developed. The main goals
of this method are:
• Provide a risk management technique for all types of academic research laboratories.
• Allow a less resource demanding risk management, to fit the provided resources of the
research environment.
• Development of a software application, allowing user-friendly and intuitive risk analysis.
• Consideration of the particular setting of the academic research environment.
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In order to achieve these goals, existing risk management techniques were analyzed and
detailed characteristics for this risk assessment approach were elaborated (see Chapter 1).
The method needs to provide relatively moderate requirements, since data and manpower are
not abound in this environment. Additionally, the provided features should involve flexibility
in level of details and the focus of the analysis.
A fundament for this method was elaborated in previous PhD studies [Ouédraogo, 2011c;
Ouédraogo et al., 2011a,b]. Since the original calculation method was biased from uncertain
expert judgments, a calculation method based on Bayesian networks was introduced and
tested with various examples [Pluess et al., 2013]. Additionally, the resource allocation was
enhanced using a more flexible approach, which is independent from financial considera-
tions and includes the feasibility of measures [Pluess et al., 2014a]. Furthermore, the LARA
method was tested at different universities in comparison with established risk management
techniques [Plu].
The LARA method orientates on the general risk management approach presented in the
previous chapter (Section 1.2). An overview of the workflow is given in Figure 2.1 and every
step will be explained in detail in this chapter. To illustrate the workflow, a step-by-step
demonstration with a brief example is given in Chapter 3.1.
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Figure 2.1 – The detailed workflow of the LARA method. 45
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2.2 Definition of the Context
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Figure 2.2 – Condensed LARA workflow: definition of the context.
As a first step of the risk management workflow, the context on several levels needs to be
established (Figure 2.2). External and internal influences, organizational details, and technical
parameters define a risk management method in different degrees. The broader context
defines the goals and the cornerstones of the risk management approach. Microscopic details
(material, equipment, techniques, etc.) influence a specific situation and need to taken into
account for the risk assessment approach. However, the boarders between the influences are
blurred lines; external, macroscopic influences are able to change the details of an approach in
a similar way as the microscopic fact can change the basic structure of a method. An ideal risk
management method leaves room for these changes, while having clearly defined structures,
which are necessary for to objective and rigorous results. In this section, different aspects of
the context having an influence on the risk management approach LARA is explained in detail.
2.2.1 Macroscopic Context
The broader context provides the base for the LARA method and defines the goals of the
method. Cultural and moral conceptions aim to avoid loss, especially in the form of human
lives. Manifestations of these conceptions are for example regulations related to occupational
health and safety, which are a main influence. Stakeholders’ expectations (internal and
external) are influencing a risk management method and determine what is considered as
possible loss. Not only human beings can be affected by unwanted events, other values
are targets for possible impacts as well: reputation, funding, recruitment, and others. The
peculiarities in this environment originate from the broader context and are an important
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factor for the development of LARA. This context defines the goals for the development of
LARA, the ideal specifications of such a method and technical details, for example what
dimensions are important to consider when analyzing a risk.
2.2.2 Organizational Context
The organizational setting is a second kind of context that influences a risk management
method. Other than the broader context, which influences the basic mechanism of a method,
this context influences organizational details, the roles and responsibilities. An existing
safety framework is an important surrounding for a risk management technique as LARA. At
most universities, an occupational health and safety service defines the safety rules at the
laboratories based on legal regulations, gives safety courses, provides support in technical
questions, and controls all laboratories on regular bases. These existing structures can be used
in a beneficial way for the LARA procedure. For risk management, clear responsibilities and
information flow are crucial for a successful application; due to this LARA is implemented
in this existing framework and uses the responsibilities provided by it. Following roles and
responsibilities are defined and used in the LARA framework (see Figure 2.3):
University
Laws and regulations Stakeholders 
Defines broader context
Institutional administration
Research groups
LARA
Group head
Safety delegate
Lab responsible
Obligations
Timeframes 
Specifications 
Acceptability Limits 
Scientist
Analysis moderators
OSH service
Figure 2.3 – Schematic overview of the roles and responsibilities in the LARA framework.
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Institutional Administration
The institutional administration is the main authority and appoints most parts of the orga-
nizational framework. The willingness of the this role is crucial to set a functioning safety
framework and risk management approach into place and helps to provide a culture of self-
critique in this context. It sets the obligations for the involved roles, validates regulations,
defines timeframes for risk management cycles and the levels of acceptability. The results of
the risk evaluations are reported to the administration for informational purposes.
Occupational Safety and Health Service
Besides of the normal tasks of this service, the support and maintenance of LARA is part of
this service. This includes keeping the databases up-to-date, giving instructions in using
LARA, and adjusting details for optimal performance of the risk management. The service
also practically implements obligations, regulations and timeframes from the institutional
administration; schedules for evaluations and revisions are settled in collaboration with the
research groups. Furthermore, the service keeps track about the risk evaluations, assesses the
progress periodically, and is responsible for the information flow in the system. As a part of
this service, the analysis moderators help users to understand the main principles of LARA
and assist them in doing analyses, when help is needed.
Research Groups
Different roles and responsibilities are present in a research group. At the top of the hierarchy,
the research group head receives the obligations from the institutional administration and
implements them into the structures of the research group; he appoints safety delegates
and laboratory responsible. He is responsible that the regulations are met and receives risk
evaluations for processes performed in the group. The safety delegate is the direct contact
person for the OSH and keeps track about the existing and upcoming projects in the different
laboratories. In collaboration with the OSH service, analyses are scheduled and discussed in
case of irregularities. The last role considered in a research group is the scientist performing
the processes, which makes him the main risk owner in this system. After an introduction
in the use of LARA, he is considered to perform regular risk assessments for his project. The
change management is an important factor; changes in the system should be overviewed and
the risks analyzed accordingly.
2.2.3 Technical Context
Technical context defines the details of LARA, mainly found in the risk assessment. A variety of
different elements can be counted to this context: materials, procedures, infrastructure, and
many others. These elements are represented in the databases used in LARA for classifying the
hazards, possible corrective measures and worsening factors, but also in the risk factors and
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other elements of the risk assessment (see further Sections of this Chapter for more details). A
crucial part of the technical context is the definition of the studied subject. In LARA, a project
is the object of an evaluation (see Figure 2.4). The different activities of a project are analyzed
separately. In practice, a certain flexibility in the definition of these terms is intended in LARA
to fit as many different scenarios as possible.
Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation 
Project
HazardHazardHazardActivities
Laboratory
Project Project ProjectProject
HazardHazardHazardActivities
HazardHazardHazardActivities
HazardHazardHazardActivities
HazardHazardHazardActivities
LARA
Figure 2.4 – Overview of the relationship between project, activity and evaluation in LARA.
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1. Definition of the context
Intention Example (as in Chapter 3.1)
• Selection of the process
• Context description
• Selection of General worsening factors  
(see Chapter 2.4)
• Synthesis of ethyl-(E)-3-(3-nitrophenyl)
acrylate
• Missing safety training 
• Blocked emergency exits
• Missing safety awareness
• Responsibilities unclear
• Overloaded fume hoods
General worsening factors: 2
• Analysis moderator:  David Pluess
• Lab responsible:   Niklaus Hostettler
• Date:    11.12.2014
• Organization unit:  EPFL GSCP
Figure 2.5 – An illustrative example of the steps performed in the LARA workflow. A more
detailed explanation of this example can be found in Chapter 3.1.
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2.3 Hazard Identification
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1. Context definition
2. Hazard identification
3. Risk analysis
4. Risk evaluation
5. Risk treatment
Figure 2.6 – Condensed LARA workflow: hazard identification.
The second step of the LARA workflow aims to identify possible hazards (Figure 2.6). Besides an
exposed target, hazards are a condition that is prerequisite for a risk (see the hazard definition
in Chapter 1.1). A main factor that is influencing the hazard identification is focus of an
analysis. Based on the methodological overview in Chapter 1.4, following types three types of
focuses can be classified:
Characteristics
The characteristics of the involved entities and activities can generate hazards. For objects,
such properties are mostly physical attributes (e.g. flammability, weight for materials, etc.).
For activities however, the hazard is located in the characteristic of it (e.g. jumping can lead
to falling). A crucial part of the focus on characteristics is the decomposition of the process
into the different elements and activities; a method that is aimed at the properties is JSA (see
chapter 1.4). When hazards are assigned to the characteristics of elements and activities, their
specific function in the process is not relevant. An example for this is the use of a flammable
solvent in a chemical reaction: the use of it is due to the solvability, whereas the flammability
is accepted, but not desired.
Function
A different point of view is the focus on functionalities of system elements. For most processes,
deviations from the intended functionalities can lead to hazards. HAZOP (see chapter 1.4) is a
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technique which analyzes the effects of deviations. In this technique, system parameters are
matched with keywords, which are indicating a possible deviation (e.g. “pressure” and “more”).
However, for performing analyses with this kind of focus a high level of system knowledge is
required. Not only knowledge about functionalities of system elements are important, but
also deviations of these functionalities need to be predicted, which is not always obvious.
Event
The last type of hazard analysis focus is aimed at events and their possible outcomes. The
FTA and the related ETA technique are both techniques, which are applying this focus in the
risk assessment. This point of view is not completely separated from the focus on character-
istics or functions; for certain scenarios, the expected consequences are an extrapolation of
characteristics in combination with functions in a system. Additionally, hazard in its basic
meaning as a condition as prerequisite for a risk cannot be met without limitations: events are
incorporating some concepts which are also related to risks (e.g. consequences).
2.3.1 Hazard Identification in LARA
The focus of the hazard identification in LARA needs to be coordinated with the studied activi-
ties and processes. A focus on the function is hardly applicable in the research environment:
functions in experimental processes are not always determinable and experience is necessary
to predict possible deviations. The same aspects also limits the possibility to focus on events
and consequences. Moreover, human interactions and resulting errors are often difficult
to foresee. A focus on characteristic of involved activities is less dependent of experience,
determinable without personal interpretation and can be applied in this environment more
easily than the other approaches.
A tool for analyzing characteristic and matching them with hazards is the checklist approach,
which is used in the JSA procedure and proposed by ACS as one possible method for hazard
identification (see Chapter1). The simplicity allows non-experienced users to perform hazard
identification. However, checklists rely on efforts previously done by experienced analysts
and is not applicable for all scenarios. In addition, the lacking flexibility does not match the
requirements for the research setting. To improve this lack of flexibility, the checklist approach
is enhanced with a database structure to act as a hazard identification tool in LARA. In this
database approach, the determined attributes and characteristics of process elements are
matched with known hazards (see Figure 2.7). In LARA, the user integration is an important
factor; therefore, a suggestion of hazards and possible relations is possible and acts as constant
enhancement of the hazard database.
For this system to work as intended, the database needs to be developed in a logical and
comprehensible manner. Finding hazards and the resulting risks can be an intellectual game
without limitations and even only remotely possible scenarios can be imagined. To keep the
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hazard identification related to the actual tasks and procedures present in laboratories, the
hazards in these are only related to materials, procedures, activities and equipment. Therefore,
possible risks originate from characteristics (flammability, sharp edges, high temperature),
whereas Indirect effects, such as social and psychological hazards are left out in the hazard
database. However, since they can have a important impact on the risk level and on other
hazards, they are integrated as worsening factors (see Chapter 2.4).
A hazard characterization system is developed on following main classes of hazards: biological
hazards, chemical hazards, physical hazards and mechanical hazards. These main classes are
divided into hazards groups, where hazards with similar characteristics are classified. Since
the hazard group non-ionizing and ionizing rays would be a hazard group in a specific hazard
class (physical hazards) but exceed the practicable size of such a group, it is counted as a
hazard class in LARA. The classification is done according to considerations explained in the
further subsection of this chapter.
Process Characteristic Hazard Database
Material 
Equipment
Characteristic 1
Characteristic 2
Characteristic 3
Characteristic 4
Hazard 1
Hazard 2
Hazard 3
Hazard 4
Hazard 5
New Hazard
Figure 2.7 – Overview of the matching between the characteristics and the hazard using a
database.
2.3.2 Chemical Hazards
Millions of chemicals substances are known and used worldwide for a multitude of purposes.
Connected to this use is an exposition to hazards related to these substances. To inform about
these hazards, a united system of labeling of chemical products for safe use, transport and
disposal began its development at the United Nations Rio Conference in 1992. The result
is the Globally Harmonized System of Classification, Labeling and Packaging of Chemicals
(GHS) [United Nations, 2007], which is implemented in the European Union as regulation
for Classification, Labelling, and Packing (CLP). In CLP, the hazards are classified in to three
main groups: physical, health and environmental hazards. The system uses three ways of
signalizing these hazards: pictograms, signal word, and hazard statements. Additionally to
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these easily accessible hazards informations, a detailed Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)
gives information about hazard, risks and precautionary statements. For LARA, the hazard
classification for chemical hazard is based on the GHS principles.
The GHS gives all the possibilities to classify chemicals according to their hazards; however,
for some specific types of chemicals, the properties are not well enough discovered to give
information about possible hazards. Nanoparticles are such a type of chemicals: effects on
the human body are not yet determined for a lot of these compounds. A way of dealing
with nanoparticles is control banding [Groso et al., 2010]. This approach focuses rather on
application of corrective measures and applies them to groups of hazards. Compounds which
are assumed to have certain similar properties are treated in a similar way. The nanoparticles
are added as hazard group in the hazard class chemicals in LARA according to the classification
from Groso et al. [2010]. Table 2.1 gives an overview of this hazard class chemical hazards.
Table 2.1 – Chemical hazards in LARA: hazard groups and hazard examples.
Hazard group Hazard example
Explosives H205: May explode in fire
Flammability H226: Flammable liquid and vapor
Oxidizer H272: May intensify fire; oxidizer
Gases under pressure H280: Contains gas under pressure; may explode if heated
Instability H250: Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air
Corrosive to metal H290: May be corrosive to metals
Inhalation hazard H336: May cause drowsiness or dizziness
Oral hazard H303: May be harmful if swallowed
Skin hazard H310: Fatal in contact with skin
Eye Irritation H318: Causes serious eye damage
Germ cell mutagenicity H341: Suspected of causing genetic defects
Carcinogenicity H351: Suspected of causing cancer
Reproductive toxicity H362: May cause harm to breast-fed children
Specific target organ toxicity H370: Causes damage to organs
Environmental hazards H411: Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects
Nanoparticles Nanoparticles in suspension
2.3.3 Physical Hazards
Hazard originating from physical effects do not have a similar, unified classification system
as the chemical hazards. Following effects are considered to cause physical hazards in LARA:
energy transfer, mechanical waves, electromagnetic waves, and pressure. Energy transfer
forms hazards related to electricity and thermic effects. Mechanical waves include noise,
vibrations, supersonic and infrasonic waves. Pressure is partially overlapping with the GHS
classification, but in the physical hazard context it aims at also at hazards originating from
hypobaric or hyperbaric environments. According to this classification, electromagnetic waves
and fields should be part of the hazard class physical hazards, but due the amount of hazards
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related to electromagnetic waves and fields, they do not fit the classification structure of LARA
and are considered as a separate hazard class. An overview of the hazard class physical hazard
is given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 – Physical hazards in LARA: hazard groups and hazard examples.
Hazard group Hazard example
Noise Occasional impulsive noise (Peak ≥ 135 dB)
Ultrasonic & Infrasonic Ultrasonic force
Vibrations Vibrations on hands (Acceleration a ≤ 5m/s2)
Hypobaric environment Hypobaric or hyperbaric environment
Electricity Accessible energized objects
Thermic Hazards Exposition to cold temperatures (T ≤ 15◦C )
Pressure hazards Vacuum
2.3.4 Electromagnetic Waves and Fields
Electromagnetic waves can be classified according to their wavelength: at a certain wavelength,
the radiation carries enough energy to liberate electrons from atoms and molecules, thereby
ionizing them. However, the distinction between ionizing and non-ionizing rays is not enough
for hazard classification, since the properties in this group is still too widespread. Non-ionizing
rays includes the visible spectrum, infrared radiation, UV-radiation and higher wavelengths
forming electromagnetic fields. Lasers, which are possible to establish in different spectra are
grouped separately due to their special characteristics. The second part of the electromagnetic
waves is the ones who are able to liberate electrons: the ionizing rays, which are a hazard
group in this category. An overview of the hazard class electromagnetic waves is given in Table
2.3.
Table 2.3 – Electromagnetic waves and fields hazards in LARA: hazard groups and hazard
examples.
Hazard group Hazard example
Laser Laser Class 3B
Radio-frequency microwaves Radiation (frequency ≤ 100 kHz)
Static Magnetic Field Magnetic field with 0.5 mT line (distance ≥ 50 cm)
UV-IR non-coherent radiation Unshielded UV-A (320 nm - 400 nm) source
Ionizing rays Alpha particles
2.3.5 Biological Hazards
Biological hazard originate from biological substances that pose a threat to living organisms.
This can include the diseases caused by viruses and microorganisms but also toxic or allergenic
substances with biological origin. The mechanisms of these hazards are more complicated
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and less known than with the other hazard classes. For safety reasons, a similar procedure
than for nanoparticles is applied: control banding. For most research facilities worldwide,
following bands are used:
• Biosafety level 1: working with well-characterized agents, which are unlikely to cause
serious diseases to healthy adult humans. The hazard potential is low.
• Biosafety level 2: working with well-characterized agents, which can cause light to
medium diseases to healthy adult humans. The hazard potential is moderate.
• Biosafety level 3: working with exotic and indigenous agents, which can cause serious to
lethal diseases. The hazard potential is high.
• Biosafety level 4: working with exotic and indigenous agents, which can cause serious
to lethal diseases for which vaccines or other treatments are not available. The hazard
potential is extremely high.
In LARA, these levels are used for further classifying biological hazards originating from
microorganisms and viruses. Other biological hazards (contact with animals, toxins) are
treated differently, unless they are not related to a possible infection with a disease. The hazard
class biological hazards is presented in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 – Biological hazards in LARA: hazard groups and hazard examples.
Hazard group Hazard example
Microorganisms Bio-Safety Level 2
Genetically modified microorganisms Bio-Safety Level 2
Viruses Bio-Safety Level 1
Contact with Animals Bites
Allergenic or toxic substances of MO Inhalation hazard
2.3.6 Mechanical Hazards
Probably the most common source of accidents is not related to chemical, biological, or
physical effects; mechanical impact can lead to serious or fatal injuries. In general, mechanical
hazards originated from the interaction of two or more objects, at which one is often a human
body. The cause of the movement of can be used for classification reasons. For example, the an
injury caused by a dangerous surface is due to the movement of the harmed person, whereas
pinching in a moving machine part is due to the movement of the machine. Another factor for
the classification is, if a movement is intended or not and if the movement is controlled or not
(e.g. ejecting of object due to a malfunction of a machine). According to this considerations
and based on based on OSH guidelines [SUVA, 2004; Bundesverband der Unfallkassen, 2006]
are classed in to following hazard groups (Table 2.5).
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Table 2.5 – Mechanical hazards in LARA: hazard groups and hazard examples.
Hazard group Hazard example
Moving machine parts Pinch points
Dangerous surfaces Sharp edges
Moving tools/objects Overrunning of an object
Uncontrolled moving objects Oscillating objects
Work in height Ladders
2. Hazard identification
Intention Example (as in Chapter 3.1)
• Subdivision of the process into process steps
• Identification of hazardous components
• Matching of the possible hazards of every com-
ponent with the hazard database of LARA
1. Dissolution of the reactants
2. Addition of Et3N
3. Stirring overnight under nitrogen
4. ...
• H225: highly flammable liquid and 
vapor
• H315: Causes skin irritation 
• H336: May cause drowsiness and 
dizziness
• ...
• Toluene
• Palladium acetate
• Heating
• Reduced pressure
• ...
Toluene
Figure 2.8 – An illustrative example of the steps performed in the LARA workflow. A more
detailed explanation of this example can be found in Chapter 3.1.
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2.4 Risk Analysis
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1. Context definition
2. Hazard identification
3. Risk analysis
4. Risk evaluation
5. Risk treatment
Figure 2.9 – Condensed LARA workflow: risk analysis.
The goal of the risk analysis is to analyze the hazard, describe the resulting risk and to evaluate
its magnitude (Figure 2.9). In Chapter 1, the requirements for a method suiting the research
environment were postulated; the risk analysis is the part of the risk management workflow,
where most of these requirements are either met or not. For the risk description, an ideal
method manages on a low amount of data, as statistical data is hardly available for this
environment. Additionally, the demands for both expertise and difficulty should be low to
moderate, since scientists are rarely trained safety specialists. Quantitative methods are
not practicable in this environment due to the requirements, qualitative methods are often
not detailed enough; for this reasons, LARA is designed as a semi-quantitative approach.
For this kind of methods, qualitative scales and corresponding quantitative values for each
dimension are defined. The underlying general scale is valid for all dimensions and represents
the magnitude of influence on the risk resulting from a hazard. The corresponding values are
integer numbers from one to five and are used for the risk estimation in LARA. Table 2.6 gives
an overview of the underlying general scale and the corresponding quantitative values.
In this section, the risk dimensions used in LARA and the risk calculation will be explained
in detail. To estimate the magnitude of each risk, the Laboratory Criticality Index (LCI) is
calculated according to the risk scores of the risk dimensions. Additionally, the calculation
method is compared to other semi-quantitative risk calculation approaches.
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Table 2.6 – The general semi-quantitative scale used in LARA.
General qualitative description Assigned value
Very minor 1
Minor 2
Moderate 3
Serious 4
Very serious 5
2.4.1 Dimensions in Risk Estimation
Risk is a multifaceted concept and has countless definitions. When the risk originating from
a specific hazard is described, different dimensions can be used for the characterization.
The level of abstractness can vary significantly depending on the specific approach. Simple
approaches as the risk matrix approaches use the dimensions severity and probability, often
expressed in a qualitative way. Quantitative approaches use statistical concepts as risk di-
mensions, which are not easily transferable to other methods. In LARA, four dimensions are
applied to describe risks (Figure 2.10).
Probability
Detectability
Worsening
Factors
Severity
Laboratory
Criticality 
Index
Figure 2.10 – Four dimensions are used in LARA to describe a risk and to calculate the LCI
value.
Severity
The first dimension used for risk estimation in LARA is the severity of unwanted events’ conse-
quences. Even if the undesired event is easily determined, the consequences are perceived
subjectively. In most risk management approaches, the financial impact is used as a gen-
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eral scale for the severity. For damages to buildings and equipment, these values are easily
determinable. The first scale of Table 2.7 shows the impact rating based on financial aspects.
Table 2.7 – Impact rating scales used in LARA for unwanted events.
General qualitative Assigned Specific qualitative
description value description
Very minor 1 < 1’000 CHF
Minor 2 1’000 - 5’000 CHF
Financial Moderate 3 5’000 - 25’000 CHF
Serious 4 25’000 - 125’00 CHF
Very serious 5 > 125’000 CHF
Very minor 1 Injury without work interruption
Minor 2 Injury with work interruption (> 2 d)
Human Moderate 3 Light handicap
Serious 4 Serious handicap
Very serious 5 Death
Very minor 1 Negligible
Minor 2 Marginal
Environment Moderate 3 Important
Serious 4 Critical
Very serious 5 Catastrophic
Very minor 1 Awareness at the laboratory
Minor 2 Awareness at the unit
Reputation Moderate 3 Awareness at the institute
Serious 4 Awareness outside the institute
Very serious 5 Claims against the university
Very minor 1 Laboratory
Minor 2 Faculty
Perception level Moderate 3 University
Serious 4 Regional
Very serious 5 National
Estimations of costs for damages on humans exist as well; insurance companies worldwide
estimate these kinds of costs to be prepared for claims. These values are based on various
influence factors, for example the loss of manpower during the sick leave. For the academic
research setting, this point of view is not applicable without limitations. Since universities
are not profit seeking, the severity of accidents leading to injuries is more complicated to
determine. Assigning costs to these kinds of accidents is a subjective task: a scientist who loses
eyesight is most likely not assigning the same value as the insurance company does. In LARA,
financial considerations for human loss is avoided by using the second scale of Table 2.7.
Human beings, buildings and equipment are not the only targets for consequences of unde-
sired events. Environmental damages are likely to occur for chemical facilities and happened
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numerous times in the past decades. Industrial facilities are strictly monitored and controlled
regularly by the authorities, but for academic research facilities these controls are not as
rigorous. In LARA, accidents with environmental damages are considered using the third scale
from Table 2.7.
For universities, their reputation is of high importance and is often cultivated with various
kinds of efforts. Independently if they are causing any kind of damage to humans, buildings
or the environment, major accidents can have a tremendous impact on the reputation of an
institute. For industrial companies, a value can be assigned for the brand image, whereas this
is hardly possible for universities. To measure the impact on the brand image, the fourth scale
of Table 2.7 is used to estimate the impact on the reputation.
Finally, accidents can have an impact that is of more fuzzy nature than the other ones. Per-
ception is often not linked to a rational constant and media are capable of drawing an un-
proportional amount of attention to a specific event. This kind of impact is often linked to
reputational damages, but can be independent from it as well as from the other kinds of
impacts. In order to grasp the impact related with this concept, the last scale of Table 2.7 is
used.
The scales of five impact fields are used in LARA to describe the impact of an unwanted event
(Figure 2.11). None of the scales is of higher importance than another one, they are all based
on the underlying general description and lead to the similar values on the semi-quantitative
scale. An impact of an unwanted event is rarely only limited to one of these scales. More likely,
it has manifestations on each of these scales. For risk estimation, these combinations can lead
to complex scenarios and involve subjective moral judgements. In order to have a stringent
impact estimation in LARA, the impact rating is not a combination of the different scales’
values, only one the highest value is used for risk estimation. The worst-case scenario might
lead to a different impact rating than the best-case scenario. In order to keep a clear policy for
risk estimation, the most likely outcome of an unwanted event is taken as a reference for this
estimation. However, for certain situations the worst-case scenario can be a more preferable
option than the baseline scenario: if there is a lack of knowledge about hazardous properties
or most-likely outcomes (e.g. nanoparticles) , the analyst has to take this into account with a
higher judgement.
Probability
The second dimension of risk estimation in LARA is the probability of an accident. This
dimension is challenging to define due to the fuzzy nature of the term exposure. Someone
who is doing a task related to a risk is not necessarily permanent exposed to this risk. Exact
probability values might be valid in a statistical context, but are often not meaningful for
specific situations. Nevertheless, efforts were made in the framework of these PhD studies to
base the probability values of LARA on statistical values; this was done with support of the
Statistical Service of Swiss Insurance Companies (SSUV) which is part of the Swiss National
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Financial Damage
Human Damage
Environmental  Damage
Brand Image Damage
Perception Level
Probability
General Scale
Detectability
Worsening
Factors
Severity
Figure 2.11 – Schematic overview of the scales used for describing the impact of an unwanted
event in LARA.
Accident Insurance Fund (SUVA). The statistical data provided by SSUV is the most detailed
accident statistics available for Switzerland. However, they focus on type of injuries rather than
causes of events. This makes it challenging to assign the data to the different kinds of hazards
present in LARA, since the causal chains are unknown. Additionally, laboratory accidents are
fortunately not common accidents and the statistical significance of the data is not given.
Based on this and the fact that LARA is intended as a semi-quantitative approach, estimations
of occurrences are used to describe indirectly, how probable an accident is. Table 2.8 gives an
overview of the occurrence rating scale, the assigned values and the qualitative description.
Table 2.8 – Occurrence rating for accidents.
General qualitative description Assigned value Occurrence
Accident is unlikely 1 1 / 10 years
Few accidents 2 1 / year
Occasional accident 3 1 / month
Frequent accident 4 1 / week
Accident is almost inevitable 5 1 / day
Not only the occurrence describes the probability of an accident, how often an activity related
to a risk is done influences it as well. In LARA, activities are the object of analyses, and these
activities are afflicted with risks. In order to estimate the commonness and the duration of an
activity, the values from Table 2.9 are used. This scale was developed using effective working
hours in relation the commonness of an activity [Ouédraogo et al., 2011a]. If for example an
activity takes 60 % of a daily work time and is performed monthly, the resulting value is 3.
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Table 2.9 – Commonness and duration rating for an activity.
Period Daily work in %
20 40 60 80 100
Weekly 4 5 5 5 5
Monthly 3 3 3 4 4
Trimesterly 2 3 3 3 3
Semesterly 2 2 3 3 3
Yearly 1 1 1 2 2
Activities can involve hazardous elements, but not all risks take part in a similar way in an
activity. An activity might be done on daily bases and last several hours, but a specific risk is
only present short-termed in an activity. To take this factor into account, each single hazard is
rated according to its involvement in an activity. This rating is shown in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10 – Rating for hazard involvement in an activity relative to the total process duration.
General qualitative description Assigned value Hazard involvement in activity
Very little 1 20%
Little 2 40%
Moderate 3 60%
High 4 80%
Very high 5 100%
The values for commonness and duration are specified for a certain activity and are valid for all
hazards related to this activity. The assigned values for occurrence and the hazard involvement
are used to describe the risk of a single hazard. Other than the impact dimension, where the
most important value was taken into account, the probability has three influencing sub-factors,
which are combined to express this dimension (Figure 2.12). How they are integrated in the
risk estimation will be explained in Subsection 2.4.2.
Detectability
The detectability of an unwanted event acts as a third dimension of risk estimation in LARA.
Whether one is able to detect an upcoming unwanted event or not, has a significant effect
of the magnitude of a risk. Detection can improve preparedness and lower both impact and
probability. Ways of detecting range from human senses to technical devices, for example oxy-
gen sensors used in laboratories to warn from a lack of oxygen. Various factors are influencing
the feasibility of a detector and are taken into account in the LARA method.
A first factor is the selectivity of a detector, which describes in what degree a detector is able
to distinguish between different risks. Human senses for example can have different degrees
of selectivity: the olfactory perception is much more selective than the gustatory perception.
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Technical sensors underlie limitations as well and can be more or less selective. A second
factor is the availability of a detector, which describes in which degree the detector is available
in case of an accident. A last factor influencing the dimension detectability is the reliability of
a detector. This factor describes if the detector is reliable in its functionality.
Table 2.11 – Rating of the detectability sub-factors.
Specific qualitative description Availability Reliability Selectivity
Low 5 5 5
Moderate 3 3 3
High 1 1 1
In order to estimate the detectability, all three factors are judged in LARA separately (see Table
2.11). LARA is designed as a semi-quantitative method and an quantitative scale with values
ranging from one to five is used for the other risk dimensions; however, the intervals are
increased for the detectability. This is due the fact that the qualitative description is fuzzier
and the concept is more widespread than the other dimensions. For consistency reasons, the
scale for detectability is inverted: a low detectability stands for a high risk is assigned to a high
value and vice versa. Similar to the probability dimension of LARA, detectability has three
sub-factors which are combined to express the detectability dimension.
Occurence
Commonness and Duration
Hazard involvement
Probability
General Scale
Detectability
Worsening
Factors
Severity
Figure 2.12 – Schematic overview of the influence factors used for describing the probability
of an unwanted event in LARA.
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Reliability
Selectivity
Availability
Probability
General Scale
Detectability
Worsening
Factors
Severity
Figure 2.13 – Schematic overview of the influence factors used for describing the detectability
of an unwanted event in LARA.
Worsening Factors
In an simplified model, risks can be analyzed based on their impact, their probability and
detectability. However, reality is often more complicated and other influences need to be
taken into account as well. Especially for an academic research setting, it is important to con-
sider its peculiarities: quick turnover of personnel, lack of written procedures, experimental
equipment, along with others. These influences are a breeding ground for risks and cannot
be neglected when analyzing them. In order to deal with these factors in LARA, the concept
of worsening factors was introduced [Ouédraogo et al., 2011a] in addition to the other risk
dimensions. In general, this concept unifies all factors that are able to influence one of the
other risk dimensions in a negative way. By expanding the commonly used risk dimensions
with the worsening factors dimension, LARA is capable of describing the risks more accurately
and to integrate interdependencies; in other methods, such relations are often overlooked and
the risks therefore underestimated. The underlying mechanisms are not always similar; the
worsening factors are classified as follows [Pluess et al., 2013]:
General Worsening Factors (GWF) These kind of worsening factors are not directly related
to one specific hazard, but are increasing the risk level for all hazards in a similar manner. An
example for such a factor is a information overload: it is not worsening a specific hazard, but
can promote unawareness in a laboratory and increase all the risks present. Due to their fuzzy
nature, they are not implemented in safety regulations. An example is the different languages
spoken in a laboratory: it is almost impossible to regulate this in practice, but they can lead
to misconceptions and therefore amplify risks. In general, these kinds of influences can be
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Table 2.12 – General worsening factors categories and examples for each category.
Category Worsening factor example Effect
Climate Humid climate Malaise
Ergonomics Respiratory personal protection equipment Exhaustion
Electrical Old electrical system Short circuits
Lighting Inadequate distribution of light Misconceptions
Safety Information signs not visible Unawareness
Work organization Unclear responsibilities Misunderstanding
Social conditions Risk prone climate Risk taking
Work related Permanent attention necessary Exhaustion
described as a basic risk level, independently from hazards, exposure and risks. In order to
group them, categories shown in Table 2.12 are used.
Hazard-Specific Worsening Factors (HSWF) Other than the GWF, these kinds of factors are
specific for a hazard and are directly influencing it (see Table 2.13). In principle, considerations
what can worsen a specific risk or what is able to trigger an accident, is implemented in existing
safety guidelines. This kind of factor often originates in deviations from safety guidelines, for
example not wearing adequate personal protective equipment, the absence of mandatory
preventive tools, or the failure of a possible hazard detection tool.
Table 2.13 – Hazard-specific worsening factors examples for some hazards.
Hazard Worsening factor example Effect
Flammable vapors Unideal electrical equipment Ignition
Laser No adequate PPE Eye damage
Toxic vapors Insufficient ventilation Intoxication
High pressure No shielding More severe impact
Synergetic Worsening Factors (SWF) The last kind of worsening factors integrated in LARA
derive from interdependencies between hazards. In particular situations, a risk can be wors-
ened or even enabled by the presence of another risk. Various combinations are possible to
form this kind of situations, for example the presence of non-ionizing radiations sources and
flammable material without any kind of safety measure, which could prevent an ignition.
In LARA, the analyst begins the evaluation by choosing from the database of GWF which
ones of them are actually present for this evaluation. This choice is valid for all the involved
activities in the evaluation. In contrast, the HSWF and the SWF are specifically assigned to a
single hazard and therefore only valid for this hazard. When the hazards from an activity are
evaluated, the analyst decides using the database which SWF and HSWF are significant for the
analysis.
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Table 2.14 – Synergetic worsening factors scale to assign a semi-quantitative value used for
risk estimation.
General qualitative description Assigned value Sum of selected SWF scores
Very minor 1 < 5
Minor 2 5- 15
Moderate 3 15 - 25
Serious 4 25 - 35
Very serious 5 > 35
Every single worsening factor, independently of what type it is, has a score assigned. These
scores are indicating to what degree a single worsening factor is capable of increasing a risk.
Based on the sum of these scores for each worsening factor category, a semi-quantitative value
is determined using a predefined scale (see Table 2.14 for an example). The scale used for GWF
indicates a relation between the sum of the selected worsening factors and the total possible
worsening factors: a sum of zero is assigned to one and the maximum possible worsening
factor sum is assigned to five. On the other side, the HSWF and the SWF scales are not related
to a maximum score of possible worsening factors and the maximal semi-quantitative value
can be reached using different combinations of worsening factors.
GWF1
Probability
General Scale
Detectability
Worsening
Factors
Severity
GWF2 GWF3 GWF4 GWF5
HSWF1 HSWF2 HSWF3
SWF1 SWF2
Figure 2.14 – Schematic overview of the worsening factors dimension and how they accumulate
in LARA.
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3. Risk analysis: hazard description
Intention Example (as in Chapter 3.1)
• Assign a value to the risk dimension Severity Injury without work interruption 
Severity : 2
• Assign values to the sub-dimensions of the risk 
dimension Probability Occurrence : 3 Commonness : 3 Involvement : 2
• Assign values to the sub-dimensions of the risk 
dimension Detectability Selectivity : 3 Reliability : 5 Availability : 1
• Select the Hazard-specific worsening factors, 
synergetic worsening factors and general wors-
ening factors (valid for the whole evaluation) 
from the LARA database
HSWF : 2 SWF : 2 GWF : 2
• Describe every hazard of the process using the 
risk dimension in LARA
• Toluene  H336: May cause drowsiness or  
              dizziness
Figure 2.15 – An illustrative example of the steps performed in the LARA workflow. A more
detailed explanation of this example can be found in Chapter 3.1.
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2.4.2 Risk Estimation
(Parts of this subsection are a modified version of the article: Expert Judgements in Risk
Analysis: a Strategy to Overcome Uncertainties [Pluess et al., 2013].)
Probability
Detectability
Worsening
Factors
Severity
Laboratory
Criticality 
Index
Figure 2.16 – For risk comparison, the four risk dimension values are combined to the LCI
value for each risk.
One of the main challenges when developing a risk analysis technique for the research envi-
ronment is the risk estimation. The latter is important in order to correctly prioritize risks and
to apply adequate corrective measures. Most of the existing techniques depend on accurate
statistical data, e.g. studies on reliability [Yun et al., 2009]. Due to the investigational nature
of scientific research, statistical data on reliability for substances or equipment are hardly
available. An often-used approach to deal with this is the use of semi-quantitative estimation
methods, which rely on linguistic judgments of experts (e.g. often, rarely, significant financial
loss). However, these linguistic terms are related to three different kinds of uncertainties:
• Stochastic uncertainty.
• Lexical uncertainty: different personal interpretation, e.g. often.
• Informal uncertainty: subjective interpretation of what an element means, e.g. severity.
Since linguistic judgements are used to estimate the risk of a hazard, these uncertainties
are significantly minimizing the informative value of a risk analysis. Analyses performed by
different experts can lead to different results for the same risk. In order to propose a reliable
method for research environment it is necessary to improve the value of these judgments.
Various approaches have been presented in the literature to decrease the uncertainties in
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different fields of risk analysis; one popular solution is the use of Fuzzy Logic [Darbra and
Casal, 2009]. The use of Bayesian networks is another promising strategy to improve the
significance of semi-quantitative risk analyses [Ren J., 2007]. Based on Bayesian probability,
Bayesian networks are not only capable of improving the uncertainty of both lingual and
numerical expressions [Wang et al., 2009]; they have other advantages (visualization, easiness)
when used to perform risk analyses [Zaili et al., 2008].
Figure 2.17 – The Bayesian network used for the calculation of the LCI.
In semi-quantitative risk analysis techniques, verbal statements are used to describe the
risk factors. According to these linguistic variables a value on a numerical scale is assigned.
This approach is used for all LARA’s risk estimation factors. Table 2.8 exhibits a possible
relation between qualitative statements, quantitative values and corresponding numerical
values of the occurrence of an accident. For the variables and the sub-variables of severity
(S), probability (P) and worsening factors (WF), a scale of integer numbers between one and
five is used. Since the detectability (D) is more challenging to determine, a scale from one
to three was used. In various risk analysis techniques, a multiplication-based formula (Eq.
2.1) similar to the one in FMECA technique is used to calculate the RPN (for the comparison
of the different calculation methods, the values of the variables having sub-variables were
determined using the average of the sub-variables):
RP N = S ·P ·W F ·D (2.1)
This method has however some important drawbacks for prioritizing the risks [Braband,
2003], e.g. the results are not uniformly distributed over the scale. In order to overcome these
drawbacks, Braband [2003] proposed to use a logarithm-sum-based formula (Eq. 2.2) in order
to calculate an improved risk priority index (iRPN); this calculation method was adapted in
LARA and is used to prioritize and compare the different risks: if a risk has a higher iRPN
value, corrective measures must be applied with a higher priority [Ouédraogo et al., 2011a;
Ouédraogo, 2011c]. A weighting process performed with an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
suggested the use of a = 1.66, b = 5.78, c = 6.06, and d = 17.24 [Ouédraogo et al., 2011b] as bases
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for the logarithms of the factors.
i RP N = l oga(S)+ logb(P )+ logc (W F )+ l ogd (D) (2.2)
Still, the logarithm-sum based calculation method remains sensitive to uncertainties of the
semi-quantitative judgements; the variance of the results obtained by different experts being
too high for the comparison of the different risks evaluated. The implementation of new risk
dimension even amplifies this problem. To overcome this, a new method using Bayesian
networks to calculate the LCI was developed in the framework of these PhD studies. This
calculation is a modified version of a method presented by Zaili et al. [2008], which uses
Bayesian networks to model Fuzzy rule bases with belief structures.
Fuzzy logic is a widely applied calculation approach in risk management to deal with imprecise
qualitative information. It uses linguistic variables in form of IF-THEN rules to model a
reasoning process without employing imprecise quantitative information. However, due to
several peculiarities of the calculation, the Fuzzy calculation method can lead to a significant
loss of information [Zaili et al., 2008]. To overcome this limitation in LARA, the Fuzzy rule
base structure is combined with a Bayesian network approach [Zaili et al., 2009]. Rule bases
in general allow linking qualitative statements for input variables with a predefined value
(quantitative or qualitative) of the output variable. An example of such a rule in the context of
LARA can be expressed as (see Figure 2.19a) for a schematic representation):
Rul e : I F
ser i ous (4) (Impact )
AN D moder ate (3) (Detect abi l i t y)
AN D unl i kel y (2) (Pr obabi l i t y)
AN D ver y ser i ous (4) (W or seni ng F actor s)
T HE N
moder ate (3) (Ri sk Index).
A complete rule base consists of one single IF-THEN rule for each possible combination of
input variables. For this example with four variables and five different qualitative statements,
the rule base contains 625 rules. This rule base is usually gathered through evaluations with
experts, reflecting their judgement of interdependencies between input and output of such a
system. However, such a rule base is not able to reflect slight changes in the input variables and
is prone for inconsistencies; the expression of the output variable possesses only degrees of
belief. In Fuzzy logic approaches, this is taken into account by extending each single IF-THEN
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rule to a belief rule with associated with belief degrees (see Figure 2.19b) for a schematic
representation). In the LARA calculation method, such a rule could be expressed as follows:
Rul e : I F
ser i ous (4) (Impact )
AN D moder ate (3) (Detect abi l i t y)
AN D unl i kel y (2) (Pr obabi l i t y)
AN D ver y ser i ous (4) (W or seni ng F actor s)
T HE N
{(0.0 ver y l ow), (0.02 low), (0.88 moder ate), (0.1 hi g h), (0.0 ver y hi g h) Ri sk Index}.
This can be further expressed in the form of conditional probabilities as follows:
Given Impact (4), and Detectability (3), and Probability (2), and Worsening Factors (4),
the probability of Risk Indexh (h = 1, ...,5) is (0.0, 0.02, 0.88, 0.1, 0.0)
or p(RIh |S(4),D(3),P (2),W F (4))= (0.0,0.02,0.88,0.1,0.0)
By expressing the output variable as a distribution over the states of an output instead of a
singe crisp value, this Fuzzy rule base provides a more informative and realistic representation
than a simple IF-THEN rule base. For the further calculation examples in LARA, the rule
base was generated using a truncated normal distribution with the variance of 0.5 for the
output variable Risk Index. The mean value of each rule’s distribution is based on the average
semi-quantitative input value of the four risk dimensions. To allow the adaptation of LARA
to changes in the context the risk management framework, the weighting of these input
parameters and the distribution can be adjusted.
101 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
   
0
Figure 2.18 – An example of a truncated distribution: mean 5.0, variance 0.5, truncated
between 1 and 10.
In a simplified version of the calculation approach of LARA, this rule base would be sufficient to
deliver an output distribution for each for each input scenario. However, not only the outputs
are afflicted with errors due to imprecise information; also the input variables can be biased
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Table 2.15 – A part of the Fuzzy rule base used in LARA for calculation of the risk index.
Rule Input (risk dimensions) Risk index
Nr. S P D WF Very low Low Moderate High Very high
1 1 1 1 1 0.40 0.24 0.06
2 1 1 1 2 0.39 0.30 0.09
3 1 1 1 3 0.35 0.35 0.13
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
378 4 3 2 4 0.02 0.88 0.1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
623 5 5 5 3 0.13 0.35 0.35
624 5 5 5 4 0.09 0.30 0.39
625 5 5 5 5 0.06 0.24 0.40
due to uncertainties in expert judgements. To overcome this limitation, the input value for
each risk dimension is expressed as a distribution instead of a crisp value (see Figure 2.19c) for
a schematic representation). As for the output parameters of the rule base, a truncated normal
distribution with the variance of 0.5 was used 2.18. Other than regular normal distributions,
this kind of distributions do have finite endpoints (for LARA, the scale of the inputs: 1 to
5). This enables to model a variety of shapes, for example a uniform distribution and allows
higher flexibility for the model [Fenton et al., 2007]. The mean value is given by the choice of
the analyst judging the risk dimension with the semi-quantitative scales presented in Chapter
2.4.1.
In the calculation method used in LARA, the Fuzzy rule base is combined with this kind of
input by using a Bayesian network to model the calculation. This improved method is based
on Bayesian statistics, being used in different branches of risk management [Marhavilas et al.,
2011]. Bayesian networks are using probability tables [Fenton and Neil, 2012] with different
states for each single node of the network. For LARA, the probability tables for each basic
node is given by the input distribution (depending on the risk judgement). The different
probability tables were created using a ranked node concept described by Fenton et al. [2007].
This concept facilitates the generation of the probability tables using truncated Gaussian
probability distributions. The Fuzzy rule base is used as probability table for the parent node.
Figure 2.17 gives an overview of the Bayesian network used for the calculation.
When an expert gives judgements on the different input parameters, the states of the risk index
(RI) node can be calculated using following Eq. 2.3:
p(RIh)=
5∑
i=1
5∑
j=1
5∑
k=1
5∑
l=1
p(RIh
∣∣Si ,P j ,Dk ,W Fl ) ·p(Si ) ·p(P j ) ·p(Dk ) ·p(W Fl ) (2.3)
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Figure 2.19 – A schematic representation of the Bayesian calculation approach: a) a simple
rule base. b) a Fuzzy rule base as used in LARA. c) the calculation in LARA by using the Fuzzy
rule base with fuzzified inputs.
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The above calculation is an aggregation of the complete rule base for a specific input; depend-
ing if an input is close to a rule in the Fuzzy rule base, it can gather information or not (0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0). The calculation can be modeled in the software Hugin [Hugin Expert A/S, 2015],
which was used to perform the calculations in LARA. Since the Risk Index node represents
a probability distribution, for better comparison of the different risks, a single crisp number
called LCI is calculated with the following Eq. 2.4 (see Figure 2.20). The adversity factor (A) for
each state of the risk index node allows to differently weight the different states and further
allow a high flexibility in the calculation system. As a last step, the resulting range of values are
normalized to a scale ranging from one to ten (2.5):
LC I =
5∑
h=1
p(RIh) · Ah (2.4)
LC Inor mali zed =
(LC I −4.51) ·9
3.18
+1 (2.5)
The actual calculation used in LARA has some minor modifications comparing to the model
proposed in this Chapter:
• The risk dimensions Probability, Detectability and Worsening factors are not chosen
directly by the analyst, but are combinations of different sub-factors (occurrence, dura-
tion, availability etc.). The values of these dimensions are therefore calculated in such a
way that each dimension forms a subsystem with an own Fuzzy rule base. The parent
nodes in these systems are calculated as the Risk Index in the main system
• Additionally the Detectability is reduced to three different states for the input variables
(as explained in Chapter 2.4.1).
Rule 381
Rule 380
Rule 379
Rule 378
Rule 377
Rule 376
Rule 375
1 2 3 4 5
LCI
Figure 2.20 – After the Bayesian calculation, the results are defuzzified using Eq. 2.4 to form a
crisp LCI value.
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Comparison of the calculation methods As described above, LARA is using expert judge-
ments to estimate the risk score. Due to the uncertainties connected to these judgements,
different experts may have different opinions when estimating the factor of a single risk. This
leads to a situation, where different experts are producing different results in the risk estima-
tion for the same risk. To illustrate this influence for a fictional hazard, Table 2.16 exhibits raw
data judgements given by different experts for each factor and the corresponding risk scores.
Table 2.16 – Comparison of the “correct” risk factors (as defined in Figure 2.17) of a sample
hazard and the different expert judgments for this hazard.
S O I Dur Av Rel Sel HSWF GWF SWF RPN iRPN LCI
Correct 4 3 4 2 3 3 1 3 3 2 2.8 7.5 6.3
Expert 1 4 4 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 1 3.0 7.7 6.6
Expert 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 3 1 1.9 6.5 4.9
Expert 3 4 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 1.6 6.0 4.6
Expert 4 3 2 5 2 2 3 2 4 2 2 2.3 7.1 5.6
Expert 5 5 3 5 1 3 3 2 4 3 3 4.2 8.4 7.6
Even though the used “correct” value is hypothetical, this example reveals the impact of uncer-
tainties: all three calculations methods are giving a certain range of risk scores. For a better
comparison of the used calculation methods (RPN, iRPN, LCI), all results were normalized
to a scale ranging from one to ten. Assuming a correct value (2.8 for RPN, 7.5 for iRPN, 6.3
for LCI), the risk scores based on expert judgements have a maximum difference of 1.4 for
the RPN method, 1.5 for the iRPN method and 1.7 for the LCI method. This effect strongly
biases the risk estimation and can lead to false judgements when treating the risk. When
comparing this biased risk score with other risks, and depending on the scenario, risk might
be underestimated. Therefore, resources needed to implement corrective measures may not
be correctly allocated.
To further investigate these uncertainties, more examples with more variations of expert
judgements were generated. For 32 different risks with fixed “correct” values, we calculated
every possible combination of expert judgments. For these judgements, a maximum difference
of 1.0 to the corresponding “correct” risk factor was set. When using only integer values for
expert judgement, depending on the combination (one and five give fewer combinations,
since zero and six are no valid judgements) a data set can include up to 60,000 different expert
judgements for one single risk. Figure 2.21 indicates the distribution of the risk scores for six
different random risks (two for each of the three different calculation methods). To illustrate
the difference of the distributions’ variances, the risk score with the lowest and the risk score
with the highest variance were chosen for each calculation method. Figure 2.21a displays
the two RPN values for the two selected hazards. The first risk score calculated with the RPN
method leads to an average risk score of 1.31 with a variance of 0.03. This means that all
possible expert judgements are closely distributed around the “correct” value. The second
example leads to an average risk score of 2.28 with a variance of 0.49. Other than the first
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example, the possible combinations for expert judgements are distributed more broadly. For
the risk comparison this implies that if the judgement from the expert is slightly different, the
risk score changes differently depending on the range in which the resulting risk score lies in.
Taking all 32 examples into account (Table 2.17), the average variance is 0.26 with a relative
standard deviation of 52.6%. Considering the risk scores and the corresponding variances,
the RPN calculation method shows the tendency of having a rapidly increasing variance with
increasing risk score. When performing risk analyses, this makes the risks with higher risks
scores nearly incomparable.
Table 2.17 – Comparison of the variances shown in Figure 2.21, and the variances of all the
calculated samples.
Variance 1 Variance 2 Mean variance Relative standard deviation
(Figure 2.21) (Figure 2.21) (32 samples) (32 samples)
RPN 0.03 0.49 0.26 52.6 %
iRPN 0.18 0.70 0.41 39.9 %
LCI 0.28 0.71 0.50 27.5 %
Using the iRPN approach (Figure 2.21b), more constant variances are observed. The example
with the lowest variance leads to a risk score of 7.56 with a variance of 0.18, which is signifi-
cantly higher than with the RPN method. The upper variance example leads to risk score of
6.74 with a variance of 0.70, which is also higher than the first method. The average variance
for the IRPN method is 0.41 is higher too, but the has a lower relative standard deviation
(39.9%) than the RPN method. For the risk comparison this means that a different judgement
leads to different changes in the risk score depending on where the result is found on the scale;
other than with the RPN method the changes are not as different through the whole scale.
Even though the mean variance is larger (Table 2.17) than with the RPN method, the lower
relative standard deviation makes this method more reliable for the risk estimation. Risks
in different regions of the risk scale can be compared in order to apply corrective measures.
However, the logarithm-addition based formula iRPN has some significant drawbacks, e.g. it
is less flexible in using different probability distributions for input parameters.
The use of Bayesian networks is a possible solution to overcome these drawbacks and having a
reliable risk estimation method. The variances observed (Figure 2.21c) are more constant even
with larger risk scores. For the example with the lowest variance of the 32 example hazards the
risk score is 6.16 with a variance is 0.28, whereas for the example with the highest variance
leads to a risk score of 5.41 with a variance 0.71. For all 32 examples the mean variance is
0.50 with a relative standard deviation of 27.5 %. As the iRPN method, the LCI approach has a
higher mean variance (Table 2.17) than the RPN method. Yet, the relative standard deviation
is lower than for the two other calculation methods. Additionally, the variance appears to be
independent of the result’s magnitude. This allows reliable risk estimations and a meaningful
comparison of different risks.
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Figure 2.21 – Distributions of the risk values based different expert judgements of two different
hazards: a) RPN method, b) iRPN method and c) LCI method.
This comparison reveals that the uncertainties in expert judgements do have a significant
impact on the semi-quantitative risk estimation. This impact is amplified depending on the
risk estimation method used. The comparison of three different estimation methods suggests
that the use of a Bayesian network approach can lead to more consistent risk estimation with
respect to other methods. When using a numerical scale to compare risks related to different
hazards, the scale should represent a linear relationship between the risk scores; otherwise, the
comparison will be biased. This is why a reliable and constant calculation method is of crucial
importance. Uncertainties are not only resulting due to experts’ judgements, but they are also
caused and amplified by calculations. As consequence, uncertainties in expert judgement and
the resulting variance of the risk calculation cannot be entirely eliminated. The analysis of the
results obtained by the RPN method has shown that this method exhibits a changing variance,
depending on the magnitude of the risk score. In order to have a constant scale of the risk
score, a risk estimation method should have a constant variance through the whole spectrum
of results. The iRPN method gives more constant results, but other aspects of this approach
reveal drawbacks when performing risk analysis. The approach of calculating the LCI based
on Bayesian network is capable of overcoming these drawbacks giving reliable results with
a constant variance through the whole spectrum of the results. Due to this consideration,
as well as the easier illustration of risk factors’ dependencies, Bayesian networks method is
an important alternative to other calculation methods in semi-quantitative risk analyses. If
this calculation method is applied for academic research laboratories, the risks of different
hazards can be estimated more precisely and therefore resources can be better allocated when
implementing corrective measures.
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3. Risk analysis: risk estimation
Intention Example (as in Chapter 3.1)
• Calculation of the Laboratory Criticality Index 
(LCI) using the Bayesian network calculation
Severity
Occurrence
Commonness
Involvement
Selectivity
Reliability
Availability
HSWF
SWF
GWF
LCI : 3.2
Figure 2.22 – An illustrative example of the steps performed in the LARA workflow. A more
detailed explanation of this example can be found in Chapter 3.1.
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Figure 2.23 – Condensed LARA workflow: risk evaluation.
Once the magnitudes of the different risks are determined, decisions are made what to do
about them. A basic question that needs to be answered for each risk is:
Is it necessary to treat this risk?
This question introduces the concept of acceptability into the risk management process.
What is acceptable or not is defined by the context of the risk management approach, for
example societal norms. The field of application influences the acceptability as well: 300 road
casualties per year are acceptable for most societies, whereas 300 casualties from nuclear
power plants are most likely not. For some industrial applications, the limits are exactly set and
defined by national regulations [Melchers, 2001]. This requires precise calculations, which only
quantitative risk management approaches can provide. The result of these calculations can
deliver estimations about the magnitude of a possible loss in terms of casualties or financial
loss (relative to the probability of an event). These results provide a high accessibility due
to the comprehensive scale and allow discussion about the issue of acceptability. If a risk is
above a defined acceptability limit, measures should be applied in order to lower this risk.
However, the remaining risks cannot necessarily be considered as acceptable. In most risk
management approaches, an ALARP region acts as a transition between the acceptable and
the unacceptable risk levels [Melchers, 2001].
The ALARP region is conceptually illustrated in Figure 2.24. If a risk is above a certain proba-
bility limit, it cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. On the other side of the scale, the
risks are either acceptable or even negligible for practical interest. In between of these limits,
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Unacceptable 
region
Acceptable 
region
Negligible 
region
ALARP 
region
Typical probabilities
10-4 per year
10-6 per year
10-7 per year
Reduction if reasonably 
possible
Figure 2.24 – Conceptualization of the ALARP approach [Melchers, 2001].
the ALARP region indicates risks which should be reduced, if the effort to do so is not grossly
disproportionate to the gain obtained (i.e. reasonable). ALARP implies therefore subjective
approaches and lingual concepts (reasonable), which are biased with similar uncertainties
than the calculation approach using expert judgments. How the LARA method approaches
this challenge is explained in Chapter 2.6, whereas the setting of the limits is explained in this
Chapter.
Figure 2.24 reduces acceptability to a one-dimensional concept by only regarding the prob-
ability of an event. However, the possible impact is an important factor to determine the
magnitude of a risk and needs to be taken into account for the decision-making. A widely
used illustration of this two-dimensional risk concept is the risk matrix (Figure 2.25).
Similar to the limits in Figure 2.24, the possible scenarios are distinguished with the use of
acceptability limits into three different regions (acceptable, ALARP, unacceptable). However,
the two-dimensional risk concept allows a more detailed distinction between risk scenarios. It
allows defining exact and comprehensible limits by applying logical rules (if the severity is
above 4, then the risk is considered to be unacceptable) and shows how the factors contributed
to a risk score.
In LARA, a semi-quantitative calculation method is used. As the risk matrix, this method does
not provide an exact estimation of possible loss, but allows a relative comparison between the
risks on a fixed scale. The calculation method integrates four different risk factors and unifies
them into a one-dimensional scale. As a consequence of this simplification, the resulting risk
scores do not indicate how the factors contributed to a score as in the risk matrix. However,
similar rules can be applied, as it is possible in the risk matrix approach. Figure 2.26a shows a
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Figure 2.25 – A sample risk matrix illustrating the three regions of risk evaluation.
possible acceptability scenario, where the presence of a maximum input of one risk factor (all
other factors remain on a minimum level) defines a lower limit and the presence of a second
maximum input defines the upper limit. For the LCI scale from 1 to 10 and with similarly
weighted factors, the lower limit is set at 2.5 and the upper limit at 5. Taking into account
all possible risk scenarios, about 10% of the risk score are considered as acceptable, whereas
around 50% are considered as unacceptable.
A less conservative scenarios is shown in Figure 2.26b and allows accepting higher risks. For
this scenario, the lower limit is set for a risk having two maximum inputs (as the upper limit in
the first scenario), whereas the upper limit is defined by risks having three maximum inputs.
For the LCI scale from 1 to 10 and with similarly weighted factors, the lower limit is set at 5
and the upper limit at 7.5. Taking into account all possible risk scenarios, about 50% of the
risk score are considered as acceptable, whereas around 10% are considered as unacceptable.
A more balanced scenario is the one presented in Figure 2.26c, where the lower limit is taken
as in the first scenario and the upper limit is defined as the one in the second scenario. For the
LCI scale from 1 to 10 and with similarly weighted factors, the lower limit is set at 2.5 and the
upper limit at 7.5. Taking into account all possible risk scenarios, about 10% of the risk score
are considered as acceptable, whereas around 1% are considered as unacceptable.
Another approach to define these limits is not via such rules, but by taking into account
the distribution of possible risk scenarios. A possible scenario is shown in Figure 2.27. The
acceptability limits are determined mathematically: the lower 25% of all possible risk scenarios
are considered as acceptable, the upper 25% considered as unacceptable. This leads to a lower
limit of acceptability of 3.6 and a upper acceptability limit of 6.3.
Two systematic ways to determine the acceptability are therefore possible in LARA: a rule-like
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(b) Acceptable limit 5.0 and unacceptable limit 7.5.
101 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.25
0
LCI
De
ns
ity
ALARP UnacceptableAcceptable
(c) Acceptable limit 2.5 and unacceptable limit 7.5.
Figure 2.26 – Distribution of LCI values and acceptability values: rule-like setting of limits.
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Figure 2.27 – Distribution of LCI values and acceptability values: distribution-dependent
setting of limits.
approach as performed in the risk matrices or a more mathematical using the distribution of
possible risk scenarios. As an advantage of the Bayesian network calculation approach, the
distribution can be set directly and are not related to random mathematical effects. Addition-
ally, the risk estimation approach facilitates the acceptance judgment by offering a constant
variance through the risk scale.
Independently what logic lies beneath the setting of the limits, it remains a subjective decision
what is acceptable and what is not. This judgements is done by the board of the institution
and is usually valid for all organization units of a university. For comparability reasons and in
order to have a consistent strategy for risk management, the limits usually remain the same
for longer periods. If the context has changed, the occupational service can advice the board
of the institution to adjust the limits.
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4. Risk evaluation
Intention Example (as in Chapter 3.1)
• Evaluation of the LCI value according to the 
acceptability limits
LCI : 3.2 3
Unacceptable
Acceptable
6
ALARP
H336: May cause drowsiness or dizziness
Figure 2.28 – An illustrative example of the steps performed in the LARA workflow. A more
detailed explanation of this example can be found in Chapter 3.1.
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Figure 2.29 – Condensed LARA workflow: risk treatment.
(Parts of this subsection are a modified version of the article: Resource allocation in risk
management: integration of non-financial factors to risk mitigation [Pluess et al., 2014a].)
Most publications in the field of risk management focus on risk identification and more refined
or precise risk quantification rather than on risk treatment. Knowing the relative importance
of the different risks present is crucial when deciding about the different possibilities of risk
treatment. Moreover, these decisions are not based solely on a risk score; other aspects do
have an influence on the decision. A risk might have different ways of treatment; some might
be more favorable in financial terms, other might be more feasible for a specific situation.
Additionally, a better overall result might be achieved when treating several smaller risks rather
than a single, more important one.
Since every process has benefits, the amount of resources used for risk treatment need to
be in a relationship with the benefits gained. This limitation makes it necessary to choose
between different options of risk treatment in order to achieve an optimal result. Choosing
the corrective measures simply based on risk scores independently of financial concerns does
not lead to an effective risk management [Aven, 2011]. When lacking of defined financial
limitations, deciding about corrective measures by their ability to reduce a risk score is still
more favorable than choosing according to a risk score [Cox, 2012]. A better allocation can
be achieved when linking the risk reduction potential with the actual costs of the proposed
measure; this risk reduction per cost ratio gives the best results when allocating measures
when lacking of a defined limitation [Cox, 2012]. When a limited budget comes into play,
optimization methods such as the knapsack optimization are giving optimal results [Cox,
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2012]. When using this approach, even interactions between the different corrective measures
can be taken into account [Reniers and Sörensen, 2013]. However, all these approaches are
linked to a financial aspect or a limited budget. For less profit-oriented environments, such as
the academic research, the value gained by the basic research can hardly be estimated in direct
financial terms and is therefore hardly comparable to the costs of risk treatment. Additionally,
other factors may influence the choice of corrective measures, such as the acceptation by the
scientists or non-financial requirements.
In the previous step of the LARA workflow, the LCI values (ranging from 1 to 10) are compared
and the decision is made, if corrective measures need to be applied. According to predefined
limits, the risks are categorized in one of the three regions: acceptable, ALARP or unacceptable.
The board of the institution usually sets these limits and their application to all processes is
compulsory. For risks in the acceptable LCI range one can proceed with experiment without
corrective measure. The risks in the unacceptable region are treated regardless of the costs and
the effort necessary and are re-evaluated after setting the mitigation measures. The remaining
risks should be reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
To find the most preferable corrective measures in regards of both financial and non-financial
aspects, the concept of a resource allocation matrix (Figure 2.30) is introduced in the frame-
work of these PhD studies. This concept is similar to risk matrices, which are widely used
in risk management. The size (5x5) and the number of zones (4) of the matrix are chosen in
order to have ideal performance in terms of decision making according to Ni et al. [2010] The
two dimensions of the matrix, representing financial aspects and non-financial concerns, are
described in the following subsections. The zones of the matrix indicate an optimal resource
allocation as follows (from the bottom left to the upper right corner):
• Zone 1: risk mitigation measures falling in this zone are not favorable in both financial
and non-financial aspects. Such measures should be avoided for an effective resource
allocation.
• Zone 2: risk mitigation measures falling in this zone are either not favorable in financial
or non-financial aspects. Such measures should not be considered, if better alternatives
are available.
• Zone 3: risk mitigation measures falling in this zone are either favorable in financial or
non-financial aspects. Such measures should considered, if no better alternatives are
available.
• Zone 4: risk mitigation measures falling in this zone are favorable in both financial and
non-financial aspects. Such measures should considered in any case.
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2.6.1 Corrective Measures
For most risks, a multitude of option exists to identify possible corrective measures. However,
the choice is highly dependent on the moment in the design process, when possibilities are
assessed (see Chapter 1.4). In the academic research setting, the risk assessment takes place
at a moment, when most processes are already designed and most likely already in operation.
The approaches to identify possible corrective measures differ in their focus. What they have
in common is the intention to change a factor of the risk context. Either they change the risk
itself by substituting an element of the hazard/exposure relation or they are affecting the risk
dimension. For the severity, most measures fall into the category protection, since they are
aiming to lower consequences of happened accidents. The probability aspect is often related
to preventive corrective measures, lowering the chances of an accident to happen. However,
the concept of prevention and protection are not linked to a certain risk dimension or risk
prerequisite and are sometimes overlapping [Meyer and Reniers, 2013]. The detectability can
be increased with various methods, some preventive and some protective. The worsening
factors are inducing another important possibility for risk mitigation: avoidance. By avoiding
combinations of situations, risks can be reduced in relation to other risks. Therefore, corrective
measures are related to hazards or to worsening factors in LARA, since their presence is often
independent of the initial risk. If no element in the risk context can be changed, the risk can
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Figure 2.30 – For risks in the ALARP region, a resource allocation matrix is used to decide
between the corrective measure options.
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either be accepted or insured.
For LARA, various systematic approaches (e.g. STOP principle (see Chapter 1.1)) were used
to generate a database of corrective measures. For every corrective measure suggestion are
stored in the database, which risk dimension are most probably affected by it; nevertheless,
the analyst decides based on the specific situation, which dimensions are affected in which
magnitude. Additionally, feasibility values are stored in the database, which are important
for the allocation of corrective measures (see Section 2.6.3 ). Similar as for other factors in
the database, the user is able to suggest corrective measures for both hazards and worsening
factors. Due to this, the database is constantly increasing and reacting to changes in the
environment.
For a specific evaluation, the user chooses corrective measures for each hazard and judges
the relative impact on each single risk factor. For an optimal allocation of the resources, the
risk is reassessed and the user gives an estimation of the costs. If a corrective measure is
chosen in the resource allocation, the user defines clear responsibilities and deadlines for
these measures. In the information flow of LARA, this is an important part and the disposition
of the corrective measures will be monitored regularly (see Section 2.7).
2.6.2 Financial Aspects
In order to have an optimal approach in resources allocation, one has to take into account,
not only the risk score, but also the limited financial resources [Aven, 2011]. For some sce-
narios however, the risk score is still the most important indicator: risks with scores above an
acceptable limit should be reduced below this limit independently of the cost or last resort,
the process must be omitted. When the risk reduction stops being a necessity and multiple
options are possible, benchmarking becomes important to find the optimal allocation of
resources.
One possibility to determine the quality of corrective measures is to compare them based on
their ability to reduce the risk score risk-reduction index. By adding the financial component,
one obtains the relation between the risk reduction potential and the costs of a measure. The
risk reduction per unit cost index is another possibility to benchmark the measures for resource
allocation. Cox [2012] has shown, that for limited budgets (i.e. the budget is lower than the
sum of all measures’ costs), allocation strategies based on the risk reduction per unit cost
index are always favorable compared to the strategies using risk-reduction index or only the
risk score. Another way to approach the problem is to treat it as a knapsack problem [Reniers
and Sörensen, 2013]. In a knapsack problem, a knapsack is packed with a choice of items with
different size and utility value; an optimization algorithm can be used to reach a maximal utility
value. The choice of corrective values can be considered as such a problem, with the utility
value being the risk reduction potential and the weight being the cost of a measure. These
optimization algorithms lead to better results compared to the other allocation strategies [Cox,
2012; Reniers and Sörensen, 2013]. However, they rely on precisely defined budget for risk
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mitigation. For the academic research environment, such budgets are often neither defined
nor expressed; sometimes they are only planned at a higher organizational level, not at the
operational level. Additionally, the main aim of scientific research is not the direct financial
gain; this is however an important element in setting a budget for risk mitigation.
Due to the requirement to have a fixed budget for the knapsack approach, the risk reduction per
unit cost index is used as a benchmark indicator in the LARA method. This ratio is applied only
to the risks having a risk score in the ALARP range. All other risks are either unacceptable and
treated regardless to their cost (except if it is deemed too high, in this case the same approach
as the one used for the ALARP region is applied), or acceptable and therefore untreated. It this
case they are monitored to control that they remain in the acceptable region. The index serves
as the first dimension of a resource allocation matrix, indicating the performance and the
financial aspects of corrective measures. However, the costs of a specific measure needs to be
evaluated in relation to the longevity of it and the amortization has to be included. Otherwise,
expensive but long-lasting measures are penalized compared to the other measures. For the
examples in this chapter, an amortization period of ten years was assumed.
2.6.3 Non-financial Aspects
Financial aspects and the effectiveness of corrective measures to reduce a risk are playing a
key role when deciding about the allocation of safety measures. In a research environment
however, the gain related to a process is hardly directly measurable in financial terms. This
makes a direct assessment of gain, loss and the costs to prevent a loss meaningless. In general,
the effectiveness of a corrective measure can also depend on other factors but financial. These
factors arise from the specific situation, the personnel involved or other specificities. In order
to use them systematically for allocation of safety measures, their definition and quantification
is necessary. For LARA, the influencing factors were defined as follows:
Acceptability
Acceptability (A) describes the acceptability of the corrective measure by scientists directly
affected by it. If the staff is not accepting the proposed measure, its effectiveness will be
reduced and therefore the measure might not be favorable. Reasons for not accepting a
corrective measure could be: distrusting the mitigating capability or unwillingness to use it
due to distorted perception on cumbersomeness of operation.
Example: A fume hood in a chemistry laboratory is equipped with an alarm, which goes off
when the sash is open for too long. If a scientist doesn’t accept this measure he might block
the mechanism, so he can work without opening and closing it all the time.
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Simplicity
Simplicity (S) describes the facility of both operation and installation. If there are further
requirements for a corrective measure to function or the measure is complicated to operate, it
might be less favorable than other ones.
Example: automatic shutdown systems (e.g. blocking systems in case of misuse) can prevent
serious accidents. Thanks to their easiness of use these kinds of installations are preferred to
manual shutdown systems.
Compatibility
Compatibility (C) describes whether the corrective measure interacts with the environment
and other measures, both positively and negatively. These interactions need to be considered
because they can significantly influence the performance of the measure.
Example: sound alarms do have a low compatibility with noisy environment. On the other
hand, visual alarms are well adapted to darkened laboratories.
Versatility
Versatility (V ) defines the capability of corrective measures to positively affect a higher number
of different independent risks. A more versatile measure is more favorable to install compared
to specific measure, if the performance is comparable.
Example: installation or improvements of existing ventilation systems can positively affect
different hazards present in academic research laboratories.
These four factors do not have the same importance when choosing corrective measures; a
quantification of their relative importance is therefore needed. When dealing with choices
between different options, the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) has become an important
tool. This method was developed by Saaty [1980] to analyze and perform complex decisions
and it has found different applications in the field of risk management [Miri Lavasani et al.,
2011; Zeng et al., 2007; Ouédraogo et al., 2011b]. The AHP process breaks down the decision
making into the different criteria involved and the options to choose from. A decision hi-
erarchy is formed on these elements and a clear goal is defined. The criteria are compared
pairwise by the decision maker in order to set an overall weighting for the hierarchy. After
comparing the different options according to the criteria and their relative weighting, the most
favorable solution is pointed out. In our specific case, a shortened AHP process to determine
the weighting of the influencing factors was implemented. This shortened calculation is
based on a method already presented by Kariuki and Löwe [2007]. This allows determining
the relative influence of each factor on the non-financial feasibility. For the comparison, a
numerical judgment scale from 1 to 9 was used. Each attribute is judged how important it
92
2.6. Risk Treatment
is relative to the other attributes. The question to be asked for each comparison was “When
comparing the different attributes, which is more important for the non-financial feasibility?”
Five occupational health and safety specialists were asked to compare the different factors
pairwise according to the AHP procedure. To do so, all identified attributes were compared in
a pairwise matrix (n x n square matrix). The weighted eigenvectors of this matrix are added
component-wise to obtain an overall scale for priorities, i.e. ω1, ω2, ω3, . . . , ωn . The results
reflect the relative importance of each factor and are used in the resource allocation approach
as weighting for the factors. The obtained weighting factors (ωx , X = A, S, C, V) are presented
in Table 2.18.
Table 2.18 – Resulting weightings of the non-financial factors.
Factor Weighting (ωx )
Acceptability (ωA) 0.43
Simplicity (ωS) 0.30
Compatibility (ωC ) 0.10
Versatility (ωV ) 0.17
In order to express all non-financial aspects with one single value, they are unified into one
feasibility factor F. When choosing a corrective measure, the analyst will rate its acceptability,
simplicity, compatibility, and versatility separately on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 represents an
insufficient and 5 an outstanding rating). From the weights ωx and the rating value rx (rmax =
5), the feasibility factor F is calculated using following eq. 2.6:
F = ωA · r A +ωS · rS +ωC · rC +ωV · rV
rmax · (ωA +ωS +ωC +ωV )
(2.6)
F can attain the maximum value of 100% or 1. More the value F approaches the maximal value,
the better the feasibility of the corrective measure is in regard of the non-financial aspects.
The feasibility factor F serves as the second dimension of the resource allocation matrix.
2.6.4 Example of Resource Allocation
The use of solvents is part of almost every activity in a chemistry laboratory. However, the risks
originating from solvents were underestimated for a long time. Various solvents, previously
considered to be harmless, can have a serious effect on the human health. These effects are
often of chronic nature and difficult to assign to a specific source of exposure. To protect
exposed persons, most countries have defined legal permissible exposure limits, for both and
Time-Weighted Average Exposure (TWA). For the purpose of this study, dichloromethane and
chloroform serve as examples. In Switzerland, the following permissible exposure limits are
published [SUVA, 2014]:
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• Dichloromethane: TWA 50 mL/m3 and Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL) 180 mL/m3.
• Chloroform: TWA 0.5 mL/m3 and STEL 2.5 mL/m3.
Even for modern laboratories with adequate ventilation, these limits can be easily reached
due to an extensive use of these solvents. Unknown and presumably adverse effects on the
health, especially for more vulnerable persons (e.g. pregnancy) make it necessary to comply
with these limits and therefore to find and install corrective measures. For the illustration
of corrective measures’ selection process, we are considering only the risks resulting from
aspiration of the solvents dichloromethane and chloroform. Synergetic effects due to other
hazards present in the processes are left out for simplicity purpose. A risk analysis using the
LARA method has lead to the results expressed in Table 2.19.
According the limits in the LARA procedure, the LCI value ranges between the acceptable
and the unacceptable zone and should therefore be reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
The choice of the corrective measures using the resource allocation matrix for this example is
explained in the next paragraph.
Corrective Measures
Corrective measures can be found using various systematic approaches, e.g. STOP principle
(see Subsection1.2), which is organizing the measures into different groups:
Table 2.19 – LARA risk analysis of the use of chlorinated solvents in the laboratory.
Risk factor Sub-factor Qualitative description Assigned value
Severity Human: serious handicap 4
Probability Commonness Weekly, 40% of daily work 5
Occurrence Few accidents 2
Involvement 80% 4
Detectability Reliability Moderate reliability 3
Selectivity Moderate selectivity 3
Availability Moderate availability 3
Worsening factors Hazard-specific Wrong handling of the 2
existing ventilation
Higher vulnerability (pregnancy)
Low perception of the effects
(long-term handicap)
General Lack of procedures 2
Lack of training
Too many working hours
Synergetic (Not considered) 1
Laboratory criticality index (LCI) 5.45
94
2.6. Risk Treatment
• Strategic: if possible, a less toxic solvent should substitute the chlorinated solvents.
Since this is not always possible, the use of other products or even other chemical
pathways should be considered. For this study, the substitution of the solvents was not
considered; substitution can remove a hazard, but can also lead to new hazards related
to the new substances. Therefore, the substitution could bias the comparison.
• Technical: improving ventilation (local or general) and removing factors that limit its
current performance could reduce the concentration and therefore lower the risk.
• Organizational: training of the personnel can lower the risk significantly, since a misuse
of the existing installations can reduce their performance. Additionally, other organiza-
tional methods could be applied, such as dislocation of critical processes to less-exposed
laboratories, or limiting the exposure time by shortening the maximum work time in
the laboratory.
• Personal: as the last option, the adverse affects can be deflected using personal protec-
tion equipment (PPE), such a respiratory protection.
In order to find the feasibility value F, the corrective measures are judged in regard to its four
sub-factors. The results of this judgment (and the derived feasibility values) for the selected
corrective measures are expressed in Table 2.20. Improving the ventilation has the highest
feasibility value, since this measure is highly accepted by the personnel, simple and versatile.
On the other hand, organizational measures have the lowest value, since the measure is very
specific and might not be accepted by the staff concerned.
Table 2.20 – Overview of the feasibility values and their sub-factors for different corrective
measures .
Nr. Corrective measure rA rS rC rV F
1 General ventilation 5 5 4 5 0.98
2 Training 3 3 5 4 0.67
3 Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) 1 5 3 4 0.58
4 Organizational measures 2 3 2 2 0.46
5 Local ventilation 5 5 4 3 0.85
Table 2.21 exhibits the financial aspects of the resource allocation and the values for the
second dimension of the resource allocation matrix. Training of the scientist reduces the
risk significantly while having relatively low costs. Personal protective equipment has a
significantly lower risk reduction potential; even though it lowers the specific risk of inhalation
intoxication, due to its cumbersomeness it can also act as a worsening factor.
Combined, these two dimensions form the risk allocation matrix as shown in Figure 2.31.
According to this matrix, training of the staff is favorable to all other options. The risk reduction
per unit cost ratio is optimal and the measure is accepted and versatile. Improved ventilation
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(both local and general) and organizational measures can be found in the next zone of the
matrix and should be implemented as second priority; since they differ significantly in both
dimensions one can be favored over the other in function of own needs. Personal protection
equipment should be the last option to implement, since the risk reduction per costs ratio is
relatively low and the feasibility value does not compensate this lack.
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Figure 2.31 – Resource allocation matrix of the different corrective measures.
Table 2.22 only shows a comparison between the different approaches for choosing corrective
measures for the same example. Making the choice between the different measures on
financial or performance aspects only will lead to other priorities. When the risk reduction
potential is the only indicator, the training is the most preferred option. Including the financial
aspect, this option is still the most favorable; another change of priority can be observed for
organizational measures: even though the risk reduction potential is not as high as other
alternatives, this measure is highly favorable when taking into account the costs.
Table 2.21 – Overview of the factors influencing the financial dimension of the resource
allocation matrix: the costs, risk reduction and the risk reduction per unit cost ratio.
Nr. Corrective measure Costs Risk reduction Risk reduction / costs
[CHF] [105]
1 General ventilation 80’000 0.43 0.54
2 Training 10‘000 0.59 5.90
3 PPE 12’000 0.02 0.16
4 Organizational measures 20’000 0.46 2.30
5 Local ventilation 40’000 0.43 1.67
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Choosing the corrective measures according to this procedure has a significant impact on the
involved functions in a laboratory. A main benefit affecting all the actors is the lowered overall
risk level. For the user, the scientist performing the experiments, this improvement is made
with a minimal interference with his work. Since the user is rarely directly involved in financial
considerations, there are no direct disadvantages for him. On the other hand, the laboratory
head might face the disadvantage of not achieving the most financially optimal solution for a
laboratory. Nevertheless, the lowered overall risk level is beneficial. The analysis moderators
and safety delegates, acting as an interface between these groups, will gain flexibility in
choosing corrective measures according to the demands of both groups. Additionally, this
method allows all the involved functions to access the decision-making due to the simplicity
of the approach and therefore its better overall acceptation.
In the (academic) research environment, other factors than financial do matter when deciding
about corrective measures. The resource allocation matrix as proposed in this Section allows
taking these non-financial aspects into account. Namely, a possible measure is not only
judged by its capability of reducing a risk or the costs of the measure; other aspects, such as
acceptation, versatility, the ease of use and compatibility are also considered. These aspects,
unified into a single value, are estimated by safety experts in the field and are therefore
representing the situation in the laboratories more accurately when compared with other
approaches. By expanding the decision making on this additional dimension, the choice of
corrective measure can be optimized in several ways. When two corrective measures have
similar performance and costs, the decision should be based on other aspects. Additionally,
options that might be reasonable financially, but not feasible in the specific situation, can be
avoided. Although the risk analysis example presented in this work is a simplified description
of a complex situation in research laboratories, it already indicates that making decision
between different alternatives of risk mitigation can be very complex. When expanding the
resource allocation to a complete process, the number of hazards and the corresponding
corrective measures can grow exponentially. Additionally, hazards and corrective measures
can interact in several ways. Some hazards might increase other risks; for some scenarios,
corrective measures can change a supposedly independent hazard. When facing such complex
decisions, an intuitive approach can significantly simplify the choice; the allocation matrix,
Table 2.22 – Comparison of corrective measures’ priority rating obtained using different
prioritization criteria.
Priority according to
Corrective measure Risk reduction Reduction/costs Allocation matrix
Improved ventilation 4 4 2-3
Training 2 1 1
PPE 5 5 5
Organizational measures 3 2 2-3
Biological monitoring 1 3 4
97
Chapter 2. LARA - Laboratory Assessment and Risk Analysis
having similar advantages as the well-established risk matrix, is such an intuitive approach.
The use of the allocation matrix in the LARA framework can help allocating resources in an
optimal way and therefore helps to notably lower the risk in the academic environment.
5. Risk treatment 
Intention Example (as in Chapter 3.1)
• Judge selected corrective measures according 
to their financial and non-financial feasibility
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Figure 2.32 – An illustrative example of the steps performed in the LARA workflow. A more
detailed explanation of this example can be found in Chapter 3.1.
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Figure 2.33 – Condensed LARA workflow: risk control.
The next step in the LARA workflow is the risk control. The risk management process in general
is an iterative process; it does not end at the implementation of corrective measures. A main
responsibility is at the OSH service, which analyzes the results in case of irregularities and
control that the proposed correction measures are established as planned. Once the measure
is applied, the OSH service ensures, that the measure works as intended, effectively lowers
the risks, and provides the robustness of the measure for long-term use. Corrective measures
however can be sources of new risks or can help to displace existing risks from one hazard to
another; the applied corrective measure need to be checked on such effects regularly.
However, the risk control is not only a simple control effort. In a fast moving environment as
the research setting, not only the scope of research is underlying quick changes, hazards and
risk are constantly developing as well. Change management is an important factor for risk
management and should be applied to a risk management process as LARA. This includes
monitor changes and act accordingly. For LARA, changes are mainly related to the context
and how they influence the risk management process; yet, the influences are not necessarily
limited to the predefined system. However, the changes are not only unidirectional and are
different for every step of the risk management framework.
Definition of the Context
Changes in the context can either be on a macroscopic level, on an organizational level or
a technical level. The broader context is not underlying rapid changes, but if changes are
happening, they can have a tremendous impact on the system. Pressure in form of new
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legal obligations of regulations can change the framework completely and therefore it has to
change accordingly. For organizational context, the performance of the responsibilities and
the information flow needs to be observed and changed, if the system is not efficient enough.
This is important as well for the technical context; the risk management workflow needs to be
shaped according to the real situation and constantly reconsidered.
Hazard Identification
For LARA, the database structure is a crucial element and is important in almost every step of
the risk management workflow. It is designed to let users suggest new entries and therefore
to grow constantly. However, the responsibility for the database development should not
remain at the user of LARA. Keeping track of near misses and accidents is crucial for having
an overview of the risk situation and helps to detect emerging risks. These risks need to be
introduced in the database systematically.
Risk Analysis
Constant change is important for the risk analysis step in several ways. The risk dimensions
are related to how risk is seen in the context of this framework. Adjustments in reaction to
changes can be done as smaller changes: adjustment in the dimensions scales, or changes
in the underlying probability distribution (see Chapter 2.4.2). The users can be biased in
their judgments; a way of compensating this is to change these distributions. If the changes
are more important, the system might even be rearranged in terms of the risk dimensions
(adding factors or removing them). The risk calculation is defining how these dimensions are
combined and should deliver an accurate impression of the risk. This includes the way, how
these factors are weighted and this can be a matter of change due to contextual influences. If
one dimension is considered more important than another one, this should be expressed in
the calculation. Additionally, the risk calculation method should not remain a static subject
and needs to be reconsidered periodically.
Risk Evaluation and Risk Treatment
Changes in the context do have an important impact on the risk evaluation and the risk
treatment. The main factors in these step are budgets, acceptability limits, feasibility values,
and weighting of these factors. If one of these factors is affected by changes, the system
needs to reconstruct to fit the demands of the workflow. Additionally, the choice of corrective
measures is a part of the database in LARA and needs to be developed constantly. Lesson
learned from past accidents need to be implemented in the corrective measure database.
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Figure 2.34 – Condensed LARA workflow: risk documentation.
As a last step of the workflow in LARA, the results are documented. Appropriate risk docu-
mentation is essential for every risk management approach and supports the continuous
learning intended in the iterative process of LARA. Depending on the context, some legislation
might require a detailed documentation of the risk management results. In LARA, a detailed
risk evaluation report is generated for each evaluation. This allows re-consulting the infor-
mation for different purposes, for example if a process is evaluated again in the framework
of a periodic revision. When the process is carries out as a routine task, a short summary of
the risk assessment will be added to the specific SOP. Furthermore, unspecific information is
stored in the databases to expand their content and to improve their feasibility. The detailed
documentation for each specific step contains following information.
Definition of the Context
The documentation of the context mainly involves the roles and responsibilities at the moment
of an evaluation. This assures traceability information and allows to check details if necessary.
Another important aspect is to document all factors influencing the evaluation: acceptability
limits, general information about the current LARA workflow and information about the
specific process of an evaluation.
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Hazard Identification
For the hazard identification, all the information available at the moment of the evaluation is
recorded in LARA. For later consultations, this allows reproducing the results and might help
to improve the risk identification approach. Since the process is described in detail for the
documentation, a certain level of confidence needs to be met. However, this is important for
the risk communication, described in Chapter 2.9.
Risk Analysis
In LARA, the risk dimensions are used to describe a risk and to estimate the LCI value. However,
the scales of these dimensions are not fixed and are intended change regularly to fit the
current conditions defined by the context of the risk management. The calculation method of
LARA underlies the same principle and is modified according to the situation present. The
documentation in LARA keeps record about the current risks dimensions, their scales and the
risk calculation method, in order to grant the traceability.
Risk Evaluation
The risk evaluation LARA uses acceptability limits to determine the acceptable, the ALARP
and the unacceptable region. An overview about the parameters valid for the risk evaluation is
given in the risk documentation.
Risk Treatment
The risk treatment in LARA integrates non-financial and financial aspects in the resource
allocation for risk mitigation. As the risk analysis step, this resource allocation uses defined
constants, but is intended to allow a dynamic change in the parameters. An overview about
the parameters valid for an evaluation is given in the risk documentation. Additionally, all
information about the corrective measure options are recorded. For the corrective measures
which are about to be applied, the efforts, costs, responsibilities, and deadlines are recorded
to allow an effective control of the measures.
Risk Control
The risk control is an element of the change management in the LARA framework. For the
documentation of this step, the development of the different system variables is documented:
acceptability limits (how and why they are changed), database (coverage, near misses, and
adjustments in the structure), and calculation method (how and why the calculation method
was adjusted). Additionally, the control of the risk treatment is documented in any revision of
an evaluation, since this information is crucial for reconsidering the risk of a project.
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Figure 2.35 – Condensed LARA workflow: risk communication.
Risk communication is a central element of LARA, which stand besides the iterative workflow
and has a superior function. Basically, the risk communication affects everything, especially
the documentation of the evaluations and the general information about LARA. A main
concept of the communication is that every role of the risk management workflow is able to
understand decisions made based on the risk evaluations. However, this is also expanded
to the stakeholders of an organization. Nevertheless, the information leaving the institution
should be revised carefully to avoid misinterpretations or even loss of sensitive information.
Confidential handling of the information is essential for this environment, since processes
and procedures might not yet been published and leakage of information could be a serious
problem. Also internal guidelines are necessary, since disclosure of information could be used
for adverse actions (e.g. sabotage or espionage).
However, the communication in LARA is not unidirectional and the information that is en-
tering the system is as important as the information leaving the LARA workflow. Knowledge
allows establishing the context of LARA and is important to integrate on every level of ap-
plication. For a risk management technique such as LARA, it is crucial that all interests are
considered and also that the highest amount of expertise possible is used to established the
guidelines of the system. For constantly expanding the system with expertise, a widespread
application and continuous training and education is a key for achieving the goals of LARA.
In the LARA framework, the results of every evaluation are distributed according to the roles
presented in Chapter 2.2. The OSH service is responsible for the distribution of these results.
Additionally, it takes care of care of the classification of these results; if the results are extraordi-
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nary in any kind of way, the OSH service gives further information to the other roles to ensure
the traceability of the results. The institutional administration receives all evaluation results
for informational purposes. The OSH service also distributes the results the specific working
group where the evaluation was performed. All of the roles present in this group (group head,
safety delegate, and scientist) receive the evaluation reports. To ensure the impact of an
evaluation, the responsible roles must provide acceptance of the results.
However, the results of LARA are not only of use for risk management purposes. Since the
LARA method has also educational intentions, the method and its results might be used this
purpose as well. On one side, this includes the application of this risk assessment workflow on
processes, which students are actually performing in their practical education. In this case, the
communication of the results remains in the closed system of the specific course. These results
can be compared to the results gathered from the course responsible and should be discussed
to achieve an educational effect. On the other side, LARA evaluation results can be used
independently from a practical education course to demonstrate the application of the method
or to show different aspects related to occupational health and safety. Furthermore, the results
can be used for risk management education due to the simplicity and the traceability of the
LARA method.
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In the previous chapters, the necessity of a risk management technique for the research and
teaching environment was shown, the ideal specifications of such a method proposed, and
the LARA risk management technique presented as a possible solution. In order to show the
feasibility of LARA, the method has been tested intensively with various examples. The main
purpose of these tests was to show that the LARA method is able to reach its goals (Chapter
2.1):
• Provide a risk management technique for all types of academic research laboratories.
• Allow a less resource demanding risk management, that fits the provided resources of
the research environment.
• Development of a software application, allowing user-friendly and intuitive risk analysis.
• Consideration of the particular setting of the academic research environment.
To conclusively demonstrate this, the studied subjects were chosen to reproduce a represen-
tative image of the research done at universities. This does not only include a broad choice
of disciplines (chemistry, biology, etc.), but also a variety of studied procedures from new
experiments to routine tasks performed in laboratories.
LARA was developed at EPFL and was mainly influenced by the safety culture of this institution.
For other institutions, the different organizational context and safety standards could make an
application difficult. Since LARA is intended to be a universal tool for research and teaching
laboratories, the feasibility at other institutions was tested as well.
In order to have show the feasibility of the LCI scale and the risk evaluation process, the
acceptability values for the different examples are set differently. In a normal risk manage-
ment system, these values remain the same for all evaluations in order to have an optimal
comparability of the different results.
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For this test, the complete LARA workflow was questioned and evaluated in detail to show the
feasibility, the strengths, and the limitations of the approach. Especially the risk assessment
workflow was of interest for the evaluation of LARA. The organizational implications of a risk
evaluation will not be discussed to the same extent, since the results are not to be implemented
in the organization. However, the suggestions for corrective measures were communicated
and the responsibility remains at the institution, were the evaluation took place.
The particular steps of the workflow are probed as follows:
Definition of the context Does the context allow the application of a risk management
technique as LARA? Is the responsible scientist capable of performing the evaluation? Is it
possible to subdivide an evaluation into activities of reasonable size and to describe them
accordingly?
Hazard identification Based on the process description, does the database of LARA give
enough options to identify hazards? Is the classification feasible for this purpose? Does the
analyst agree with the identified hazards?
Risk analysis Are the risk dimensions appropriate to describe the risks present? Do the
single dimension fulfill their intended goal of describing the mentioned aspects? Does the LCI
values of the risks represent a plausible image of the risks and the risk level in general?
Risk evaluation Do the defined limits allow classifying the risk in the categories acceptable,
ALARP, or unacceptable? Does the classification of the risk match the conception of the
analyst?
Risk treatment Is LARA capable of suggesting possible corrective measures and are they
feasible? Does the resource allocation using the allocation matrix allow a more distinct
decision for the risk mitigation?
Risk control, risk documentation and risk communication Does the documentation pro-
vided by LARA give an adequate overview of the risk situation for the evaluation? How does a
change in the context affect the example and the risk assessment results?
By answering these questions and by testing LARA intensively, it will also be shown, that LARA
matches the ideal specifications (Table 3.1) of a risk management technique presented in
Chapter 1.
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Table 3.1 – Ideal specifications of a risk assessment approach for the academic research
environment.
Requirements Approach
Data Low to moderate
Difficulty Low
Complexity Low
Expertise System (moderate)
Time Low
Form Semi-quantitative
Level of detail Moderate
Direction Hybrid
Focus Variable
Phase Operation
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3.1 Demonstration of the LARA Approach
3.1.1 LARA Procedure
In this section, the LARA approach is illustrated using an example of a short chemical synthesis.
For simplification reasons, the example is not discussed to its full extent.
Process
The example synthesis is a two-step synthesis to form ethyl-(E)-3-(3-nitrophenyl) acrylate
(Figure 3.1).
NO2 NO2
Br
NO2
O
O
Figure 3.1 – The two-step synthesis of ethyl-(E)-3-(3-nitrophenyl) acrylate is used to illustrate
the application of LARA.
Step 1 Nitrobenzene (3.0 g, 3.0 mmol, 1.0 eq) was added to a three-necked flask filled with
24 ml of water and 24 ml of sulfuric acid. The reaction mixture was cooled to 25°C. Potassium
bromate (5.5 g, 3.3 mmol, 1.1 eq) was added in portions to keep the temperature between
25-35°C. After the complete addition, the reaction mixture was stirred for 3.5 h, exothermic
reactions were cooled with ice. The formed solid was filtered, washed with water (2 x 10 ml)
and dried to yield to a yellow solid.
Step 2 m-Bromonitrobenzene (1.07 g, 5.29 mmol, 1.0 eq), ethyl acrylate (6.0 ml, 52.9 mmol,
10.0 eq), palladium acetate (12 mg, 0.05 mmol, 0.01 eq) and triphenylphosphane (28 mg, 0.1
mmol, 0.02 eq) were dissolved in 15 ml of dimethylformamide and 1 ml of Et3N was added.
The reaction mixture was stirred overnight at 87°C under nitrogen. The reaction mixture was
cooled down to RT and extracted with toluene (13 ml). The organic phase was washed with
1 M HCl (13 ml) and with water (2 x 10 ml). The solvent of the organic phase were removed
under reduced pressure and the remaining oil was purified with column chromatography (6 :
1 ; Hexane : Ethyl acetate). Drying yielded to a brown solid.
1. Definition of the Context
As a first step, the evaluation boarders and the related activities are defined. In this example, the
evaluation consists of two activities: the first and the second step of this synthesis. Additionally,
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the general worsening factors of the laboratory where this synthesis takes place are determined.
From the LARA database, the factors presented in Table 3.2 are considered being present and
valid for the whole evaluation (General Worsening Factors: 2).
Table 3.2 – General worsening factors present for this evaluation.
General Worsening Factor
Missing safety training
Blocked emergency exits
Missing safety awareness
Responsibilities unclear
Overloaded fume hoods
2. Hazard Identification
For each activity, the process is divided into the process steps (Table 3.3) and the components
(Table 3.4), regardless if it is an action, material, or equipment. For the second activity, the
process is described as follows:
Table 3.3 – Process steps of the second activity.
Process steps
1. Dissolution of the reactants
2. Addition of Et3N
3. Stirring overnight under nitrogen
4. Cooling down of the reaction mixture
5. Extraction with toluene
6. Washing with 1 M HCl and water
7. Removing of solvent under reduced pressure
8. Column chromatography
9. Drying
Table 3.4 – Hazardous components of the second activity.
Hazardous components
m-Bromonitrobenzene Heating
Ethyl acrylate Toluene
Palladium acetate HCl
Triphenylphosphane Reduced pressure
Dimethylformamide Hexane
Et3N Ethyl acetate
Nitrogen Silica
The components are possibly related with a hazard and are therefore matched with the hazard
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database in LARA. For the use of the chemical hexane during the column chromatography, the
following hazards are involved:
Table 3.5 – Hazards related to the hazardous component hexane.
Hazards
H225: Highly flammable liquid and vapor
H361: Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child
H304: May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways
H372: May cause damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure
H315: Causes skin irritation
H336: May cause drowsiness or dizziness
H411: Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects
The process steps and components are determined for all the activities from this evaluation.
Afterwards, all the hazards related to these components are determined.
3. Risk Analysis
The risk analysis in LARA is demonstrated on the bases of the hazard H336: May cause drowsi-
ness or dizziness induced by the solvent hexane. To do this, the risk dimensions are evaluated
and a value is assigned; Figure 3.2 shows the hazard data sheet generated in LARA. The risk
dimensions are assigned based on following considerations:
Severity The impact is limited to human damages. However, since it is a rather unimportant
effect, the impact is considered as injury without work interruption (Severity: 1).
Probability This dimension consists of three sub-dimensions. The first is occurrence and
is estimated to be an occasional accident (Occurrence: 3). The second sub-dimension is
the commonness of this activity, which is assumed for this example as an activity done each
semester taking up a high percentage of the daily work (Commonness: 3). The last factor
for the probability indicates how much the hazard is involved in this activity. Since hexane
is only used during the column chromatography and drying, the involvement is rather low
(Involvement: 2).
Detectability As the probability dimension, the detectability has three sub-dimensions. The
detector for this hazard is assumed to be human senses, which means the olfactory perception.
A higher concentration of solvent vapors can be detected this way and the hazard avoided,
but the performance of this detector is not ideal for each aspect. Therefore, the values are
determined as follow: Availability 1, Reliability 5, and Selectivity 3.
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H336: MAY CAUSE DROWSINESS OR DIZZINESS 
 
Hazard source:  Hexane.  
Consequences of the hazard:  Drowsiness or dizziness.  
 
 
Hazard category Hazard group Hazard 
Chemical hazards Inhalation hazard H336 
 
 Presence in steps   
1. Step 2. Step 3. Step 4. Step 5. Step 6. Step 7. Step 8. Step 9. Step 
 
Risk factor Assigned  
Value 
CM 1 CM 2 CM 3 CM 4 CM 5 CM 6 
Severity 1 1 1     
Occurrence 3 2 2     
Commonness 3 3 3     
Involvement 2 2 2     
Availability 1 1 1     
Reliability 5 5 5     
Selectivity 3 3 3     
General WF 2 2 2     
Hazard-specific WF 2 2 2     
Synergetic WF 2 2 2     
LCI 3.2 2.9 2.9     
 
Nr. Corrective Measure Costs [CHF] A S C V F 
1 Improvement of the existing 
ventilation 
80’000 5 5 4 5 0.98 
2 Information to improve the 
performance of the existing 
ventilation 
1’000 4 1 4 4 0.62 
 
Nr.  Hazard-specific WF Score 
1 Insufficient ventilation  2.3 
2 Elevated temperatures 1.6 
 
Nr.  Synergetic WF Score 
1 Evaporation (Heat) 3.9 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Hazard data sheet for the hazard H336: May cause drowsiness or dizziness.
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Worsening Factors The general worsening factors are defined for the whole evaluation
(General worsening factors: 2). The other factors depend on the hazard. On one side, the
hazard-specific worsening factors are chosen from the LARA database (Hazard-specific wors-
ening factors: 2) as shown in Figure 3.2. On the other hand, the synergetic worsening factors
depend on the other hazards present in this activity. For this hazard, the evaporation under
reduced pressure is considered to worsen the initial hazard (Synergetic worsening factors: 2).
Laboratory Criticality Index Using the described values from the hazard data sheet (Figure
3.2) the LCI value is calculated with a resulting value of 3.2.
This procedure is repeated with every single hazard identified for the two activities of the
synthesis of ethyl-(E)-3-(3-nitrophenyl) acrylate.
4. Risk Treatment
With the levels of acceptability set to 3.0 for acceptable risks and 6.0 for unacceptable risks,
the evaluated hazard lies in the ALARP region. Therefore, corrective measures are evaluated
with the resource allocation matrix. The hazard data sheet (Figure 3.2) gives an overview of
the possible corrective measures available in the LARA database. The resource allocation is
demonstrated with the corrective measure information to improve the performance of the
existing ventilation.
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Figure 3.3 – A sample resource allocation matrix based on the corrective measures of the
hazard H336: May cause drowsiness or dizziness.
First, all of the above dimensions are re-evaluated under the assumption, that the corrective
measure is applied. This re-evaluation comes to the result, that the accident becomes less
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common and the occurrence rating lowers to 2. This leads to a new LCI value of 2.9. Combined
with the costs of this measure, the risk reduction per costs ratio is determined (30).
The corrective measures are then classified according to their feasibility values: the acceptabil-
ity (4) is seen as relatively high. The simplicity (1) is rated as very low, since the measure needs
a lot of interaction. However, the compatibility (4) and the versatility (4) are both judged to be
high, since the measure improved the situation for other hazards as well. Overall, this leads to
a feasibility value of 0.62.
This procedure is repeated for all the corrective measures derived from risks falling in the
ALARP region. The collected corrective measures are illustrated in the allocation matrix (Figure
3.3). The regions of the matrix give an indication, which measures are more favorable than
others. The actual choice of corrective measures is discussed with the safety delegate and if
necessary with the research group head.
3.1.2 LARA Web Interface
One goal of the LARA project is to provide a user friendly and intuitive software for risk man-
agement in the research and teaching environment. A second version of this browser-based
software was developed in the framework of this PhD project. This software allows performing
the procedure described in the previous chapter in a simple and intuitive environment. The
users are guided through the evaluations and can suggest hazards, corrective measures and
worsening factors to the database. After an evaluation of the administrators, these entries are
added to the database. Once an evaluation is finished, the information flow is provided with
automatically created reports, which are sent to all the roles defined in Chapter 2.2.
The following screenshots of this web-based software give an overview of some functions. A
more detailed explanation can be found in the Appendix B.
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Figure 3.4 – The dashboard screen of LARA.
Figure 3.5 – In the evaluation overview, the user is able to add and consult all information
related to a evaluation.
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Figure 3.6 – The hazard overview allows to enter all the hazard-related information and
provides the generation of the hazard data sheet.
Figure 3.7 – The user can enter the specific risk dimension rating in pop-up windows (severity
in this screenshot).
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Figure 3.8 – Entering database specific values is possible trough a specific interface, which
allows suggestions.
Figure 3.9 – Corrective measures are directly added to hazards to ensure optimal overview and
integration of organizational factors.
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Figure 3.10 – Activity details, such as the related process steps can be entered easily using the
interface.
Figure 3.11 – The software is aimed at optimal user interference and allows modifications of
all setting details.
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3.2 EPFL
The Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) was founded as a part of the University
of Lausanne, but was split off into an independent organization in 1969 under the control of
the Swiss Confederation. It is part of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology (ETH) domain,
which includes the following institutions: the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich
(ETHZ), Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI),
the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (EAWAG), the Swiss Federal
Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology (EMPA), and the Swiss Federal Institute
for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research (WSL). In numbers, EPFL presents itself as follows
[EPFL, 2014]:
• 5 schools, 2 colleges, 1 transdisciplinary entity, 27 institutes, 340 laboratories
• 9’868 students (Bachelor, Master, PhD post-docs) of over 125 nationalities
• 5’534 staff (scientific, administrative, and technical, including PhD students)
• 859.4 million CHF annual expenses
The evaluations at EPFL are conducted at the Faculty of Basic Sciences (FSB). This faculty
consists of chemistry, mathematics and physics institutes. The Occupational Safety and Health
Service of the School of Basic Sciences (SB-SST) group is in charge of the safety for the faculty
and provides a support aimed at protection on the workplace for researchers and students of
the School of Basic Sciences (SB) as well as for the hosts in its building [SST, 2014].
3.2.1 Laboratory of Inorganic Synthesis and Catalysis
The first application example of LARA was performed at the Laboratory of Inorganic Synthesis
and Catalysis (LSCI) at EPFL. The main research area of this group is to develop catalysts that
are made of earth-abundant elements for chemical transformations that are related to synthesis,
energy, and sustainability [LSCI, 2014]. The characteristics of this research group are:
• Professor Xile Hu, head of the research group
• Gerald Bauer (PhD student), safety delegate
• 4 postdoctoral scholars and 9 PhD students
• 1 apprentice and 1 administrative collaborator
• 10 different nationalities
• 5 laboratories
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! Figure 3.12 – The synthesis of [Fe(BoPa)Cl(THF)2] is evaluated as a first example with the LARA
method.
The objective of the evaluation is the multi-step synthesis of [Fe(BoPa)Cl(THF)2] (Figure 3.12).
This synthesis was performed according to the supplementary information from the article
by Bauer et al. [2014]. The process was chosen to be evaluated in LARA due to the typical
characteristics of an average inorganic synthesis. The procedure was developed based on
similar syntheses and was performed several times, but no SOP was established. According to
the responsible scientist (Gerald Bauer, who is also the safety delegate of LSCI), no noteworthy
accident ever happened in the research group for this or for a similar synthesis. The main
hazardous element in the process is assumed to be the use of n-Butyllithium, due to the high
reactivity of this substance.
Due to the extent of a full risk assessment, the data shown in this section are condensed results
of this evaluation. The full results of the risk assessment are given in Appendix C.1.
LARA Results
Process The first step of the process is the hydration of o-nitrobenzoic acid to anthranilic
acid. As a second step, anthranilic acid is coupled with 2-chlorobenzoic acid to form 2,2’-
iminodibenzoic acid, which is chlorinated in a third step to 2,2’-iminodibenzoyl chloride
and coupled again with R-(-)-phenylglycinol to get the desired ligand 7C oxaz-NNN-Ph. This
ligand is used to form the iron complex [Fe(Bopa-Ph)Cl(THF)2], which is used for further
investigations, but not as part of this evaluation.
The multi-step synthesis of [Fe(BoPa)Cl(THF)2] involves six necessary steps to reach the
desired product. Table 3.6 gives an overview of the mentioned steps, which are considered
as activities in LARA and analyzed accordingly. Activity Nr. 5 includes operations with n-
Butyllithium and has the highest average LCI of all activities (4.6). The highest number of
identified hazard is 31 hazards in activity Nr. 4, having an average LCI of 4.1. The detailed
procedures, hazard sources and identified risks can be found in C.1.
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Table 3.6 – Involved activities in the synthesis of [Fe(BoPa)Cl(THF)2].
Nr. Activity Hazard sources Risks Average LCI
1 Synthesis of anthranilic acid 5 13 4.0
2 Synthesis of 2,2’-Iminodibenzoic acid 6 14 4.0
3 Synthesis of 2,2’-Iminodibenzoyl chloride 4 17 4.2
4 Synthesis of 7C-Oxaz-NNN-Ph 7 31 4.1
5 Synthesis of (Bopa-Ph)Li 3 19 4.6
6 Synthesis of [Fe(Bopa-Ph)Cl(THF)2] 4 15 4.3
Risks Most risks in this evaluation originate from the use of chemicals. In total, 109 risks
were identified and assessed according to the LARA procedure. The average LCI value (4.2)
for all risks is relatively low (on a scale from 1 to 10). The most unimportant risk is related to
the heat source used in different synthesis steps (LCI 2.0), whereas the most important risks
are related to the toxic and reactive properties of n-BuLi (highest LCI: 5.6). Table 3.7 gives an
overview of the most important risks of the evaluation; the same risks are also presented in
Figure 3.13. For simplification reasons, multiply occurring risks from different sources are
left out. A complete list of all evaluated risks can be found in attachment C.1 Most risks in
this evaluation originate from the use of chemicals. In total, 109 risks were identified and
assessed according to the LARA procedure. The average LCI value for all risks is relatively low
with 4.2 (on a scale from 1 to 10). The most unimportant risk is related to the heat source
used in different synthesis steps (LCI 2.0), whereas the most important risks are related to the
toxic and reactive properties of n-BuLi (highest LCI: 5.6). Table 3.7 gives an overview of the
most important risks of the evaluation and Figure 3.13 shows the LCI values before corrective
measures were applied. For simplification reasons, multiply occurring risks from different
sources are reduced to the one with the highest risk score. A complete list of all evaluated risks
and the detailed values for each risk factor can be found in Appendix C.1.
Table 3.7 – The most important risks in the synthesis of [Fe(BoPa)Cl(THF)2].
Nr. Risk Origin LCI
1 H250 Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air n-BuLi 5.3
2 H261 In contact with water releases flammable gas n-BuLi 5.5
3 H300 Fatal if swallowed CH3SO2Cl 5.2
4 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways n-BuLi 5.6
5 H310 Fatal in contact with skin CH3SO2Cl 5.4
6 H319 Causes serious eye irritation THF 5.0
7 H330 Fatal if inhaled CH3SO2Cl 5.4
8 H351Suspected of causing cancer THF 5.0
9 H360 May damage fertility or the unborn child DMF 5.2
10 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child Toluene 5.2
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Figure 3.13 – LSCI: the most important risk in context of the ALARP region. All values above
7.5 are considered as unacceptable, whereas the values below 5.0 are considered as acceptable
(as in Scenario b) from Figure 2.26).
Risk treatment For this evaluation, the limits of acceptability are set to 5.0 for acceptable
risks and 7.5 for unacceptable risks (as in Figure 2.26b), the ALARP region is defined between
those two values (Figure 3.13). No risk falls in the category unacceptable, therefore a treatment
regardless of the costs is not necessary. The risks shown in Table 3.7 correspond to the ALARP
region, therefore the risk allocation matrix is used to decide between possible corrective
measures. Table 3.8 gives an overview of the options for the risk treatment. As for the risks, the
corrective measures are reduced for simplification reasons: if a corrective measure affects more
than one risk, the one with the highest risk reduction potential is taken into the comparison. A
complete list of the corrective measures determined for the risk in the ALARP region can be
found in Appendix C.1.
According to the results of the resource allocation matrix, most measures in this comparison
are favorable both financially and non-financially (see Figure 3.14). The most favorable option
is to raise safety awareness for the use of carcinogenic or teratogenic substances (Nr. 4),
such as toluene or n-Butyllithium. The measure aims specifically at female scientist to avoid
exposition of possibly pregnant women, since the teratogenic properties are suspected to
cause the highest risks in this process. Other measures do not provide an ideal performance
in financial and non-financial terms. On one hand, biological monitoring (Nr. 2) might show
possibly dangerous expositions and lower the risk significantly, but the feasibility of such a
measure is not given in this context. On the other hand, the improvement of the ventilation
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Table 3.8 – Suggested corrective measures for the risks in the ALARP region.
Nr. Corrective measure Affects risk Nr. Priority
1 Additional PPE 5 1
2 Biological monitoring 10 2
3 Improvement of ventilation 7 2
4 Information to raise awareness 9 1
5 Intensified safety training for critical substances 1 1
6 Training to avoid misuse of existing measures 2 1
7 Training to raise safety awareness 3 1
(Nr. 3) has a high feasibility, but lacks an ideal risk reduction per costs potential. However, the
risk level in the process in not unacceptably high, therefore the decision remains with the
research group head, which measures are actually advisable.
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Figure 3.14 – LSCI: resource allocation matrix of the different corrective measures.
Outcome of the application The results of the evaluation reveal on one side the most im-
portant risks of the project. Even if they remain untreated in terms of corrective measures,
awareness is raised and the involved scientists might be more careful when performing certain
activities. On the other side, possible corrective measures were determined and their effective-
ness both financially and non-financially were estimated. The options of risk treatment are
not mandatory and will be discussed with the safety delegate of the research group. For this
evaluation, the suggestion according to LARA is to lower the risk H360: may damage fertility
or the unborn child with the corrective measure information to raise awareness (Figure 3.15).
This measure allows to achieve an optimal impact with low resources. The general risk level is
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rather low, thus leaving the other risks untreated seems acceptable.
In order to get the corrective measures applied in a reasonable amount of time, an action plan is
established. In the further procedure of LARA, the risk evaluation results, the recommendation
for corrective measures, and the action plan for the implementation of the corrective measures
is distributed to all the roles in the LARA framework (see Chapter 2.2).
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Figure 3.15 – LSCI: only the risk Nr. 9 is suggested to be treated according to the LARA results.
Remarks on the Application
The application of LARA for this example was possible without limitations. The scope of LARA
matched the application for a chemical synthesis and the method gave enough possibilities to
describe the activities, the hazard sources, and the hazards. The identification of chemical
risks in LARA is beneficially influenced by the strict and very detailed hazard classification of
the GHS system. The description of the hazards matched the requirements of a method for the
research environment: the semi-quantitative approach allowed untrained scientist to describe
and assess the risks. The LCI results of the risks assessment mostly fit the appraisement of the
scientists performing the process. As in LARA, he sees the properties of n-BuLi as the most
important risk to take care of, but not as an unacceptably high risk. The corrective measures
are not assumed to be necessary, since the risks are not unacceptably high; a circumstance that
is also demonstrated in LARA. This matches the real situation, where the process is conducted
without any change and the risks are considered acceptable.
123
Chapter 3. Application Examples of LARA
3.2.2 Group of Catalytic Reaction Engineering
The second application example of LARA was performed at the Group of Catalytic Reaction
Engineering (GGRC) at EPFL. The research focus of this group is thedevelopment of novel
compact (micro)-reactors based on structured catalysts in the form of grids, gauzes and sintered
metal fibers [GGRC, 2014]. The characteristics of this research group are:
• Professor Lioubov Kiwi, head of the research group
• Tatiana Iouranova (senior scientist), safety delegate
• 3 postdoctoral scholars
• 4 PhD students
• 2 apprentice and 1 administrative collaborator
• 4 laboratories
The objective of this evaluation is a selective hydrogenation of 2-butyne-1,4-diol in a batch
reactor (see Figure 3.16). The purpose of this experiment is to train students in the use of
these devices and to demonstrate certain effects by changing the conditions of the reaction.
The alterations studied in this evaluation consider the use of different solvents (ethanol,
isopropanol and toluene). The experiments were performed according to the SOP in Appendix
C.2. The process was chosen to be evaluated in LARA due to the typical characteristics of an
instructional experiment for undergraduate students. According to the responsible scientist
(Tatiana Iouranova, who was also the safety delegate of the research group), no noteworthy
accident ever happened in relation to this experiment. The main hazardous element in the
process is assumed to be the poisonous properties of the reactant 2-butyne-1,4-diol.
Due to the extent of a full risk assessment, the data shown in this section are condensed results
of this evaluation. The full results of the risk assessment are given in Appendix C.2.
LARA Results
Process For this experiment, the substrate is placed into a stainless steel reactor (150 cm3
autoclave, Büchi AG, Uster, Switzerland) equipped with a pressure controlled H2 supply system.
The hydrogen consumption in the reservoir is monitored with a press gas flow controller (BCP-
6002, Büchi, Switzerland). A stainless steel 6 -blade disk turbine impeller provides agitation at
1900 - 2000 rpm. A bath circulator (HAAKE B-N3) is used to control the reaction temperature to
within ± 1 K using water as a thermal medium. When the reactor is assembled, the apparatus
is tested with various procedures. Afterwards, the system is purged with nitrogen, heated to
reaction temperature and purged with hydrogen for starting the reaction. Sampling is done via
124
3.2. EPFL
Figure 3.16 – Experimental setup of the studied process.
a valve of the reactor and transferred to the GC vial. After the reaction is finished, the system is
cleaned with ethanol in an ultrasonic bath and dried in the oven.
The hydrogenation of 2-butyne-1,4-diol is considered as a single activity for the evaluation
in LARA. Since the experiment is carried out with three different solvents, there are three
mainly identical activities to be analyzed in LARA. Table 3.9 gives an overview of these three
activities. Even though the procedures use different solvents, the average LCI value of the
three activities is the same (4.2). Regardless of the solvent used for the process, ethanol is
used in every activity for cleaning and preparation purposes, which leads to different amounts
of hazard sources in the activities. The process carried out with toluene as solvent involves
the most risks, whereas the one with ethanol is connected with the fewest risks. The detailed
procedures, related hazard source and identified risks can be found in Appendix C.2.
Table 3.9 – Involved activities in the hydrogenation experiment series.
Nr. Activity Hazard sources Risks Average LCI
1 Selective hydrogenation (ethanol) 6 11 4.2
2 Selective hydrogenation (isopropanol) 7 14 4.2
3 Selective hydrogenation (toluene) 7 17 4.2
Risks As in the first example of the application of LARA, the most risks in this evaluation
originate from the use of chemicals (33). 42 hazards were identified in total for all three
activities with an average LCI value of 4.2 (on a scale from 1 to 10). The lowest LCI value was
assigned to the risk of ejection of reaction mixture during the sampling for gas chromatography-
mass spectrometry (3.5). The highest identified risk is assigned to flammable properties of the
solvents with an LCI value of 5.2. Table 3.10 gives an overview of the most important risks of
the evaluation and Figure 3.17 shows the LCI values before corrective measures were applied.
For simplification reasons, multiply occurring risks from different sources are reduced to the
one with the highest risk score. A complete list of all evaluated risks and the detailed values for
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Table 3.10 – The most important risks in the hydrogenation experiment series.
Nr. Risk Origin LCI
1 Hot medium Heating 4.1
2 H301 Toxic if swallowed 2-butyne-1,4-diol 4.2
3 H331 Toxic if inhaled 2-butyne-1,4-diol 4.2
4 H319 Causes serious eye irritation Isopropanol 4.8
5 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 2-butyne-1,4-diol 4.8
6 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways Toluene 5.2
7 H220 Extremely flammable gas H2 5.3
8 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child Toluene 5.3
9 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapor Ethanol 5.3
each risk factor can be found in Appendix C.2.
Risk treatment When applying the same acceptability limits for this evaluation as for the
first example, all risks would be acceptable. However, to illustrate the application of the
resource allocation approach, the limits for this example are defined as follows: risks below an
LCI value of 5.0 are considered as acceptable and risks with an LCI value higher than 7.5 are
considered as unacceptable; however, such risks are not present in this example. Therefore the
resource allocation focuses on the region of risks with an LCI value between 5.0 and 7.5, which
should be reduced to ALARP. Table 3.11 gives an overview of the possible corrective measures.
As for the risks, the presented corrective measures are reduced for simplification reasons:
if a corrective measure affects more than one risk, the one with the highest risk reduction
potential is taken into the comparison. A complete list of the corrective measures determined
for the ALARP risks can be found in C.2.
Table 3.11 – Suggested corrective measures for the risks in the ALARP region.
Nr. Corrective measure Affects risk Nr. Priority
1 Strict regulations concerning labeling 7 1
2 Information to raise awareness 8 1
3 Improve ventilation 9 2
According to the results of the resource allocation matrix, two of three measures in this
comparison are favorable both financially and non-financially (see Figure 3.19). As for the
first evaluation example, intensified efforts to raise awareness for specific risks are the most
favorable option. Improvements in the ventilation system might be feasible to lower certain
risks, but the low risk reduction per costs ratio makes this option not favorable for application
in this context. A compulsive application of a corrective measure to lower the risks is however
not necessary, since the overall risk level for these three activities is rather low.
126
3.2. EPFL
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Risk
LCI
Figure 3.17 – GGRC: the most important risk in context of the ALARP region. All values above
7.5 are considered as unacceptable, whereas the values below 5.0 (greyed out in the Figure)
are considered as acceptable (as in Scenario b) from Figure 2.26).
Outcome of the application The evaluation identified and evaluated the most important
risks in this procedure, even though the risk level in general is rather low for all the involved
activities; only 4 risks out of 43 are not considered as acceptable. Although two of three
possible corrective measures are feasible in financial an non-financial terms, the suggestion
based on the LARA evaluation is to accept the risks in the ALARP zone. The gain from a
measure is still disproportional to the actual benefits, especially since the risk level is relatively
low. Nevertheless, the risk evaluation results are reported to the roles in the LARA framework
(see Chapter 2.2).
Remarks on the Application
The application of LARA for this example was possible with few limitations. The flexible
focus of LARA allowed the description of the three similar activities and the involved risks.
The majority of the risks are chemical risks and were easily determinable due to the GHS
classification system; the remaining risks were identified using the other categories provided
by LARA. As for the first application example, the LCI results of the risks assessment mostly fit
the appraisement of the scientists performing the process and seem to fit the real risk situation.
However, the corrective measures are not beyond controversy; a reduction in this region does
not get a lot of acceptability by the scientists working in this environment. Since the activities
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Figure 3.18 – GGRC: the risks in the ALARP region of this project remain untreated.
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Figure 3.19 – GGRC: resource allocation matrix of the different corrective measures.
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are not interdependent as in the first example and performed for educational purposes only,
the legitimation of each experiment needs to be scrutinized in general. For this example, the
use of toluene might be abandoned, since the solvent involves a high amount of risks.
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3.3 University of Basel
The University of Basel was founded in 1460 and is a self-controlled university under the
supervision of the cantons Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft. In numbers, the institution
presents itself as follows [University of Basel, 2014]:
• 7 faculties
• 11’000 students (Bachelor, Master), around 20% foreigners
• 2’000 PhD students
• 538.9 million CHF annual expenses
The occupational safety is organized by a centralized OSH service, even though the broad
spectrum of the university reaches from social sciences to natural sciences. The evaluations
of LARA were performed at the faculty of basic sciences, which includes the departments for
biology, chemistry, mathematics and information sciences, pharmaceutical sciences, physics,
and environmental sciences. The research group chosen for the evaluation is part of the
chemistry department. This department is self-organized in terms of safety, featuring an own
OSH service.
3.3.1 Chemistry Departement: Constable Group
The third application example of LARA in this thesis was performed at the Constable group at
the chemistry department of the University of Basel. One of the focuses of this research group
is aimed at light harvesting using inorganic coordination complexes as dyes in dye-sensitized
solar cells [Constable group, 2014]. The characteristics of this research group are:
• Professor Edwin Constable, head of the research group
• No specific safety delegate
• 8 postdoctoral scholars
• 14 PhD students
• 9 different nationalities
• 5 laboratories
The objective of this evaluation is the preparation and the testing of the dye-sensitized solar
cells. This is a repetitional task, which is performed each time a complex (see Figure 3.20)
is tested for its feasibility for the use in these solar cells. The preparation was performed
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Figure 3.20 – Example of a dye used for the performed tests of the solar cells.
according to the supplementary information in the article by Bozic-Weber et al. [2012]. The
process was chosen to be evaluated in LARA due to the typical characteristics of a repetitional
task related to other processes. The process to prepare the solar cells changes constantly and
is adjusted on a regular basis to fit the newest testing standards. Only negligible accidents
happened in the research group when preparing the solar cells, for example burns when
touching a hot surface. The main hazardous element in the process is therefore considered to
be the heating of the solar cells during the preparation.
Due to the extent of a full risk assessment, the data shown in this section are condensed results
for this process. The full results of the risk assessment are given in Appendix C.3.
LARA Results
Process A first part of the process is the preparation of the electrode of the solar cell. There-
fore, a glass (FTO glass, Solaronix TCO22-7, 2.2 mm thickness, sheet resistance ≈ 7Ω square
−1) is washed, cleaned and coated with a TiO2 layer, by doctor blading a TiO2 onto the con-
ducting glass slide. Afterward, the electrode is dried with various temperatures; then a ligand
and ZnCl2 is applied. After an immersion in another solved ligand for 64 h the electrode is
finished. For the preparation of the counter electrode, a hole is drilled into a similar piece
of FTO glass, cleaned and an a Pt catalyst (H2PtCl6) is applied. The two electrodes are as-
sembled using a thermoplast hot-melt sealing foil (Solaronix, Meltonix, 1170-25 Series, 25
microns thick) by heating while pressing them together. The electrolyte (a mixture of LiI, I2,
1-mehtylbenimidazole and 1-butyl-3-methylimidazolinium iodide in MeCN) is applied via
vacuum backfilling. The hole in the counter electrode is finally sealed using the hot-melt
sealing foil and a cover glass. The testing of the cells is done by irradiating from behind using
a light source SolarSim 150 (100 mW cm−2 = 1 sun). The power of the stimulated light is
calibrated using a reference Si photodiode.
The process to produce the solar cells was subdivided into three different activities shown in
Table 3.12. The detailed procedures, the related hazard sources, and the identified hazards
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can be found in Appendix C.3.
Table 3.12 – Involved activities in the preparation of solar cell for testing purposes.
Nr. Activity Hazard sources Risks Average LCI
1 Preparation of the electrode 8 22 4.8
2 Preparation of the counter electrode 5 10 4.6
3 Assembling of the solar cell 7 23 4.5
Risks Chemical risks are the main risks involved in this activity (50), even though the process
does not involve a chemical reaction. The source of these chemical risks is the use of solvents
for cleaning and application purposes. Not only chemicals are causing risks, physical risks
are present in the form of hot media or UV radiation. The most unimportant risk in the
evaluation is the risk of harmful effects caused by swallowing of zinc chloride (LCI of 3.6). On
the other side of the LCI spectrum is the same substance due to its very toxic properties to the
aquatic environment with long lasting effects (LCI of 6.0). Table 3.13 gives an overview of the
most important risks of the evaluation and Figure 3.21 shows the LCI values before corrective
measures were applied. For simplification reasons, multiply occurring risks from different
sources are reduced to the one with the highest risk score. A complete list of all evaluated
risks and the detailed values for each risk factor can be found in Appendix C.3. In general, the
risk level is higher than in the other examples. A reason for this is a higher level of general
worsening factors: untrained personnel, unclear and constantly changing procedures, and
other particularities are present for this process. However, also the fact that the process is
carried out relatively often increases the LCI level.
Table 3.13 – The most important risks in the preparation of the solar cells.
Nr. Risk Origin LCI
1 UV Radiation Light source 5.0
2 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour EtOH 5.2
3 Hot media Heating 5.2
4 H318 Causes serious eye damage 1-methylbenzimidazole 5.4
5 H319 Causes serious eye irritation MeCN 5.4
6 H330 Fatal if inhaled UV-O3 (Ozone) 5.5
7 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage H2PtCl6 5.6
8 H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ZnCl2 6.0
Risk treatment In order to allocate resources for corrective measures, the ALARP region for
this example is set between the LCI values 5.0 to 7.5 (as in Figure 2.26b). As in the first two
examples, no risk needs to be treated regardless of the related effort. However, several risks
need further investigation about possible corrective measures. Table 3.14 gives an overview
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Figure 3.21 – Constable group: the most important risk in context of the ALARP region. All
values above 7.5 are considered as unacceptable, whereas the values below 5.0 are considered
as acceptable (as in Scenario b) of Figure 2.26).
of the possible corrective measures. As for the risks, the corrective measures are reduced for
simplification reasons: if a corrective measure affects more than one risk, the one with the
highest risk reduction potential is taken into the comparison. A complete list of the corrective
measures determined for the ALARP risks can be found in Appendix C.3.
A large number of corrective measures are possible both financially and non-financially to treat
the identified risks (see Figure 3.22). The most important risk with a serious environmental
impact can be lowered with an improved waste management. The bandwidth of options
includes specific options, such as the use of an ozone detector, but also less specific measures,
for example intensified safety training.
Outcome of the application As for the other applications, the evaluation provides an exten-
sive overview of the risks related to the process. For the whole process, eight risks fall in the
ALARP region and should be reduced to as low as reasonably practicably. For these risks, a
broad spectrum of possible corrective measures was found. The suggestion of the LARA proce-
dure is to treat the risks as follows: the risk hot media with the corrective measure warning
signs, the risk H319 Causes serious eye irritation with the corrective measure improvement of
safety training and the risk H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects with the
measure improved waste management including controls (see Figure 3.23). These measures
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Table 3.14 – Suggested corrective measures for the risks in the ALARP region.
Nr. Corrective measure Affects risk Nr. Priority
1 Disciplinary regulations to enforce PPE use 5 1
2 Improved waste management including controls 8 1
3 Improvement of safety training 5 2
4 Improvement of shielding 1 1
5 O3-Detector 6 1
6 Reduction of storage quantities 2 2
7 Temperature indication 3 1
8 Warning signs 3 1
all provide a high effectiveness in financial and non-financial terms. Especially the improved
training should be implemented, since a lack of organized training is a worsening factor for
the entire laboratory and research group.
In order to get the corrective measures applied in a reasonable amount of time, an action plan
is established. In the further procedure of LARA, the risk evaluation results, the recommenda-
tion for corrective measures and the action plan for the implementation of these corrective
measures is distributed to all the roles in the LARA framework (see Chapter 2.2).
Remarks on the Application
Since the evaluation involves a high number of chemical risks, the scope of the LARA method
allows a proper analysis of the involved risks. The estimated risks match the estimations of
the persons involved in the process, even though the general risk level was estimated lower. A
cause for this different estimation is the inclusion of worsening factors in the process, which
increase the risk level for all risks involved. The corrective measures for the process are feasible,
even though the risk level does not force a change of the procedure. However, the distinction
between the regions of the allocation matrix is not ideal, since the corrective measures are
relatively close. The corrective measure database does not include all possibilities of context
change in a procedure; other aspects can allow such change as well: since the dye-sensitized
solar cells became a widely researched topic, blank solar cells for testing became commercially
available. Therefore, the process will be abandoned in the near future in this research group,
lowering the overall risk level, even though this fact was not the main driving force.
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Figure 3.22 – Constable group: resource allocation matrix of the different corrective measures.
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Figure 3.23 – Constable group: the risks Nr. 3, 6 and 8 are suggested to be treated according to
the LARA results.
135
Chapter 3. Application Examples of LARA
3.4 ETHZ
The Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ) was founded in 1855 as a national
technical university under the control of the Swiss Confederation. As the EPFL, the ETHZ is
part of the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology. In numbers, the institution presents itself as
follows [ETHZ, 2014]:
• 16 departements
• 18’000 students (Bachelor, Master), 110 nationalities
• 3’900 PhD students
• 1’467 million CHF annual expenses
The occupational safety is organized by a centralized OSH service, which deals with all topics
related to security, health and environment at the university [CABS, 2014]. The evaluation of
LARA was performed at the department of biology, which includes five institutes for different
fields of biological research. The institute chosen for the evaluation is the Institute of Molecular
Systems Biology (IMSB).
3.4.1 Institute of Molecular Systems Biology: Aebersold Group
The fourth application example of LARA in this thesis was performed at the Abersold group
at the Institute of Molecular System Biology of the ETHZ. The Aebersold group is interested
in developing and applying novel methods in quantitative mass spectrometry to accurately
measure protein analytes in complex samples. [Institute of Molecular Systems Biology, 2014].
The characteristics of this research group are:
• Professor Ruedi Aebersold, head of the research group
• 1 administrational collaborator
• 2 senior scientist
• 15 postdoctoral scholars
• 8 PhD students
• 10 different nationalities
• 1 laboratories with biosafety level 2
The subject of evaluation in this example is the proteolytic digestion of protein samples, which
is part of a data acquisition workflow shown in Figure 3.24. This can either be done with a
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Figure 3.24 – The complete experimental workflow presented in Rosenberger et al. [2014].
trypsinization or via a pressure cycling technology (PCT) assisted lysis and digestion. The
whole workflow and the associated results can be found in the article of Rosenberger et al.
[2014]. The interest in this process to evaluate it in LARA is due to the field of application
(biological chemistry) and the kind of process, which can be described as a routine task.
According to a scientist familiar with the process, it is harmless and accidents to occur can
only remotely be imagined.
Due to the extent of a full risk assessment, the data shown in this section are condensed results
for the process. The full results of the risk assessment are given in Appendix C.4.
LARA Results
Process The proteolic digestion can be done via two routes: trypsinization or PCT-assisted
lysis and digestion. The following procedures are shortened experimental instruction of the
article Rosenberger et al. [2014]:
The protein samples were reduced with 5 mM TCEP, and alkylated with 10 mM iodoacetamide
before overnight trypsinization. Protein from SEC fractions was denatured by incubation
at 69◦C for 10 min, reduced, alkylated and digested in the presence of 1% (v/v) Sodium-
deoxycholate overnight. Trypsin was inactivated by lowering the pH to 2 and the peptides
were immobilized onto C18 columns. After multiple washes, the peptides were eluted (50%
acetonitrile/0.1% formic acid) and solvents were evaporated in a SpeedVac centrifuge. After
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re-suspension, the samples were briefly sonicated before MS analysis.
pressure cycling technology (PCT) applies cycles of hydrostatic pressure between ambient and
ultra-high levels to induce cell lysis and to enable precise thermodynamic control of biomolec-
ular interactions. All PCT-processed samples were handled using Barocycler NEP2320 (Pres-
sureBioSciences, Inc, South Easton, MA). In brief, tissue or cell line samples were lysed in
buffer containing 8M urea, 100mM ammonium bicarbonate supplemented with Complete
protease and phosphatase inhibitor cocktail under Barocycler program (tissue samples: 60
cycles of 50 s 45 kpsi and 10 s 14.7 psi; cell line samples: 120 cycles of 20 s 45 kpsi and 10 s 14.7
psi) at 35 °C. Whole cell/ tissue lysates were then sonicated for 25 s with 1 min interval on ice
for 4 times. After removing tissue debris or unbroken cells, if any, by centrifugation, protein
lysates were reduced and alkylated prior to proteolytic digestion. Lys-C (enzyme to substrate
ratio: 1:50) and trypsin (1:30) were sequentially added to digest the proteins. Digestion was
accelerated under a PCT scheme of 50s 25kpsi and 10s 14.7psi (cell line samples: 25 s 25
kpsi, 10 s 14.7 psi for 45 mins), under which both Lys-C and trypsin remain active. Lys-C
digestion was performed in 6 M urea for 45 cycles, whereas trypsin digestion was performed
in further diluted urea (1.6 M) for 90 cycles (cell line samples: 24 s 25 kpsi, 10 s 14.7 psi for 90
min). Subsequently, trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) was added to a final pH of around 2 before C18
desalting using SEP-PAK C18 cartridges (Waters Corp., Milford, MA, USA).
These two procedures are treated as separate activities shown in Table 3.15. The detailed
procedures, the related hazard sources and the identified hazards can be found in Appendix
C.4.
Table 3.15 – Involved activities in the proteolytic digestion step of the data acquisition workflow.
Nr. Activity Hazard sources Risks Average LCI
1 Proteolic digestion (Trypsin) 5 16 2.4
2 PCT-assisted lysis and digestion 4 10 2.3
Risks Most risks in this evaluation are not related to biological hazard sources but to chemi-
cal compounds (24). In total, 26 risks were identified in these two activities, having a relatively
low average LCI of 2.4. The most unimportant risk in the evaluation is the ultrasonic vibrations
used for the sonication of the samples (LCI of 1.7). The most important risk does not indicate
a significant risk either: the environmental effect of trifluoroacetic acid has a LCI value of 3.5.
Table 3.16 gives an overview of the most important risks of the evaluation and Figure 3.25
shows the LCI values before corrective measures were applied. For simplification reasons,
multiply occurring risks from different sources are reduced to the one with the highest risk
score. A complete list of all evaluated risks and the detailed values for each risk factor can be
found in Appendix C.4.
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Table 3.16 – The most important risks in the proteolytic digestion step of the data acquisition
workflow.
Nr. Risk Origin LCI
1 H335: May cause respiratory irritation Lys-C 2.1
2 H225: Highly flammable liquid and vapor Acetonitrile 2.6
3 H226: Flammable liquid and vapor Formic acid 2.6
4 H413: May cause long lasting harmful effects to aq. life Iodoacetamid 2.6
5 H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects Trifluoroacetic acid 2.8
6 H319: Causes serious eye irritation Acetonitrile 3.3
7 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage Trifluoroacetic acid 3.5
8 H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects Trifluoroacetic acid 3.5
Risk treatment In order to allocate resources for corrective measures, the ALARP region for
this example is set similarly as for the other examples between the LCI values 3.6 to 6.3 (as
in Figure 2.27). However, no risk is considered as unacceptable and none should be reduced
to ALARP. Since all risks are acceptable for this example, corrective measures are neither
determined nor evaluated.
Outcome of the application As for the other applications, the evaluation provides an exten-
sive overview of the risks related to this process. It matches the assumptions done in advance
of the evaluation: the risk level is very low. In the further procedure of LARA, the risk evaluation
results are distributed to all the roles in the LARA framework (see Chapter 2.2).
Remarks on the Application
This evaluation was a challenging example for the LARA method, since risks related to this
procedure do practically not exist. Even though chemicals are related to the activities, the
compounds are present in a highly diluted form, which makes a hazardous event only remotely
imaginable. The preparation of these solutions could be hazardous, but this is not considered
as a part of this procedure. Therefore, most risk dimensions used in LARA remained on a very
hypothetical level and the estimation of these factors was redundant. Nevertheless, it is part
of the LARA procedure to evaluate the identified hazards, even if the risks are considered to be
negligible. The risk evaluation was challenging and the results do not show major risks, but
the evaluation results match the assumptions done before the evaluation.
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Figure 3.25 – Aebersold group: the most important risk in context of the ALARP region (as in
the scenario of Figure 2.27). All values above 6.3 are considered as unacceptable, whereas the
values below 3.6 are considered as acceptable (greyed out).
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3.5 Comparison with Other Techniques
(Parts of this subsection are taken from the article: Joint applicability test of software for
laboratory assessment and risk analysis [Pluess et al., 2014b].)
In order to compare the results of LARA with well-established risk management methods, two
examples were selected: one from the University of Pardubice and one from EPFL. To have
a variety of laboratory tasks, both chemical experiments and routine tasks were considered
in the comparison. The first example was analyzed using the LARA method and a HAZOP
procedure, whereas the second example was analyzed using the LARA method and the FMECA
procedure. Both of these risk analysis procedures are widely accepted tools to identify and
manage risks [Bluvband et al., 2004].
The joint tests described in this article are performed under conditions that simulate the
environment for which the method is intended. The risk evaluations were performed and
guided by a group of scientists, being familiar with the methods and having experience in
performing FMECA and HAZOP procedures. For the LARA method, those scientists had a
short introduction, but no information about the principles of the method. This was intended,
since non-experts are the designated users of the LARA method. The scientists involved in the
experiments provided the analysts with all information necessary, including details about the
laboratory environment.
The test results highlight the different aspects of this new method to assess laboratory risks.
The results do not only focus on the successfully evaluated risks, but also on the other factors
of the evaluation, such as prerequisites and effort to perform the analysis. The tests provides
us with answers for questions whether if the LARA method is easily performed, how quick it
can be completed and if it is capable to uncover all risks connected with an experiment. In this
article we focus on identification and evaluation of the risks; we omit the aspect of applying
corrective measures, which is important part of risk analyses, but is not as relevant for this
comparison.
3.5.1 Example 1: Synthesis of methyl nitrate
Description of process There is an intention to produce methyl nitrate for testing reasons at
the Institute of Energetic Materials of the University of Pardubice. This uncommon, sensitive
liquid explosive should be produced regularly in amounts of several kilograms. The synthesis
and the product properties are well described in literature [Black, 1943]. Although the process
itself does exhibit difficulties, it requires a certain level of experience. The laboratory intended
for the preparation of this explosive does not differ much from standard laboratories equipped
for organic synthesis. A couple of tests have been already performed in smaller amounts.
The synthesis is carried out in a beaker. A mixture of nitric and sulfuric acid is poured into a
beaker. Methanol is then added dropwise while the reaction mixture is stirred well and cooled
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in an ice bath. The temperature of the reaction mixture must be kept between 15-20◦C. When
the whole amount of methanol is added, the reaction mixture is left for five minutes at room
temperature. Methyl nitrate is separated from the acid residue, washed with cold water and
sodium carbonate solution.
An accident occurred during one of the test synthesis; a sudden decomposition of the prod-
uct occurred. Later it was discovered that this was caused by the presence of ricin oil in
methanol, which was used as a key precursor for methyl nitrate. It is highly probable that if the
decomposition would have occurred in larger amounts, it would have caused an explosion.
Safety aspects of the synthesis were discussed with the leader of the project. According to
his statement the most important risk is connected with sensitivity of methyl nitrate – even a
small friction in a part of the equipment used for the synthesis could lead to an explosion. The
accident mentioned above emphasizes that only pure chemicals (p.a.) should be used for this
synthesis. The acids and toxic materials present during this synthesis may lead to increased
risks as well, but can be reduced to minimum by appropriate safety measures.
Table 3.17 – Most important hazards according to HAZOP.
Nr. Keyword Element Deviation Consequences
1 More Methanol Faster dropping Exoth. reaction, explosion
2 Other Methanol Impure methanol Exoth. reaction, explosion
3 Other Separation Valve grease washout Exoth. reaction, explosion
4 No Stirring No stirring Local overheating, explosion
5 Other Pouring Reaction mixture poured Irritation and intoxication
6 No Separation Valve grease not applied Explosion caused by friction
HAZOP results The HAZOP analysis was performed according to BS IEC 61882:2001 by the
team consisting of organic chemists, explosives and safety engineering experts. The synthesis
was divided into six nodes: methanol nitration, stirring, cooling, pouring into separation
funnel, separation and washing. Overall eighty-eight deviations were considered. Table 3.17
shows the six most serious hazards of the methyl nitrate synthesis. However HAZOP does not
provide the quantitative risks evaluation and prioritization, therefore the relative importance
of risks were chosen according to the experts’ opinions. The analysis is well performable on a
laboratory scale, although is designed mainly for industrial environment. HAZOP gives appro-
priate results and reflects the experience and predictions of experts. Despite the applicability
and realistic results, the procedure is relatively complicated, time and resources consuming
and not suited to be performed by non-expert.
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LARA results LARA analysis performed by the same scientists revealed that all 15 identified
risks arise from hazardous properties of the involved substances. The relevance of the analysis
results is given by risk prioritization, which corresponds to the particular laboratory practice.
The procedure determined that methyl nitrate explosives properties have the highest risk
priority. Among the risks with highest importance belongs methyl nitrate toxicity, corrosive
effects of nitric acid and methanol flammability. All these risks are mentioned in laboratory
rules and personnel is periodically familiarized with them during safety training. The most
important risks according to this analysis are presented in Table 3.18.
Comparison Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 reveals the most important hazards of this activity
based on the results of both analyses. Almost all deviations identified by HAZOP lead to
exothermic reaction and/or explosion of methyl nitrate. According to LARA, explosive prop-
erties of methyl nitrate have the highest priority. However these results do not reflect the
experiences of the experts who performed HAZOP analysis, thus it is not so clear in which par-
ticular situation methyl nitrate explosive properties could exert. Remaining risks determined
by LARA procedure are connected with the effect of involved substances on the personnel.
This is in agreement with the deviation pointing out leakage of the reaction mixture identified
by HAZOP.
In Chapter 1.4, the input and the output of each method is described. HAZOP as used in this
example mainly matches the theoretical description of the input: a high level of expertise
and resources (time) is required to perform the analysis. However, the data requirement is
not different as the one from LARA, since the example itself is the limiting factor. The output
remains qualitative and relies on the subjective expert judgement, whereas LARA offers a
prioritization of the risks. The level of detail differs not significantly for both methods, due to
the limitations of the input for the example.
Table 3.18 – Most important risks according to LARA.
Nr. Risk
1 Explosion caused by methyl nitrate
2 Intoxication (inhalation) caused by methyl nitrate
3 Intoxication (skin) caused by methyl nitrate
4 Irritation (skin) caused by methyl nitrate
5 Intoxication (oral) caused by methyl nitrate
3.5.2 Example 2: Medium scale purification of solvents
Description of process The second example, which was chosen to test the LARA method,
is the purification of larger quantities of solvents. This process is realized at the laboratory
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of asymmetric catalysis and synthesis (LCSA) at EPFL. Large amounts of solvents, mainly
ethyl acetate and pentane, are used in this laboratory for chromatographic purposes. Since
the commonly available solvents are not sufficiently pure enough, a further purification is
performed directly in the lab. The task is realized according to a planning, which obligates
each member of the group to perform this process periodically. Even thought the task is
planned and recurring, there is no SOP available.
For the purification, a Heidolph LABOROTA 20 medium scale rotary evaporator was used. The
purification is realized several times per week with a quantity between 5L and 10L of solvent
each time. For the ethyl acetate, the device is heated to 50◦C and the pressure was set to 25
kPa. For the purification of pentane, the device was heated to 50◦C and the pressure was set
to 95 kPa. Until now, no accidents have occurred. According to the responsible scientist, the
main risk in this process is related to the flammability of the solvents. Other hazards related to
the chemical properties of the solvents, such as the hazards for the environment or toxicity,
are estimated to be negligible.
FMECA results A team of scientists performed a systematical risk analysis of the most
important components using the FMECA method. In total, 29 potential failures were identified
and their relative priorities for applying measures were determined. Seven of these failure
modes are only influencing the operability itself and are not relevant form a safety point of
view. From the remaining 22 failure modes, 6 are related to mechanical operations and the
remaining 16 are indirectly related to the hazardous properties of the solvents. Since those
properties are not directly evaluated by the procedure, the relative importance and magnitude
of the effects remain unclear after the FMECA analysis.
LARA results The same team of scientists used the LARA method to perform a risk analysis
on this activity. This analysis revealed nine different hazards originating from different sources
(chemicals and devices). All of those hazards are relevant from an occupational safety point
of view. Four of the hazards are directly related to the hazardous properties of the solvents.
The other five hazards present according to the LARA analysis are related to mechanical or
physical risk.
Table 3.19 – Comparison of the risk priorities in Example 2 using LARA and FMECA method.
Hazard Risk LARA FMECA
Blast shield Injuries due to unintended closing 2 1
Lowering mechanism Injuries due to pinching 2 5
Toxic substance (solvent) Intoxication by inhalation 1 2/3/4
Irritating substance (solvent) Eye irritation 3 2/3/4
Flammable substance (solvent) Fire 5 2/3/4
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Comparison Table 3.19 shows the most important hazards of this activity based on the
results of both analyses. The most important hazard determined by the LARA method is the
toxic properties (aspiration toxicity) of both solvents. In the FMECA analysis, the toxicity is
indirectly related to the failure modes with the relative priority 2, 3 and 4 (all those failure
modes are leading to leakage of solvent). Based on the FMECA method, the blast shield of
the apparatus is the most hazardous element of this process, which is ranked second in the
LARA method. The mechanical hazards do have the same importance according to the LARA
method, since both do have similar occurrences and exposures. The FMECA analysis however
ranked the similar hazards in a different order, even though the hazards are comparable.
The FMECA analysis fails to differentiate between the different hazards originating from the
chemical properties of the solvent.
As for the first example, the comparison is judged according to the criteria defined in Chapter
1.4. Since the input is limited again by the example itself, the data requirement can not be
taken into account. However, the other requirements show the same tendencies as described
in the theoretical section. FMECA requires more resources than LARA, which allows a non-
trained user to perform a basic risk assessment. On the output side, FMECA shows less level of
detail when it comes to prioritization of the risks; on the other side, LARA is able to generate a
more meaningful output with the limited resources.
3.5.3 Evaluation of the results
The results of this study suggest, that the LARA can be used as a holistic risk analysis method
in the academic laboratory environment. Even though only two examples were examined,
the joint test at two universities showed the advantages compared to established risk analysis
techniques.
One of the most important features of a risk management method is the capability to identify
risks. Since no method is able to identify all the possible risks, an appropriate method should
be capable of discovering the most important risks of a process. On the contrary, the more
risks a method can identify, the higher is the probability to identify scenarios, which are
either highly improbable or of no importance for occupational safety. In the first example, the
HAZOP procedure identifies several scenarios, which are influencing the performance of the
process, but are not important to the safety of the involved scientists. Such irrelevant scenarios
(in terms of safety) can detract from the safety-related relevant scenarios; additionally, they
are extending the analysis itself in terms of complexity. The LARA method is capable of
identifying the same relevant scenarios as the HAZOP method. Additionally, the method is
able of identifying relations, which the HAZOP procedure is not capable of. The same results
were shown in the second example, comparing the results from LARA with the ones of the
FMECA procedure.
The effort needed to perform a risk analysis is another important aspect, which influences
the feasibility of a method. An ideal risk analysis method for academic research laboratories
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should not require too demanding resources, since both qualified personnel in safety and time
is a rare commodity in this environment. The systematic approach of the HAZOP procedure is
not complex itself; however, in order to perform the analysis, an experienced user (the HAZOP
moderator) needs to participate to find most of the scenarios. In contrast, the examined
example showed that the LARA method is more intuitive when performing the risk analysis.
Both methods anyhow need expertise about the process, but LARA needs less experience
about the risk management method itself.
However, the comparison has shown some limitations of the LARA method as well. The
method relies on a database, and is therefore as accurate as the database is. This drawback
can be overcome by systematic use of the software at universities in order to fill the databases
with possible hazards and risks.
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3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Application of LARA
The application of LARA for these examples had the intention to analyze the workflow and to
evaluate its feasibility according to the goals of this method. For most parts, the LARA method
provides a functioning risk management approach for research and teaching laboratories,
regardless of the site of application. The advantages and limitations of the individual steps are
described below.
Definition of the context As discussed in Chapter 2.2, the context defines the setting and
the main mechanisms of the LARA risk management approach. The broader context had
only limited implications on the use of LARA, depending on the different settings where
it was applied. Different personal interpretations and differences in the safety cultures of
the universities were shown in some peculiar questions, mostly in the judgment of certain
parameters. An example for this is the general worsening factor definition of an evaluation: in
environments that are perceived to be stricter concerning their regulations, analysts applied
more self-criticism when choosing the factors present. However, a clear and consistent
guidance in the LARA procedure can help to avoid such irregularities.
The organizational context defines the roles and responsibilities of the involved persons and
groups. These differ significantly at the studied universities and could influence the risk
documentation and the risk communication. Since the LARA application remained on a hypo-
thetical level, the results had no implications on the safety framework at these universities. If
LARA is actually implemented as a risk management approach in an existing safety framework,
it will need to be adjusted to fit the organizational structures of an institution.
The technical context shapes how LARA identifies hazards and evaluates risks. As a first part,
it is important to define the studied object correctly. The evaluation system of LARA should
allow grouping of the different projects and subdividing them according to the activities
and processes involved. For the examples evaluated in LARA, this was possible without any
limitations.
Hazard identification The hazard identification is a central element of a risk assessment
technique. LARA faces the challenging situation that a multitude of different types of hazards
converge. To master this situation, a flexible focus was implemented in LARA by using an
adaptable hazard database. For some kinds of hazards, this works as intended; especially the
chemical hazard category is well described and allows the identification of all the hazards
involved. Due to the GHS classification system of chemicals, the hazard originating from this
category can be identified almost completely. In all evaluations discussed in this chapter, the
chemical hazards were by far the most common hazards. On one side, this can be explained
with the average number of hazard statements related to chemicals in the GHS system. On the
147
Chapter 3. Application Examples of LARA
other hand, chemicals are involved in most processes in research laboratories, even if they
are only used for secondary operations. When compared to other hazard classes, the number
of hazards identified for chemicals might lead to misconceptions. However, other hazards
were still identifiable by the LARA database approach, albeit not as numerous. Altogether, the
database is a highly feasible approach to identify most hazards related to a project. This is also
shown by the fact that there is agreement on the identified hazards by the involved scientists
and no further hazards which went missing in LARA could be imagined.
Risk analysis A high number of risks were found for each single evaluation. Therefore it
is important for the risk management to prioritize the risks correctly and to separate the
less important from the more important ones. In LARA this is done with the use of four
risk dimensions and the calculation of the LCI value. A general problem of risk dimensions,
regardless of the method used, is the setting of the scale. The broader the covered field
of hazards is, the less specific the scales need to be. Not all scales matched every specific
situation; however, this is a drawback that comes with the comparability of different kinds of
risks. Even though the dimensions were not feasible in every situation to describe a risk, they
helped to identify the important factors contributing to the LCI value of each risk. Knowing
this is of high importance for the risk mitigation, since the corrective measure should aim at
the important elements in order to reach an optimal reduction potential.
The overall impression of the risk estimation method indicates that LARA is capable of pri-
oritizing the risks correctly. Challenging issues for the risk analysis are those risks, which are
rather insignificant. This was shown in the example performed at ETHZ, where the chemicals
were highly diluted and the related risk dimensions were difficult to judge. However, the
resulting risk scores for these risks matched the assumptions and proved their insignificance,
which is a sign of feasibility for the prioritization approach.
Risk evaluation The risk evaluation process has the goal to indicate which risks are accept-
able, which are unacceptable, and which ones should be reduced to ALARP. The classification
of the acceptable risks matches the perception of the involved persons in all cases. Also the
risks falling under the ALARP category match the conception intended in LARA: other than
the acceptable risks, these risks cannot be readily classified as acceptable, but are perceived
too low to be treated regardless of the costs. Even though an upper limit of acceptability is
implemented in LARA, not a single risk was considered as unacceptably high. This is not
surprising however, since it would indicate a major defect in the safety framework of one of
these universities.
Risk treatment The resource allocation approach used in LARA has the intention to integrate
a non-financial aspect in the choice of corrective measures for all risks in the ALARP region.
A well-balanced choice of corrective measures helps to find a feasible solution how to treat
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the risks. The choices of corrective measures for each evaluation are considered to be highly
feasible in this context, since the acceptability plays an important role.
Risk control, risk documentation, and risk communication A crucial element of LARA
as a risk management approach for universities is the embedment into an existing safety
framework. This allows effective risk documentation and risk communication. One of the
main goals of risk management is to be aware of risks and to apply corrective measure if
necessary. However, these applications need to be determined exactly and realized in a
reasonable amount of time, otherwise the risk management is done in vain. This is done
preferably with an action plan including the responsibilities and detailed reports about the
risks present.
For the application examples of LARA, this aspects was only examined on a hypothetical level,
therefore no judgment about the feasibility can be made. However, the technical aspects in
the software allow a timely and adequate distribution of the information gathered with the
risk evaluation process.
3.6.2 Evaluation of the LARA Method
The intention of the LARA project is to provide a tool for risk management at universities.
The ideal specifications of such a method were postulated as a result of the methodological
discussion of Chapter 2.4. The results from the application suggest, that LARA fits these
specifications in most parts. The intuitive approach allows non-experts in risk management
techniques to perform a straightforward evaluation of the risks related to their processes.
The required expertise is not related to the technique itself but to the experiment, and this
knowledge is usually available. The time requirement is an improvement compared to the
well-established risk management techniques, but a further improvement would be preferable.
The deliverables match the expectations for such a technique; especially the semi-quantitative
character makes an easier access to risk management possible and allows meaningful results.
The variable focus of the risk identification however causes some slight limitations: the
focus on characteristics might overlook some specific hazards and is not capable of identify
completely unknown hazards. Yet, this is a demanding requirement for a risk management
technique.
The results of the previously described applications suggest, that the LARA project reaches the
goal of providing a risk management technique for the research and teaching environment.
Especially the reduced requirement of resources compared to the other techniques make
LARA an ideal choice for analyzing risks in this environment. The software application makes
the approach a highly favorable choice for universities, since it makes the problem more
accessible than other approaches. It considers the particular setting by the implementation of
worsening factors, the novel semi-quantitative calculation method, and a resource allocation
approach, that allows to consider non-financial aspects in the choice of corrective measures.
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Conclusion
The evaluation of risk management at universities performed in the framework of this disser-
tation pointed out the most important aspects of this topic. A detailed methodological study
of a selection of widely used risk management techniques showed, that they are not feasible
for the academic environment without numerous limitations. Other approaches developed
for this environment cover a specific field, but cannot be used as a holistic risk management
approach for this setting.
To fill this gap, the LARA method was developed and applied at different Swiss universities.
The results of these tests suggest, that this method overcomes the known limitations and is
able to serve as a holistic risk management technique for research and teaching laboratories.
Compared to the other presented methods, the LARA approach requires fewer resources,
which is crucial for the academic setting, since neither manpower nor financial resources for
risk management are abundantly available. This is achieved by various elements, such as the
flexible focus during risk identification and a comprehensive risk description. Besides the
regular risk dimensions used in other approaches, LARA integrates the peculiarities of the
research environment with the use of worsening factors. These allow to model interdependen-
cies, which help to lower the risk level significantly. Another important element that makes
the method accessible is the use of a user-friendly and intuitive software. This software allows
executing the workflow, generating risk evaluation reports, and directly communicating the
results to the roles and responsibilities of an organization.
However, during the application of LARA some limitations were revealed. On one side, there
are risks so low, that they are negligible in terms of safety. The application showed, that it is
difficult to judge the magnitude of these risks on the scales of risk dimensions in LARA. An
example for this is a toxic compound which is used in a highly diluted form. The hazard is
present and the impact is defined by the properties of the compound, but the dilution makes
the risks insignificant. However, this is not limited to the LARA approach only; most risk
management techniques generate insignificant results due to their systematics. On the other
side, there are some limitations which originate from the broad spectrum that LARA has to
cover. This is a conflict of interest which arises from the comparability and is not a unique
limitation of LARA; other methods deal with these topics as well. Besides these smaller flaws
in the mechanism, LARA achieves the goals defined for this project in the main points.
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Even though the impacts are unlikely to reach as disastrous extents as in the industry, major
accidents could happen at universities as well. Besides the direct impact, such an accident
could lead to other consequences: financial claims, reputation loss, limitation of resources for
research, and others. It is in the interest of every institution to do everything reasonably practi-
cable to avoid such accidents. A tool that helps to achieve this is the LARA risk management
method. By making this approach more accessible than traditional methods, LARA allows risk
management in a field, where such techniques are not widely applied yet. A comprehensive
use of this method could help to be aware of the risks people face in their experiments and
to allocate resources in an optimal way to avoid accidents from happening. Even though the
method has its limitations and improvements should be tackled in the further studies, this
method is capable of contributing to an important development in the research and teaching
environment.
Perspectives and Recommendations
The LARA method presented in this dissertation is a feasible method for risk management at
universities. However, like all other methods, it has not only benefits but also limitations. In
order to improve the approach, the following developments are suggested to allow an even
more elaborated risk evaluation at universities.
Systematic Hazard Identification
Hazard identification is a central element of every risk assessment workflow. In LARA, the
hazard identification is done with a checklist-like database approach. This works ideally for
a majority of the hazards present in scientific research laboratories, especially the chemi-
cal hazards; this is due to the GHS classification system of chemicals, which is part of the
legislation for the use of chemicals. This system allows a detailed classification of hazards
and provides hazard information for chemicals. For other hazards however, the classification
is not as advanced and the hazards cannot be described and distinguished as detailed. An
optimal improvement of the LARA method therefore aims at these classifications. Since the
aim of LARA covers a broad field of hazards, different hazard identification strategies used
simultaneously could help to identify more hazards.
Safety Framework Integration
LARA is intended as a method used in an existing safety framework. The interaction between
those systems mainly concerns the roles and responsibilities which are used in LARA for the
risk communication and risk documentation. A more intensive integration of LARA in this
framework could improve the safety level of an institution. An important aspect are clear
guidelines, when a risk management with LARA is mandatory and needs to performed prior
to a process. For processes in the design stage, such an obligation could lower the risk level
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significantly, since risks can actively be avoided before even occurring by changing details
of the process; doing this with corrective measures in existing processes is related to higher
costs and does not always lead to satisfying results. Another example of the integration into
existing structures is the use of LARA for student experiments performed in laboratory courses.
An integration of LARA could not only identify and evaluate unknown risks, but could also
be used for educational purposes to raise awareness for occupational safety. However, these
aspects are related to the organizational structures and need to be adapted to the situation
present at an institution. A general plan, how such an adaption needs to be done and what
LARA can achieve, could be part of further studies related to this project.
Calculation Improvement
The calculation method used in LARA is based on Bayesian networks. This approach allows
absorbing the effect of uncertainties in semi-quantitative judgments and provides a linear
relationship between the different risk scores. The uncertainties related to these judgments
are not always caused by the same reasons and might even be different for the risk dimensions
used in LARA. Once LARA is used in laboratories at various institutions, statistical relevant data
about the risks and the risk judgments will be available. This data could be used for various
purposes. A further investigation could identify patterns in the behavior of the users. Since
the Bayesian calculation method uses probability distributions, these distributions could be
improved according to these studies. Another benefit of the Bayesian calculation method is,
that an adaptive element can be integrated. This could be used to remove biases of users and
to display the risk situation found in a laboratory more precisely, independently of who is
doing the analysis.
Database Connectivity
The database of LARA is the backbone of the method and provides flexibility and the possibility
to expand and adapt the method constantly. Most laboratories already work with numerous
databases, for example chemical structure databases, which also contain safety information
for most common compounds. Some of these databases can be linked with electronic labora-
tory notebook tools, allowing a simple integration of information. A similar approach could
be an optimal extension of the LARA software, since it would make the hazard identification
easier and more accessible. A later version of LARA could allow a direct integration of elec-
tronic laboratory notebook data and automatically gather the information provided by the
chemical databases. This would be an important extension of the method, since the hazard
identification allows automation on certain levels and would help to minimize the required
time to perform an analysis.
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Corrective Measures
The ideal choice of corrective measures is as important for a risk management technique as
an optimal hazard identification. In LARA the choice between the options is facilitated by
the use of an allocation matrix, which allows the integration of financial and non-financial
factors in the selection process. However, the identification of corrective measures is not an
integrated part of the LARA workflow; the corrective measures are mainly based on experience.
An approach to systematically identify corrective measures could improve the choice and the
feasibility of measures, before an actual selection takes place. Some approaches to systematize
the discovery of possible corrective measures (e.g. STOP as described in Chapter 1.1) already
exist. A development of such a method could improve the resource allocation even further
and help to increase the safety level at universities.
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A.1 Hazards
Table A.1 – Chemical hazards used in LARA.
Hazard group Hazard
Explosives H200: Unstable explosive
Explosives H201: Explosive; mass explosion hazard
Explosives H202: Explosive; severe projection hazard
Explosives H203: Explosive; fire, blast or projection hazard
Explosives H204: Fire or projection hazard
Explosives H205: May mass explode in fire
Explosives EUH001: Explosive when dry
Explosives EUH006: Explosive with or without contact with air
Flammability H220: Extremely flammable gas
Flammability H221: Flammable gas
Flammability H222: Extremely flammable aerosol
Flammability H223: Flammable aerosol
Flammability H224: Extremely flammable liquid and vapour
Flammability H225: Highly flammable liquid and vapour
Flammability H226: Flammable liquid and vapour
Flammability H227: Combustible liquid
Flammability H228: Flammable solid
Reactivity H230: May react explosively even in the absence of air
Reactivity H231: May react explosively even in the absence of air
at elevated pressure and/or temperature
Reactivity H240: Heating may cause an explosion
Reactivity H241: Heating may cause a fire or explosion
Reactivity H242: Heating may cause a fire
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Hazard group Hazard
Reactivity EUH014: Reacts violently with water
Reactivity EUH019: May form explosive peroxides
Reactivity EUH044: Risk of explosion if heated under confinement
Instability H250: Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air
Instability H251: Self-heating; may catch fire
Instability H252: Self-heating in large quantities; may catch fire
Instability H260: In contact with water releases flammable gases
which may ignite spontaneously
Instability H261: In contact with water releases flammable gas
Oxidizer H270: May cause or intensify fire; oxidizer
Oxidizer H271: May cause fire or explosion; strong oxidizer
Oxidizer H272: May intensify fire; oxidizer
Gas under pressure H280: Contains gas under pressure; may explode if heated
Gas under pressure H281: Contains refrigerated gas; may cause cryogenic
burns or injury
Corrosion H290: May be corrosive to metals
Oral hazards H300: Fatal if swallowed
Oral hazards H301: Toxic if swallowed
Oral hazards H302: Harmful if swallowed
Oral hazards H303: May be harmful if swallowed
Oral hazards H304: May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways
Oral hazards H305: May be harmful if swallowed and enters airways
Skin hazards H310: Fatal in contact with skin
Skin hazards H311: Toxic in contact with skin
Skin hazards H312: Harmful in contact with skin
Skin hazards H313: May be harmful in contact with skin
Skin hazards H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage
Skin hazards H315: Causes skin irritation
Skin hazards H316: Causes mild skin irritation
Skin hazards H317: May cause an allergic skin reaction
Eye hazards H318: Causes serious eye damage
Eye hazards H319: Causes serious eye irritation
Eye hazards H320: Causes eye irritation
Eye hazards EUH070: Toxic by eye contact
Inhalation hazards EUH071: Corrosive to the respiratory tract
Inhalation hazards EUH029: Contact with water liberates toxic gas
Inhalation hazards EUH031: Contact with acids liberates toxic gas
Inhalation hazards EUH032: Contact with acids liberates very toxic gas
Inhalation hazards H330: Fatal if inhaled
Continued on next page
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A.1. Hazards
Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Hazard group Hazard
Inhalation hazards H331: Toxic if inhaled
Inhalation hazards H332: Harmful if inhaled
Inhalation hazards H333: May be harmful if inhaled
Inhalation hazards H334: May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or
breathing difficulties if inhaled
Inhalation hazards H335: May cause respiratory irritation
Inhalation hazards H336: May cause drowsiness or dizziness
Germ cell mutagenicity H340: May cause genetic defects
Germ cell mutagenicity H341: Suspected of causing genetic defects
Carcinogenicity H350: May cause cancer
Carcinogenicity H351: Suspected of causing cancer
Reproduction toxicity H360: May damage fertility or the unborn child
Reproduction toxicity H361: Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child
Reproduction toxicity H361d: Suspected of damaging the unborn child
Reproduction toxicity H362: May cause harm to breast-fed children
Specific target organ toxicity H370: Causes damage to organs
Specific target organ toxicity H371: May cause damage to organs
Specific target organ toxicity H372: Causes damage to organs through prolonged
or repeated exposure
Specific target organ toxicity H373: May cause damage to organs through prolonged
or repeated exposure
Environmental hazards H400: Very toxic to aquatic life
Environmental hazards H401: Toxic to aquatic life
Environmental hazards H402: Harmful to aquatic life
Environmental hazards H410: Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects
Environmental hazards H411: Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects
Environmental hazards H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects
Environmental hazards H413: May cause long lasting harmful effects to aquatic life
Environmental hazards H420: Harms public health and the environment by
destroying ozone in the upper atmosphere
Nanoparticles Dry nanofibers
Nanoparticles Nanoparticles in suspension
Nanoparticles Nanoparticles in a matrix
Nanoparticles Nanoparticles in powder form
157
Appendix A. LARA Databases
Table A.2 – Physical hazards used in LARA.
Hazard group Hazard
Noise Noise emitted continuously ( 8H Lex >85 dB per day)
Noise Occasional impulsive noise (Peak >135 dB)
Ultrasonic & Infrasonic Ultrasonic & Infrasonic
Vibrations Vibrations on hands (Acceleration a <5 m/s2)
Vibrations Whole body vibrations (Acceleration a <0.8 m/s2)
Hypobaric or hyperbaric environment Hypobaric environment
Hypobaric or hyperbaric environment Hyperbaric environment
Electricity Accessible energized objects
Electricity Power outage
Electricity Arc flash
Electricity Short circuit
Thermic Hazards Hot media
Thermic Hazards Cold Media
Thermic Hazards Exposition to elevated temperatures (T > 33◦C )
Thermic Hazards Exposition to cold temperatures (T < 15◦C )
Thermic Hazards Frequent variations of temperature
Pressure hazards High pressure devices
Pressure hazards Vacuum
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Table A.3 – Electromagnetic fields and waves hazards used in LARA.
Hazard group Hazard
Laser Pulsed laser
Laser Continuous light laser
Laser IR laser
Laser Visible
Laser UV laser
Laser Tunable laser
Laser Class 2M
Laser Class 3R
Laser Class 3B
Laser Class 4
Radiofrequency-microwaves Source of radiofrequency radiation with frequency
<= 100 kHz
Radiofrequency-microwaves Source of radiofrequency radiation with frequency
F: 100 kHz <F <=110 MHz
Radiofrequency-microwaves Source of radiofrequency radiation with frequency
F: 110 MHz <F <= 10 GHz
Radiofrequency-microwaves Source of microwave radiation with frequency
F: 10 GHz <F <= 300 GHz
Radiofrequency-microwaves Completely shielded radiofrequency-microwave source
Radiofrequency-microwaves Partially shielded or unshielded radiofrequency
microwave source
Static Magnetic Field Magnetic field with 0.5 mT line at distance
>50 cm from the equipment’s edge
Static Magnetic Field Magnetic field with 0.5 mT line at distance
<= 50 cm from the equipment’s edge
UV-IR non-coherent radiation Unshielded UV-C (190 nm - 290 nm) source
UV-IR non-coherent radiation Unshielded UV-B (290 nm - 320 nm) source
UV-IR non-coherent radiation Unshielded UV-A (320 nm - 400 nm) source
UV-IR non-coherent radiation Unshielded IR source
Ionizing rays Alpha particles
Ionizing rays Beta particles
Ionizing rays Gamma rays
Ionizing rays X-rays
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Table A.4 – Biological hazards used in LARA.
Hazard group Hazard
Danger of infection by MO or viruses Biosafety level 1
Danger of infection by MO or viruses Biosafety level 2
Danger of infection by MO or viruses Biosafety level 3
Danger of infection by MO or viruses Biosafety level 4
Genetically modified organisms Biosafety level 1
Genetically modified organisms Biosafety level 2
Genetically modified organisms Biosafety level 3
Genetically modified organisms Biosafety level 4
Allergen or toxic substances of MOs Biosafety level 1
Allergen or toxic substances of MOs Biosafety level 2
Allergen or toxic substances of MOs Biosafety level 3
Allergen or toxic substances of MOs Biosafety level 4
Contact with animals Bites
Plants Allergens or toxic substances
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Table A.5 – Mechanical hazards used in LARA.
Hazard group Hazard
Noise Noise emitted continuously ( 8H Lex>= 85 dB day)
Noise Occasional impulsive noise (Peak>= 135 dB)
Ultrasonic & Infrasonic Ultrasonic & Infrasonic
Vibrations Vibrations on hands (Acceleration a <= 5 m/s2)
Vibrations Whole body vibrations (Acceleration a <= 0.8 m/s2)
Hypobaric or hyperbaric environment Hypobaric or hyperbaric environment
Electricity Accessible energized objects
Electricity Power outage
Electricity Arc flash
Electricity Short circuit
Thermic Hazards Hot media
Thermic Hazards Cold Media
Thermic Hazards Exposition to elevated temperatures (T>33°C)
Thermic Hazards Exposition to cold temperatures (T<15°C)
Thermic Hazards Frequent variations of temperature
Pressure hazards High pressure devices
Pressure hazards Vacuum
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A.2 Worsening Factors
Table A.6 – General worsening factors used in LARA.
Worsening factor group Worsening factor
Climate Too hot/cold
Climate Odors
Climate Noise
Climate Humide climate
Electrical Outdated electrical systems/equipment
Electrical Overloaded sockets
Ergonomics Heavy weights
Ergonomics Respiratory protecting device
Ergonomics Cramped benches
Ergonomics Cramped fumehoods
Ergonomics Cramped passages
Lighting Inadequate lighting
Lighting No daylight
Lighting Reflections
Lighting Inadequate distribution
Lighting Inadequate colors
Safety Warning signs not visible
Safety Missing safety training
Safety Missing waste management
Safety Misplaced safety equipment
Safety Stage of chemicals not ideal (e.g. labelling)
Safety Blocked emergency exits
Safety Missing safety equipment
Safety Warnings not hearable
Safety Excess of information
Social conditions Too many or too few people in room
Social conditions Different spoken languages
Social conditions Group composition not ideal
Social conditions Leader not ideal
Social conditions Discrimination or mobbing
Social conditions Awarneness
Work organisation Lack of procedures
Work organisation Unclear workflow
Work organisation Responsabilities unclear
Work organisation Responsability overload
Work organisation Lack of training
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – continued from previous page
Worsening factor group Worsening factor
Work organisation Pressure of time
Work organisation Distortions
Work organisation Lack of breaks
Work organisation Stress
Work organisation Missing advanced training
Work organisation Missing fitness for duty
Work organisation Rule overload
Work organisation Missing supervision
Work organisation Lack of communication
Work organisation Complex procedures
Work organisation Night work
Work organisation Overtime
Work organisation Too many working hours
Work related Narrow space
Work related Uncomfortable position
Work related Uncomfortable postures
Work related Repetitional tasks
Work related Qualitative underchallenged personal
Work related Quantitative underchallenged personal
Work related Qualitative overchallenged personal
Work related Quantitative overchallenged personal
Work related Permanent attention
Work related Isolation
163
Appendix A. LARA Databases
Table A.7 – Hazard-specific worsening factors used in LARA.
Hazard-specific worsening factor
Absence of access limits
Absence of automatic extinguishing system
Absence of beam stops
Absence of fire extinguisher
Absence of protective equipment
Absence of signalisation of the EM field
Bad labelling conditioning and sorting
Contact without PPE
Control unit in unprotected zone
Excessive quantity stored
Expired products
Ferromagnetic objects near strong static fields
Ignition source
Inaccessible places
Incompatibles wastes mixing
Lack of banisters
Lack of carefullness
Lack of caution
Lack of lab access control
Lack of oxygen
Lack of protective equipment
Lack of ventillation system
Leakage of the ventilation system
Loose-fitting clothes
Low perception of the effects (low dose effect)
Metallics prosthesis wearer
MSDS not available
Noise
Pacemaker wearer
Person had cataract operation
Presence of reflecting surfaces
Short circuiting
Simultanous use of the hood for working and storage
Sparks
Substances in gas or pulverulent forms
Temperature elevation
Tools that can be started without protection
Unknown wastes
Continued on next page
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A.2. Worsening Factors
Table A.7 – continued from previous page
Hazard-specific worsening factor
UV photosensitised person (naturally or due to medication)
Wastes in need of subsequent treatment
Work requiring oral communication
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LARA MANUAL 
INTRODUCTION 
LARA is an integrated risk management methodology developed for research 
laboratories by the Group of Chemical and Physical Safety (ISIC-GSCP) of 
the Institute of Chemical Sciences and Engineering; and the Occupational 
Safety and Health (SB-SST) of the School of Basic Sciences at the Ecole 
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne.  
This new methodology for complex risk analysis exhibits multi-functionality 
allowing identifying hazards, assessing and evaluating risks in response to 
emerging and increasing accidents concerns. LARA offers the possibility to 
prioritize risks based on a criticality index combining several parameters 
allowing implementing and quantifying corrective measures to reduce or 
mitigate the risk.  
LARA is an intuitive and friendly user tool for decision-making, based on an 
interdisciplinary approach. Unlike other methods of risk analysis, it mobilizes 
less time, human and financial resources.  
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EVALUATION MANAGEMENT 
 
The first part of the LARA software is the evaluation part, which is the main 
part for basic users. An evaluation is assigned to a project and the involved 
activities are part of this evaluation. In LARA, the user adds an evaluation to a 
specific research group (the organization units are editable by the 
administrators, which also define the rights for the specific users for each 
single organization unit). 
 
The interface to generate an evaluation lets the user add following information 
when generating an evaluation:  
• Description of the project 
• Organization unit 
• Analysis moderator 
• Analysis team 
• Laboratory responsible 
• Safety delegate 
• Date 
Person related selections are limited to the person list defined by the 
administrators in the setup. Since LARA gives the possibility to store multiple 
calculation files, the desired one is selected for an evaluation in the evaluation 
interface.  
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 After a creation of an evaluation, the user gives the information about the 
general worsening factors by choosing from the ones stored in the LARA 
database. According to the groups in the database, the user can select if a 
factor is present.  
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The evaluation overview gives an overview of the entered information and 
displays the value for the GWF according to the choice of the user. In the 
lower part of interface, the user can add activities to the evaluation or switch 
between existing ones. When a new activity is added to the evaluation it can 
be described accordingly. Once the evaluation is finished, the LCI values of all 
hazards are displayed in in a bar chart. If the calculation file is updated, the 
values are not changed for existing evaluation; however, they are marked as 
outdated values.  
Organizational operations for the evaluation are available between the 
overview and the activity interface: download finished evaluation reports or 
add revisions for the evaluation.  
 
The “activity analysis” button opens the analysis management for the selected 
actvitiy.  
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ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT 
 
When the user enters the activity analysis interface, the general parameters 
valid for all the hazards of this activity are defined: first, the steps are 
described including the hazardous components and then the commonness 
value is determined. An interface (5 x 5 square, colors indicating 5 different 
possible values (1-5)) allows assigning a value for the first calculation 
parameter. Both axis of the scale are adjustable for the main administrator of 
the software. 
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The hazard overview shows the parameters of this activity and lets the user 
add hazards from the database or switch between. For each hazards, the 
user can add a short description and choose a consequence: the selection of 
possible consequences is depending on the selected hazard. The 
consequences are part of the database and the user has the possibility to add 
suggestion. The suggestions will be added to the database after revision of an 
administrator.  
Then the user chooses the values for the risk dimensions: 
The impact of a hazard is the first parameter for the calculation of the risk. 
The value is given by the vertical axis (1-5) for each of the possible field of 
impact. The scale (very serious, serious, etc.) and the choices (e.g. regional 
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for the field of impact “perception level”) are adjustable by the main 
administrator of the software.   
 
The probability is the second parameter for the calculation of the risk. The 
value is given by a choice of 5 different options (1-5). The qualitative 
description of a value (“Accident is unlikely”) as well as the quantitative (“0.01-
0.03”) is adjustable by the main administrator of the software.  
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In a similar way, the other factors of the risk dimensions are determined. 
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 The rest of the interface is a database selection for each specific hazard. The 
different types of worsening factor are the other parameters used for the 
calculation of the risk. Each hazard has a specific list for each type of 
worsening factors (stored in the database). The user can chose from this list 
and add factors to the analysis for this hazard. Each single factor has an 
internal value in the database. The sum of these values (of the chosen 
factors) is compared with a fixed scale (settings) in order to give the final 
value for the worsening factor type, which is shown in the interface. Other 
than the specific worsening factors, the choice of synergetic worsening factors 
is related to the other hazards present in the analysis.  
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Once the hazards for an activity are described, the user can switch to the 
corrective measure interface below the activity overview. In this bar, the user 
can also access the step interface and add images to the activity, which are 
then stored in the evaluation report.  
The corrective measure overview shows the LCI values before, after and 
when a specific corrective measure is applied.  
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The corrective measures interface gives the user the possibility to add 
corrective measures related to each single hazard (options are stored in the 
database) and chose their effectiveness. The user changes the values of 
each corrective measure manually. As part of additional information, the user 
can assign responsible persons, deadlines and estimated costs to each 
corrective measure.  
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DATABASE MANAGEMENT 
The second part of the LARA software is the management of the classifiers, 
i.e. everything that is part of the database. Normal users do not have the 
permissions to do so, but they have the possibility to suggest a database 
entry. After a validation by an administrator, the newly suggest item will be 
added to the database. Following classes are editable in LARA 
 
 
HAZARDS 
The hazard overview shows the hazard categories, groups and hazards in a 
explorer-like hierarchy. Each type of hierarchy can be added through the 
overview interface.  
 
 
The hazard editing interface allows to add a new or to edit an existing hazard. 
Additional to the general information, a hazard symbol icon can be assigned 
form an existing choice or uploaded from the user. Each hazard has linked 
database entries: consequences, hazard-specific worsening factors, and 
synergetic worsening factors.  
Every user can suggest new hazards; however, they are not implemented 
directly in the hazard database. Before it can be used in LARA, an 
administrator has to validate the hazard and enable it (only visible for 
administrators) 
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CONSEQUENCES 
This interface lets the user add consequences and assign them to hazards 
from the database. As for the hazards, suggested consequences need to be 
validated first, before they can be used in LARA.  
 
 
GENERAL WORSENING FACTORS 
This interface lets the user add general worsening factors and assign them to 
a worsening factor group. Additionally, a value is assigned which is used for 
the calculation. A normal user cannot suggest this kind of worsening factors.  
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HAZARD-SPECIFIC WORSENING FACTOR 
This interface lets the user add hazard-specific worsening factors and assign 
them to hazards from the database. Additionally, a value is assigned which is 
used for the calculation. As for the hazards, suggested hazard-specific 
worsening factors need to be validated first, before they can be used in LARA.  
 
 
 
SYNERGETIC WORSENING FACTORS 
This interface lets the user add hazard-specific worsening factors and assign 
them to hazards from the database. Additionally, a value is assigned which is 
used for the calculation. As for the hazards, suggested synergetic worsening 
factors need to be validated first, before they can be used in LARA.  
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CORRECTIVE MEASURES 
This interface lets the user add corrective and assign them to hazards from 
the database. As for the hazards, suggested corrective measures need to be 
validated first, before they can be used in LARA.  
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SETTINGS 
In the setting part of LARA, the various variables for the risk 
management can be changed.  
 
 
An important part is the user management:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In LARA, following user groups are defined: 
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USER is allowed to see analyses and evaluations for certain groups, 
institutes, faculties or institutions (as set by the administrator). 
ANALYST is allowed to see, create and edit analyses and evaluations for 
certain groups, institutes, faculties or institutions (as set by the administrator). 
Has the right to propose new items to the database.  
ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to see, create and edit analyses and 
evaluations for certain groups, institutes, faculties or institutions. Defines the 
access right of users and analysts. Has the right to propose new items to the 
database. Accepts propositions for the database and completes the 
information. Is able to edit the content of the database. Can create account 
and set them to either user or analyst. Can delete evaluations or analyses. 
 SUPER-ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to see, create and edit analyses and 
evaluations for certain groups, institutes, faculties or institutions. Defines the 
access right of users, administrators and analysts. Accepts propositions for 
the database and completes the information. Is able to edit the content of the 
database. Can create account and set them to user, analyst, administrator or 
super-administrator. Can delete evaluations or analyses. Is allowed to perform 
any changes in the settings.  
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A.1.3 Settings
In the setting part of LARA, the various variables for the risk management can be changed. An
important part is the user management ((Figure A.19) and (Figure A.20)). In LARA, following
user groups are defined:
User Is allowed to see analyses and evaluations for certain groups, institutes, faculties or
institutions (as set by the administrator).
Analyst Is allowed to see, create and edit analyses and evaluations for certain groups, insti-
tutes, faculties or institutions (as set by the administrator). Has the right to propose new items
to the database.
Administrator Is allowed to see, create and edit analyses and evaluations for certain groups,
institutes, faculties or institutions. Defines the access right of users and analysts. Has the right
to propose new items to the database. Accepts propositions for the database and completes
the information. Is able to edit the content of the database. Can create account and set them
to either user or analyst. Can delete evaluations or analyses.
Table A.1 – Different account types and their rights.
User Analyst Administrator Super-Administrator
See analyses X X X X
Create analyses X X X
Edit/delete analyses X X X
Propose items to Database X X X
Accept proposed items X X
Edit database X X
Create accounts X X
Change of settings X
141
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In LARA, all risk dimensions are changeable by the administrator of the 
system in order to provide the flexibility and to adapt the settings to the 
situation present.  
 
Also the calculation engine is changeable. The interface to change the 
calculation allows defining the exact parameters to ensure traceability.  
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Additionally, the user is able to change his account settings:  
 
Some items are not directly stored in the database, since they do not have a 
direct implication for hazard. The first kinds of these items are persons. In 
LARA, the persons related to an evaluation are not necessarily registered as 
users; therefore they can be added separately.  
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The second kinds of items are hazard symbols: they can also be stored in the 
setup by each administrator.  
 
 
LARA CALCULATION FILE 
LARA gives the possibility to add different kind of calculation files and to 
choose between the calculation methods for each single evaluation. The basic 
mechanism is as follows:  
LARA hands over the values for variables (definition see below) to a server 
running Octave (a freeware clone of Matlab), which calculates the LCI values 
using the calculation file and hands them back to LARA. If Bayesian Network 
is used, Octave uses an API to calculate the values using Hugin.  
The calculation file needs to be compiled as a .m-File (standard Matlab 
calculation file which works as well with Octave).  
In order to work with the LARA interface, the parameters used in the 
calculation file need to be defined as followed:  
• Severity:    Severity_matlab_input  
• Probability: 
o Commonness:  Frequency_matlab_input  
o Occurrence;   Rate_matlab_input 
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o Involvement:  Exposure_matlab_input  
• Detectability:  
o Availability:  Availability_matlab_input 
o Reliability:   Reliability_matlab_input 
o Selectivity:  Selectivity_matlab_input 
• Worsening factors:  
o HSWF:  Hazard_specific_matlab_input 
o SWF:    Interrelations_matlab_input 
o GWF:   Special_conditions_matlab_input 
 
Additional information for the use of Bayesian networks 
Hugin uses following commands to calculate the values:  
%The following two files are required for the calculation using Hugin and need 
to be stored on the server. The path needs to be renamed in order to work.  
ghapi = NET.addAssembly ('C:\Program Files\Hugin Expert\Hugin Researcher 
7.6 (x64)\HDE7.6CS\Lib\hugincs-7.6-2.0-x64.dll') 
%The .net-File contains the Hugin information and needs to be compiled 
using the Hugin-Software.  
 d = HAPI.Domain ('C:\Program Files\Hugin Expert\Hugin Researcher 7.6 
(x64)\Samples\Basic_Version_test2_truncated_3.net', 
HAPI.DefaultClassParseListener); 
 
        Severity_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Severity_input'); 
        Severity_input.SelectState (Severity_matlab_input); 
 
        Rate_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Rate_input'); 
        Rate_input.SelectState (Rate_matlab_input); 
 
        Exposure_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Exposure_input'); 
        Exposure_input.SelectState (Exposure_matlab_input); 
 
        Frequency_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Frequency_input'); 
        Frequency_input.SelectState (Frequency_matlab_input); 
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        Availability_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Availability_input'); 
        Availability_input.SelectState (Availability_matlab_input); 
 
        Reliability_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Reliability_input'); 
        Reliability_input.SelectState (Reliability_matlab_input); 
 
        Selectivity_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Selectivity_input'); 
        Selectivity_input.SelectState (Selectivity_matlab_input); 
 
        Hazard_specific_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Hazard_specific_input'); 
        Hazard_specific_input.SelectState (Hazard_specific_matlab_input); 
 
        Interrelations_input = d.GetNodeByName ('Interrelations_input'); 
        Interrelations_input.SelectState (Interrelations_matlab_input); 
 
        Special_conditions_input = d.GetNodeByName 
('Special_conditions_input'); 
        Special_conditions_input.SelectState (Special_conditions_matlab_input); 
   
  d.Compile (); 
d.Propagate(HAPI.Equilibrium.H_EQUILIBRIUM_SUM,HAPI.EvidenceMode.
H_EVIDENCE_MODE_NORMAL); 
 
LCI = d.GetNodeByName ('LCI_value'); 
LCI.GetExpectedUtility(); 
import(n,12) = ((((ans-4.51)*9)/(7.69-4.51))+1        %Normalization to 10 
end 
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C LARA Application Examples: Details
C.1 Laboratory of Inorganic Synthesis and Catalysis
Organization EPFL
Research Group Laboratory of Inorganic Synthesis and Catalysis (LSCI)
Laboratory BCH 3201
Group head Prof. Xile Hu
Safety delegate Gerald Bauer
Responsible scientist Gerald Bauer
Analysis moderator David Nicolas Pluess
Date 05.08.14
Description of the evaluation Evaluation of the synthesis to form [Fe(Bopa-Ph)Cl(THF)2]
General worsening factors present Too hot/too cold (Climate)
Respiratory protecting device (Dynamic work)
Group composition not ideal (Social)
Overloaded benches (Space)
Overloaded fumehoods (Space)
Too many working hours (Working hours)
Evaluation LSCI
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Responsible scientist: Gerald Bauer Laboratory 05.08.14
Activity Step-Nr. 
2-Chlorobenzoic acid 1 Dissolution of nitro benzoic acid and addition of Pd/C
2 Stirring in H2 Atmosphere
3 Filtering off and evaporation of solvent
2,2-Iminodibenzoic acid 1 Mixing of all reactants and addition of DMF
2 Heating to 140°C (24h)
3 Evaporation of solvent
4 Dissolution in water
5 Filtering of the solution
6 Acidification
7 Filtering and drying
2,2-Iminodibenzoyl chloride 1 Suspension of reactants
2 Heating to reflux (overnight)
3 Filtering and washing
4 Quenching of the filtrate
5 Drying of the organic phase
6 Recrystallization
7C Oxaz-NNN-Ph (GB13_043) 1 Dissolution of reactants and addition of tryethylamin
2 Cooling (0°C) and addition of 2,2-iminodibenzoyl chloride
3 Stirring for 1 h
4 Cooling (0°C) and addition of methanesulfonyl chloride
5 Warming to room temperature and stirring for 2h
6 Quenching of the mixture
7 Extraction of the organic phase
8 Column chromatography
(Bopa-Ph)Li 1 Dissolution of the reactants in toluene
2 Addition of n-BuLi
3 Stirring for 2h
4 Addition of pentane
5 Filtration and drying
[Fe(Bopa-Ph)Cl(THF)2] 1 Dissolution of the reactants in THF
2 Addition of FeCl2(THF)1.5
3 Stirring overnight
4 Evaporation of solvent
5 Redisollution in toluene
6 Filtration 
7 Concentration and precipitation with pentane
8 Filtration 
9 Recrystallization
Evaluation LSCI
BCH 3201 Date
Step 
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Responsible scientist: Gerald Bauer Laboratory 05.08.14
Activity Origin Nr. Hazard LCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2-Chlorobenzoic acid Nitrobenzoic Acid 1 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.7
2 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.6
3 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.2
Methanol 4 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.0
5 H301 Toxic if swalloed ! 3.2
6 H311 Toxic in contact with skin ! 3.7
7 H331 Toxic if inhaled ! 3.9
8 H370 Causes damage to organs ! 4.3
Pd/C 9 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.9
10 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.0
11 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.2
H2 12 H220 Extremely flammable gas ! 4.7
Evaporation 13 Hot medium ! 2.8
2,2-Iminodibenzoic acid Anthranilic acid 14 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.4
2-Chlorobenzoic acid 15 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.4
Copper(I)oxide 16 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.1
17 H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! 4.8
K2CO3 18 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.1
19 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.5
20 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.4
21 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 3.7
Heating 22 Hot medium ! ! 3.0
DMF 23 H226 Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.5
24 H312 Harmful in contact with skin ! 3.7
25 H332 Harmful if inhaled ! 3.9
26 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.4
27 H360 May damage fertility or the unborn child ! 5.2
2,2-Iminodibenzoyl chloride DCM 28 H315 Causes skin irritation ! ! ! 4.1
29 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! ! ! 4.9
30 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! ! ! 4.2
31 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! ! ! 3.8
32 H351 Suspected of causing cancer ! ! ! 4.5
33 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! ! ! 4.3
Thionyl chloride 34 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.3
35 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 4.8
36 H331 Toxic if inhaled ! 4.1
Reflux 37 Hot medium ! ! 2.6
Hexane 38 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 5.0
39 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! 5.2
40 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.4
41 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.7
42 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child ! 5.2
43 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 4.0
44 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! 4.1
7C Oxaz-NNN-Ph (GB13_043) Triethylamine 45 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.8
46 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.5
47 H311 Toxic in contact with skin ! 3.7
48 H331 Toxic if inhaled ! 3.6
49 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 4.8
50 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.0
DCM 51 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.6
52 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.4
53 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 3.6
54 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 2.9
55 H351 Suspected of causing cancer ! 4.0
56 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 3.8
KOH 57 H290 May be corrosive to metals ! 3.2
58 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.3
59 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 4.6
Cooling 60 Cool media ! 2.5
Methanesulfonyl chloride 61 H300 Fatal if swallowed ! 5.2
62 H310 Fatal in contact with skinH330 Fatal if inhaled ! 5.4
63 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 4.6
64 H330 Fatal if inhaled ! 5.4
65 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.1
Hexane 66 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.6
67 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! 5.0
68 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.4
69 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.0
70 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child ! 5.0
71 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 3.6
72 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! 4.1
Ethyl acetate 73 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.6
74 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 4.8
75 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.3
(Bopa-Ph)Li Toluene 76 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.9
77 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! 5.0
Step 
BCH 3201 Date
Evaluation LSCI
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Activity Origin Nr. Hazard LCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Step 
BCH 3201 Date
Evaluation LSCI
78 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.4
79 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.5
80 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child ! 5.2
81 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 4.5
n-BuLi 82 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 5.3
83 H250 Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air ! 5.3
84 H261 In contact with water releases flammable gas ! 5.5
85 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! 5.6
86 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 4.6
87 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.5
88 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child ! 5.2
89 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 4.3
90 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! 4.4
Pentane 91 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.6
92 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! 5.4
93 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.5
94 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! 4.2
[Fe(Bopa-Ph)Cl(THF)2] Toluene 95 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.6
96 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! 4.8
97 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.0
98 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 3.1
99 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child ! 5.2
100 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 3.8
Pentane 101 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! ! 4.8
102 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways ! ! 5.4
103 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! ! 3.7
104 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! ! 4.2
Evaporation 105 Hot medium ! 2.0
THF 106 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! ! 5.0
107 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! ! 5.0
108 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! ! 4.2
109 H351 Suspected of causing cancer ! ! 5.0
Appendix C. LARA Application Examples: Details
194
Gerald Bauer Laboratory BCH 3201 05.08.14
Nr Hazard Impact LCI
Exposure Occurence	   Involvement Reliability Selectivity Availability GWF HSWF SWF4
1 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 4 3 3 5 1 1 3 1 3.7
2 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.6
3 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 2 4.2
4 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 4 2 3 1 5 3 1 2 1 4.0
5 H301 Toxic if swalloed 3 4 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 1 3.2
6 H311 Toxic in contact with skin 3 4 1 3 3 5 1 1 2 1 3.7
7 H331 Toxic if inhaled 3 4 1 3 3 5 1 1 2 2 3.9
8 H370 Causes damage to organs 4 4 2 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 4.3
9 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 4 3 3 5 3 1 2 1 3.9
10 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 3 3 5 3 1 2 1 5.0
11 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 2 4.2
12 H220 Extremely flammable gas 4 4 2 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 4.7
13 Hot medium 1 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2.8
14 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.4
15 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.4
16 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 4 1 2 5 3 3 1 1 1 3.1
17 H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 5 4 2 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 4.8
18 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 4 1 2 5 5 3 1 1 1 3.1
19 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 4 2 3 5 3 1 1 1 3.5
20 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.4
21 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 1 2 3.7
22 Hot medium 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 3.0
23 H226 Flammable liquid and vapour 3 4 2 2 5 3 3 1 2 3 4.5
24 H312 Harmful in contact with skin 2 4 3 2 5 5 3 1 2 1 3.7
25 H332 Harmful if inhaled 2 4 3 2 5 3 3 1 2 2 3.9
26 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 2 5 5 1 1 2 1 4.4
27 H360 May damage fertility or the unborn child 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 3 2 5.2
28 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 4 4 3 5 3 1 2 1 4.1
29 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 4 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.9
30 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 4 3 1 3 1 1 2 4.2
31 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 3 3.8
32 H351 Suspected of causing cancer 4 4 2 4 3 1 1 1 2 1 4.5
33 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 1 4 1 1 3 1 2 1 4.3
34 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 1 3.3
35 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 4.8
36 H331 Toxic if inhaled 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 4.1
37 Hot medium 1 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2.6
38 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 3 5.0
39 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 5 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 2 5.2
40 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 3 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 3.4
41 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 3.7
42 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 3 2 5.2
43 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 4.0
44 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 1 4.1
45 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 4.8
46 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 3.5
47 H311 Toxic in contact with skin 3 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 1 3.7
48 H331 Toxic if inhaled 3 4 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 3.6
49 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 4.8
50 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 4.0
51 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 4 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 3.6
52 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.4
53 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 3.6
54 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 2.9
55 H351 Suspected of causing cancer 4 4 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 4.0
56 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 3.8
57 H290 May be corrosive to metals 1 4 3 2 5 5 5 1 1 1 3.2
58 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 4 2 2 5 5 3 1 1 1 3.3
59 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 1 4.6
60 Cool media 1 4 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2.5
61 H300 Fatal if swallowed 5 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 1 5.2
62 H310 Fatal in contact with skinH330 Fatal if inhaled 5 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 5.4
63 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 1 4.6
64 H330 Fatal if inhaled 5 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 5.4
65 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 2 3 3 5 1 2 1 4.1
66 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 1 1 4.6
67 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 5 4 2 2 3 5 1 1 2 1 5.0
68 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 3 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 3.4
69 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 1 4 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 3.0
70 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 3 1 5.0
71 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 3.6
72 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 1 4.1
73 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 4.6
74 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 1 2 1 4.8
75 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 3.3
76 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 3 3 5 5 1 1 1 4.9
77 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 4 4 2 3 5 5 3 1 2 1 5.0
78 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 2 3 5 5 3 1 2 1 3.4
79 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 3 3 1 3 1 2 1 3.5
80 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 1 3 1 5.2
81 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 2 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 4.5
82 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 3 3 5 5 3 1 2 1 5.3
83 H250 Catches fire spontaneously if exposed to air 4 4 3 3 3 5 3 1 2 1 5.3
84 H261 In contact with water releases flammable gas 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 1 5.5
85 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 5 4 2 3 5 5 3 1 2 1 5.6
86 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 4 2 3 3 5 1 1 1 2 4.6
87 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 3 5 3 1 1 2 1 3.5
88 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child 4 4 2 3 3 5 3 1 3 1 5.2
89 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 2 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 4.3
90 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4.4
91 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 1 4.6
92 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 5 4 2 3 3 5 3 1 1 1 5.4
93 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 3 3 1 3 1 2 1 3.5
94 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 3 4 2 3 5 3 3 1 1 1 4.2
95 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 1 3 5 5 1 1 2 4.6
96 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 4 4 2 1 5 5 3 1 2 2 4.8
97 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 4 2 1 5 5 3 1 2 1 3.0
98 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 3.1
DateResponsible scientist:
Evaluation LSCI
Detectability WFProbability
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Nr Hazard Impact LCI
Exposure Occurence	   Involvement Reliability Selectivity Availability GWF HSWF SWF
DateResponsible scientist:
Evaluation LSCI
Detectability WFProbability
99 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child 4 4 2 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 5.2
100 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 4 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 3.8
101 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 3 3 5 1 1 2 2 4.8
102 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 5 4 2 3 3 5 3 1 1 1 5.4
103 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 4 3 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 3.7
104 H411 Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 3 4 2 3 5 3 3 1 1 1 4.2
105 Hot medium 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.0
106 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 4 2 3 5 5 5 1 1 2 5.0
107 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 4 2 3 5 5 5 1 2 1 5.0
108 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 4 2 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 4.2
109 H351 Suspected of causing cancer 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 5.0
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Corrective Measure LCI LCI ΔLCI
before after Costs	  [CHF] Reduction/costs A S C V F§ 4 F
107 Training to raise safety awareness 5 4.6 0.4 10'000 3.7 5 5 4 5 0.98
109 Biomonitoring 5 4.1 0.9 40'000 2.2 2 2 3 1 0.39
61 Training to raise safety awareness 5.2 4.6 0.6 10'000 5.7 3 3 5 4 0.67
27 Biomonitoring 5.2 5.0 0.2 40'000 0.6 2 2 3 1 0.39
27 Information to raise awareness 5.2 4.6 0.6 5'000 12.6 5 4 5 5 0.94
88 Biomonitoring 5.2 4.0 1.2 40'000 3.1 2 2 3 1 0.39
88 Information to raise awareness 5.2 4.6 0.6 5'000 11.5 5 4 5 5 0.94
82 Intensified safety training for critical substances 5.3 4.4 0.9 10'000 9.4 3 3 5 4 0.67
83 Intensified safety training for critical substances 5.3 4.4 0.9 10'000 9.4 3 3 5 4 0.67
62 Additional PPE 5.4 4.6 0.8 5'000 16.6 1 5 3 4 0.58
64 Improvement of ventilation 5.4 4.6 0.8 80'000 1.0 5 5 4 5 0.98
64 Training to avoid misuse of existing measures 5.4 4.6 0.8 10'000 7.7 3 3 5 4 0.67
85 Training to raise safety awareness 5.6 5.4 0.2 10'000 2.3 3 3 5 4 0.67
Feasibility Financial aspect
Evaluation LSCI
Responsible scientist: Date
Refering Hazard
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197
Appendix C. LARA Application Examples: Details
C.2 Group of Catalytic Reaction Engineering
Organization EPFL
Research Group Group of Catalytic Reaction Engineering
Laboratory CH H3 554
Group head Prof. Lioubov Kiwi
Safety delegate Tatjana Iouranova
Responsible scientist Tatjana Iouranova
Analysis moderator David Nicolas Pluess
Date 05.08.14
Description of the evaluation Selective hydrogenation in a batch reactor
General worsening factors present Excess of information (Safety)
Missing safety training (Safety)
Different spoken languages (Social)
Too many/few people in lab (Social)
Permanent attention (Work)
Too many working hours (Working hours)
Evaluation GGRC
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Responsible scientist: Tatjana Iouranova Laboratory CH H3 554 05.08.14
Activity Step-Nr. 
Selective hydrogenation 1 Filling of the reaction with the subtrate dissolved in the solvent
2 Placing of the catalyst on the stirrer
3 Asembling of the reactor
4 Purging of the system using N2 (3 times)
5 Depressurize the reactor
6 Heat up the reactor 337K
7 Purge the system with H2 (8 bar)
8 Sample via GC 
9 Stop stirring
10 Release the pressure
11 Set the temperature to 298K
12 Let the reactor cool down under stirring
13 Cleaning of the reactor
Evaluation GGRC
Date
Step 
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Responsible scientist: Tatjana Iouranova Laboratory 05.08.14
Activity Origin Nr. Hazard LCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Selective hydrogenation 2-butyne-1,4-diol 1 H301 Toxic if swalloed  4.2
with ethanol as solvent 2 H312 Harmful in contact with skin  3.5
3 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage  4.8
4 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction  3.9
5 H331 Toxic if inhaled  4.2
6 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure  3.6
Ethanol 7 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour   5.3
H2 8 H220 Extremely flammable gas    5.3
Pressure 9 Overpressure       3.9
Heating 10 Hot medium      3.9
Sampling (GC) 11 Ejection of reaction mixture  3.5
Selective hydrogenation 2-butyne-1,4-diol 12 H301 Toxic if swalloed  4.0
with isopropanol as solvent 13 H312 Harmful in contact with skin  3.7
14 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage  4.6
15 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction  3.9
16 H331 Toxic if inhaled  4.0
17 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure  3.6
Ethanol 18 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour  5.3
H2 19 H220 Extremely flammable gas    5.3
Pressure 20 Overpressure       3.7
Heating 21 Hot medium      4.1
Sampling (GC) 22 Ejection of reaction mixture  3.5
Isopropanol 23 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour  4.2
24 H319 Causes serious eye irritation  4.8
25 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness  3.7
Selective hydrogenation 2-butyne-1,4-diol 26 H301 Toxic if swalloed  4.2
with toluene as solvent 27 H312 Harmful in contact with skin  3.5
28 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage  4.8
29 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction  3.7
30 H331 Toxic if inhaled  4.2
31 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure  3.6
Ethanol 32 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour  5.3
H2 33 H220 Extremely flammable gas    5.1
Pressure 34 Overpressure       3.7
Heating 35 Hot medium      4.1
Sampling (GC) 36 Ejection of reaction mixture  3.5
Toluene 37 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour  4.2
38 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways  5.2
39 H315 Causes skin irritation  3.2
40 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness  3.7
41 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child  5.3
42 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure  3.9
CH H3 554 Date
Evaluation GGRC
Step 
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Nr Hazard Impact LCI
Exposure Occurence	   Involvement Reliability Selectivity Availability GWF HSWF SWF4
1 H301 Toxic if swalloed 3 2 2 1 5 5 3 2 1 1 4.2
2 H312 Harmful in contact with skin 2 2 3 1 3 5 3 2 1 1 3.5
3 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 2 2 1 5 5 5 2 1 1 4.8
4 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction 2 2 3 1 5 5 3 2 2 2 3.9
5 H331 Toxic if inhaled 3 2 2 1 3 3 5 2 1 1 4.2
6 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3.6
7 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 2 2 4 5 3 3 2 2 1 5.3
8 H220 Extremely flammable gas 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 5.3
9 Overpressure 3 2 2 4 1 1 1 2 2 2 3.9
10 Hot medium 1 2 3 3 5 3 3 2 2 2 3.9
11 Ejection of reaction mixture 2 2 2 1 3 5 5 2 1 2 3.5
12 H301 Toxic if swalloed 3 2 2 1 5 5 3 2 1 1 4.0
13 H312 Harmful in contact with skin 2 2 3 1 3 5 3 2 2 1 3.7
14 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 2 2 1 5 5 5 2 1 1 4.6
15 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction 2 2 3 1 5 5 3 2 2 2 3.9
16 H331 Toxic if inhaled 3 2 2 1 3 3 5 2 1 1 4.0
17 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3.6
18 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 2 2 4 5 3 3 2 1 1 5.3
19 H220 Extremely flammable gas 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 5.3
20 Overpressure 3 2 2 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 3.7
21 Hot medium 1 2 3 3 5 3 3 2 2 2 4.1
22 Ejection of reaction mixture 2 2 2 1 3 5 5 2 1 2 3.5
23 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 2 2 1 3 3 5 2 2 1 4.2
24 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 2 2 1 5 5 5 2 1 2 4.8
25 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 3.7
26 H301 Toxic if swalloed 3 2 2 1 5 5 3 2 2 1 4.2
27 H312 Harmful in contact with skin 2 2 3 1 3 5 3 2 2 1 3.5
28 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 2 2 1 5 5 5 2 2 1 4.8
29 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction 2 2 3 1 5 5 3 2 2 2 3.7
30 H331 Toxic if inhaled 3 2 2 1 3 3 5 2 1 1 4.2
31 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 3.6
32 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 4 2 2 4 5 3 3 2 2 1 5.3
33 H220 Extremely flammable gas 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 5.1
34 Overpressure 3 2 2 4 1 1 1 2 1 2 3.7
35 Hot medium 1 2 3 3 5 3 3 2 2 2 4.1
36 Ejection of reaction mixture 2 2 2 1 3 5 5 2 2 2 3.5
37 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 2 2 1 3 3 5 2 2 1 4.2
38 H304 May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways 5 2 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 5.2
39 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 2 3 1 5 3 6 2 1 1 3.2
40 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 3.7
41 H361 Suspected of damaging fertility or the unborn child 4 2 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 2 5.3
42 H373 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3.9
DateResponsible scientist:
Evaluation GGRC
Detectability WFProbability
CH H3 554
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Corrective Measure LCI LCI ΔLCI
before after Costs	  [CHF] Reduction/costs A S C V F§ 4 F
38 Strict regulations concerning labeling 5.2 4.8 0.4 15'000 2.4 3 3 3 4 0.63
41 Information to raise awareness 5.3 4.6 0.6 5'000 12.3 5 4 4 5 0.92
19 Improve ventilation 5.3 5.1 0.2 80'000 0.3 5 5 4 5 0.98
Feasibility Financial aspect
Evaluation GGRC
Responsible scientist: Date
Refering Hazard
CH H3 554
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s 
st
u
dy
 a
n
d 
m
od
el
in
g 
ar
e 
im
pl
ic
it
 a
s 
w
el
l.
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1.
 I
N
T
R
O
D
U
C
T
IO
N
 
H
et
er
og
en
eo
u
sl
y 
ca
ta
ly
ze
d 
li
qu
id
-p
h
as
e 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
a 
cl
as
s 
of
 
re
ac
ti
on
s 
th
at
 a
re
 v
al
u
ab
le
 i
n
 f
in
e 
ch
em
ic
al
 i
n
du
st
ry
 a
n
d 
se
le
ct
iv
e 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
 
of
 
ca
rb
on
-c
ar
bo
n
 
tr
ip
le
 
bo
n
d 
is
 
am
on
g 
th
em
. 
T
h
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
is
 c
om
m
on
ly
 c
ar
ri
ed
 o
u
t 
in
 b
at
ch
 o
r 
se
m
i-
ba
tc
h
 r
ea
ct
or
s 
w
h
er
e 
to
 o
n
e 
re
ac
ta
n
t 
in
it
ia
ll
y 
co
n
ta
in
ed
 i
n
 a
 s
ti
rr
ed
 t
an
k
 r
ea
ct
or
 t
h
e 
se
co
n
d 
re
ac
ta
n
t 
co
n
ti
n
u
ou
sl
y 
ad
de
d 
to
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r,
 w
it
h
 n
o 
fl
ow
 o
u
t 
of
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r.
 
1.
1.
 G
as
/li
qu
id
 r
ea
ct
io
n
s 
on
 s
ol
id
 c
at
al
ys
ts
 
D
u
ri
n
g 
a 
h
et
er
og
en
eo
u
s 
ca
ta
ly
ti
c 
pr
oc
es
s 
w
h
ic
h
 i
n
vo
lv
es
 l
iq
u
id
 a
n
d 
ga
se
ou
s 
(e
.g
., 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
) 
re
ag
en
ts
 
an
d 
so
li
d 
po
ro
u
s 
ca
ta
ly
st
, 
th
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
st
ep
s 
ta
k
e 
pl
ac
e 
(F
ig
. 
1)
: 
(1
) 
m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
 f
ro
m
 
ga
s 
to
 b
u
lk
 l
iq
u
id
 p
h
as
e;
 (
2)
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f 
th
e 
li
qu
id
 r
ea
ct
an
t 
an
d 
di
ss
ol
ve
d 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
bu
lk
 p
h
as
e 
to
 t
h
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 s
u
rf
ac
e 
of
 s
ol
id
 
ca
ta
ly
st
; 
(3
) 
m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 
of
 
th
e 
li
qu
id
 
re
ac
ta
n
t 
an
d 
di
ss
ol
ve
d 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
 
in
si
de
 
th
e 
po
re
s 
of
 
so
li
d 
ca
ta
ly
st
; 
(4
) 
ad
so
rp
ti
on
 
of
 
th
e 
re
ac
ta
n
ts
 o
n
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 s
u
rf
ac
e;
 (
5)
 ch
em
ic
al
 r
ea
ct
io
n
; 
(6
) 
de
so
rp
ti
on
 
of
 t
h
e 
pr
od
u
ct
s 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 s
u
rf
ac
e;
 (
7)
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
od
u
ct
s 
in
si
de
 t
h
e 
po
re
s 
of
 s
ol
id
 c
at
al
ys
t 
to
 i
ts
 o
u
te
r 
su
rf
ac
e;
 (
8)
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
od
u
ct
s 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 o
u
te
r 
su
rf
ac
e 
to
 t
h
e 
bu
lk
 
ph
as
e.
 
 
F
ig
u
re
 1
. S
k
et
ch
 s
h
ow
in
g 
th
e 
re
si
st
an
ce
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
G
/L
 r
ea
ct
io
n
 
on
 a
 c
at
al
ys
t 
su
rf
ac
e 
T
h
e 
sl
ow
es
t 
st
ep
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
te
-l
im
it
in
g 
on
e.
 I
f 
it
 i
s 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sp
or
t 
(s
te
ps
 1
, 
2,
 8
),
 t
h
en
 t
h
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 l
im
it
at
io
n
s 
ex
is
t 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
 t
h
e 
co
u
rs
e 
of
 t
h
e 
w
h
ol
e 
h
et
er
og
en
eo
u
s 
pr
oc
es
s.
 I
f 
it
 i
s 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sp
or
t 
(s
te
ps
 3
, 
7)
, 
th
en
 t
h
e 
co
u
rs
e 
of
 t
h
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
Appendix C. LARA Application Examples: Details
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2 
 
is
 g
ov
er
n
ed
 b
y 
in
te
rn
al
 m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 l
im
it
at
io
n
s.
 I
f 
st
ep
 5
, 
i.
e.
, 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
, 
is
 t
h
e 
sl
ow
es
t 
(a
ds
or
pt
io
n
 a
n
d 
de
so
rp
ti
on
 a
re
 u
su
al
ly
 f
as
t 
an
d 
re
ve
rs
ib
le
),
 t
h
en
 t
h
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
pr
oc
ee
ds
 i
n
 t
h
e 
k
in
et
ic
 r
eg
im
e.
 O
n
ly
 
in
 t
h
is
 r
eg
im
e 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 k
in
et
ic
s 
ca
n
 b
e 
m
ea
su
re
d 
an
d 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 
m
ec
h
an
is
m
 c
an
 b
e 
st
u
di
ed
. 
A
 c
ri
ti
ca
l 
st
ep
 i
n
 o
bt
ai
n
in
g 
re
li
ab
le
 q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
ve
 k
in
et
ic
s 
is
 t
o 
en
su
re
 
th
e 
ab
se
n
ce
 o
f 
al
l 
tr
an
sp
or
t 
li
m
it
at
io
n
s 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
n
d 
in
te
rn
al
 
h
ea
t 
an
d 
m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 t
h
e 
ra
te
 o
f 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
 t
ra
n
sf
er
 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
ga
s 
ph
as
e 
to
 t
h
e 
li
qu
id
 p
h
as
e.
 
1.
1.
 C
at
al
ys
t 
op
ti
m
iz
at
io
n
 
M
et
al
li
c 
P
d 
is
 
k
n
ow
n
 
to
 
be
 
th
e 
m
os
t 
se
le
ct
iv
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 
fo
r 
-C
≡C
- 
hy
dr
og
en
at
io
ns
. 
T
h
e 
pe
cu
li
ar
 b
eh
av
io
r 
of
 P
d 
is
 a
tt
ri
bu
te
d 
to
 t
h
e 
st
ro
n
g 
ad
so
rp
ti
on
 o
f 
al
k
yn
es
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 t
h
at
 o
f 
al
k
en
es
  
w
h
ic
h
 y
ie
ld
s 
to
 
h
ig
h
 
se
le
ct
iv
it
y 
to
 
a 
se
m
i-
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
ed
 
pr
od
u
ct
 
[1
].
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
it
s 
ca
ta
ly
ti
c 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 c
an
 b
e 
st
ro
n
gl
y 
in
fl
u
en
ce
d 
by
 t
h
e 
di
sp
er
si
on
, 
n
at
u
re
 o
f 
su
pp
or
t 
an
d 
th
e 
u
se
 o
f 
P
d 
pr
om
ot
er
s 
an
d 
ad
di
ti
ve
s 
to
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 m
ix
tu
re
. 
T
h
e 
op
ti
m
iz
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
es
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
is
 o
f 
cr
u
ci
al
 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 f
or
 a
ch
ie
vi
n
g 
th
e 
h
ig
h
es
t 
ac
ti
vi
ty
-s
el
ec
ti
vi
ty
-s
ta
bi
li
ty
. 
1.
1.
1.
 E
ff
ec
t 
of
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 s
u
pp
or
t 
T
h
e 
ro
le
 
of
 
th
e 
su
pp
or
t 
is
 
on
e 
of
 
th
e 
m
ai
n
 
fa
ct
or
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
h
et
er
og
en
eo
u
sl
y 
ca
ta
ly
ze
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s.
 T
h
e 
su
pp
or
t 
n
ot
 o
n
ly
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
s 
th
e 
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
, 
st
ru
ct
u
re
, 
di
sp
er
si
on
 
an
d 
m
or
ph
ol
og
y 
of
 
m
et
al
 
pa
rt
ic
le
s,
 b
u
t 
al
so
 c
on
tr
ib
u
te
s 
to
 c
at
al
ys
is
 (
e.
g.
, 
st
ro
n
g 
m
et
al
-s
u
pp
or
t 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
).
 B
es
id
es
, 
su
rf
ac
e 
ar
ea
 a
n
d 
po
re
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
su
pp
or
t 
co
n
tr
ol
 t
h
e 
in
te
rn
al
 d
if
fu
si
on
 l
im
it
at
io
n
s.
 A
s 
su
pp
or
ts
, 
m
et
al
 o
xi
de
s,
 
ca
rb
on
at
es
 
an
d 
ca
rb
on
 
ar
e 
of
te
n
 
u
se
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n
 
of
 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
 c
at
al
ys
ts
. 
1.
2.
 In
tr
in
si
c 
re
ac
ti
on
 k
in
et
ic
s 
T
h
e 
in
tr
in
si
c 
re
ac
ti
on
 k
in
et
ic
s 
co
n
si
st
s 
of
 t
h
e 
th
re
e 
el
em
en
ta
ry
 s
te
ps
 
of
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
ti
c 
cy
cl
e 
th
at
 t
ak
e 
pl
ac
e 
on
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
ti
c 
su
rf
ac
e:
 t
h
e 
ad
so
rp
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ac
ta
n
ts
, 
th
e 
su
rf
ac
e 
re
ac
ti
on
s 
an
d 
th
e 
de
so
rp
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
od
u
ct
s.
 
K
in
et
ic
 m
od
el
s 
m
ak
e 
th
e 
as
su
m
pt
io
n
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
ov
er
al
l 
re
ac
ti
on
 k
in
et
ic
 
is
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
el
em
en
ta
ry
 s
te
ps
 o
f 
ad
so
rp
ti
on
/d
es
or
pt
io
n
 a
n
d 
su
rf
ac
e 
re
ac
ti
on
s.
 I
n
 m
os
t 
ca
se
s,
 t
h
e 
ad
so
rp
ti
on
/d
es
or
pt
io
n
 s
te
ps
 a
re
 a
ss
u
m
ed
 
to
 b
e 
re
ve
rs
ib
le
 a
n
d 
at
 e
qu
il
ib
ri
u
m
 w
h
il
e 
th
e 
su
rf
ac
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 s
te
ps
 a
re
 
of
te
n
 a
ss
u
m
ed
 i
rr
ev
er
si
bl
e 
an
d 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
th
e 
ra
te
 d
et
er
m
in
in
g 
st
ep
.  
 
 
 
3 
 
--
C
≡C
- 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
 
is
 
co
m
m
on
ly
 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
by
 
L
an
gm
u
ir
-
H
in
sh
el
w
oo
d 
m
ec
h
an
is
m
. 
1.
3.
 M
od
el
 r
ea
ct
io
n
 
C
at
al
yt
ic
 h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
 o
f 
2-
bu
ty
n
e-
1,
4-
di
ol
 (
B
3D
) 
to
 2
-b
u
te
n
e-
1,
4-
di
ol
 
(B
2D
) 
is
 t
ak
en
 a
s 
a 
m
od
el
 r
ea
ct
io
n
 s
in
ce
 B
2D
 i
s 
an
 i
m
po
rt
an
t 
pr
od
u
ct
 
in
 t
h
e 
pr
od
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
V
it
am
in
 B
6 
(p
yr
id
ox
ol
) 
an
d 
an
 i
n
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 o
f 
fu
ra
n
 n
u
de
u
s 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
ti
ca
ls
. 
T
h
e 
sc
h
em
e 
of
 r
ea
ct
io
n
 i
s 
sh
ow
n
 i
n
 
F
ig
u
re
 3
. 
T
h
e 
ta
rg
et
 p
ro
du
ct
 i
s 
fo
rm
ed
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 p
a
th
 a
. 
D
u
e 
to
 o
ve
r-
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
 o
f 
B
3D
 (
p
a
th
 b
) 
an
d 
co
n
se
cu
ti
ve
 h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
 o
f 
B
2D
 
(p
a
th
 c
),
 B
1D
 i
s 
fo
rm
ed
. 
M
or
eo
ve
r,
 c
ro
ty
l 
al
co
h
ol
, 
n
-b
u
ty
ra
ld
eh
yd
e 
an
d 
bu
ta
n
ol
 c
an
 b
e 
fo
rm
ed
 f
ro
m
 B
2D
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 p
a
th
s 
d
, 
e 
an
d 
f 
co
n
se
qu
en
tl
y.
 
B
ot
h
 
h
ig
h
 
se
le
ct
iv
it
y 
to
w
ar
ds
 
B
2D
 
an
d 
m
ax
im
u
m
 
B
2D
 
yi
el
d 
ar
e 
de
si
ra
bl
e.
 
 
F
ig
u
re
 2
. R
ea
ct
io
n
 n
et
w
or
k
 o
f 
B
3D
 h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
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4 
 
2.
 O
B
JE
C
T
IV
E
S
 
 • 
G
et
 a
cq
u
a
in
te
d
 w
it
h
 a
 s
em
i-
ba
tc
h
 r
ea
ct
or
 o
p
er
a
ti
on
 c
a
rr
yi
n
g 
ou
t 
th
re
e-
p
h
a
se
 c
a
ta
ly
ti
c 
re
a
ct
io
n
s.
 Y
ou
 w
il
l 
le
ar
n
 h
ow
 t
o 
ch
ar
ge
 a
n
d 
op
er
at
e 
an
 
au
to
cl
av
e,
 
pe
rf
or
m
 
th
e 
te
st
s 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
/a
bs
en
ce
 
of
 
m
as
s 
tr
an
sf
er
 
li
m
it
at
io
n
s,
 
ch
os
e 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 c
on
di
ti
on
s 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
k
in
et
ic
 r
eg
im
e.
 
• 
S
tu
d
y 
th
e 
ki
n
et
ic
s 
of
 s
el
ec
ti
ve
 3
-p
h
a
se
 c
a
ta
ly
ti
c 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
a
ti
on
 o
f 
2-
bu
ty
n
e-
1,
4-
d
io
l 
(B
3
D
) 
ov
er
 P
d
(P
t)
-b
a
se
d
 c
a
ta
ly
st
s.
 D
et
er
m
in
e 
k
in
et
ic
 p
ar
am
et
er
s,
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
ac
ti
va
ti
on
 e
n
er
gy
, 
re
ac
ti
on
 o
rd
er
s,
 
k
in
et
ic
 a
n
d 
ad
so
rp
ti
on
 c
on
st
an
ts
. 
D
ev
el
op
 r
ea
ct
io
n
 m
ec
h
an
is
m
 
an
d 
u
se
 B
er
k
el
ey
 M
ad
on
n
a 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
to
 t
es
t 
it
s 
co
n
si
st
en
cy
 w
it
h
 
th
e 
re
al
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
re
su
lt
s.
 
• 
In
ve
st
ig
a
te
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
of
 
re
a
ct
io
n
 
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
a
n
d
 
ca
ta
ly
st
 
m
od
if
ie
rs
 
on
 
th
e 
re
a
ct
io
n
 
ki
n
et
ic
s.
 
T
h
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
of
 
va
ri
ou
s 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
(s
u
ch
 a
s 
ca
ta
ly
st
 s
u
pp
or
t,
 s
ol
ve
n
t,
 e
tc
.)
 o
n
 c
at
al
ys
t 
ac
ti
vi
ty
/s
el
ec
ti
vi
ty
 w
il
l 
be
 s
tu
di
ed
. 
T
h
e 
ba
si
c 
k
n
ow
le
dg
e 
w
il
l 
be
 
ap
pl
y 
in
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
ex
pl
ai
n
 t
h
es
e 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
3.
 E
X
P
E
R
IM
E
N
T
A
L
 
3.
1.
 C
at
al
ys
t 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n
 
P
d(
P
t)
-b
as
ed
 
ca
ta
ly
st
s 
w
er
e 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 
by
 
de
po
si
ti
on
 
of
 
m
et
al
 
n
an
op
ar
ti
cl
es
 o
n
 a
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
d 
su
pp
or
t.
 S
in
te
re
d 
m
et
al
 f
ib
er
s 
(S
M
F
) 
fi
lt
er
s 
ar
e 
u
se
d 
as
 a
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
d 
su
pp
or
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
ac
ti
ve
 m
et
al
 p
h
as
e.
 T
h
e 
S
M
F
 s
h
ee
ts
 h
av
e 
h
ig
h
 p
er
m
ea
bi
li
ty
, 
go
od
 m
ec
h
an
ic
al
 s
tr
en
gt
h
, 
an
d 
h
ig
h
 t
h
er
m
al
 c
on
du
ct
iv
it
y,
 m
ak
in
g 
th
em
 a
dv
an
ta
ge
ou
s 
fo
r 
ex
ot
h
er
m
ic
 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
at
io
n
. 
T
h
ey
 c
an
 b
e 
ea
si
ly
 s
h
ap
ed
 a
n
d 
pl
ac
ed
 t
o 
va
ri
ou
s 
ty
pe
s 
of
 r
ea
ct
or
s.
 T
h
e 
S
M
F
 a
re
 c
oa
te
d 
w
it
h
 a
 l
ay
er
 o
f 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ox
id
es
 (
e.
g.
 
Z
n
O
, A
l 2
O
3,
 M
gO
, e
tc
) 
on
 w
h
ic
h
 P
d(
P
t)
 n
an
op
ar
ti
cl
es
 a
re
 d
ep
os
it
ed
. 
3.
2.
 E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l s
et
u
p 
T
h
e 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
se
m
i-
ba
tc
h
 
st
ir
re
d 
st
ai
n
le
ss
 
st
ee
l 
re
ac
to
r 
(1
50
 
cm
3  
au
to
cl
av
e,
 
B
ü
ch
i 
A
G
, 
U
st
er
, 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d)
 
eq
u
ip
pe
d 
w
it
h
 
a 
pr
es
su
re
 
co
n
tr
ol
le
d 
H
2 
su
pp
ly
 s
ys
te
m
 is
 s
ch
em
at
ic
al
ly
 r
ep
re
se
n
te
d 
in
 F
ig
u
re
 4
. 
 
F
ig
u
re
 3
. E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l s
et
u
p 
fo
r 
st
u
dy
 o
f 
a 
th
re
e-
ph
as
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 in
 a
 
se
m
i-
ba
tc
h
 r
ea
ct
or
 
H
yd
ro
ge
n
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
re
se
rv
oi
r 
is
 m
on
it
or
ed
 o
n
-l
in
e 
w
it
h
 a
 
pr
es
s 
ga
s 
fl
ow
 c
on
tr
ol
le
r 
(B
P
C
-6
00
2,
 B
ü
ch
i,
 S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d)
. 
A
 s
ta
in
le
ss
 
st
ee
l 
6-
bl
ad
e 
di
sk
 
tu
rb
in
e 
im
pe
ll
er
 
(e
qu
ip
pe
d 
w
it
h
 
a 
se
lf
-g
as
si
n
g 
h
ol
lo
w
 s
h
af
t)
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
ag
it
at
io
n
 a
t 
19
00
-2
00
0 
rp
m
. 
A
 b
at
h
 
ci
rc
u
la
to
r 
(H
A
A
K
E
 B
-N
3)
 i
s 
u
se
d 
to
 c
on
tr
ol
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 
to
 w
it
h
in
 ±
1 
K
 u
si
n
g 
w
at
er
 a
s 
th
e 
th
er
m
al
 m
ed
iu
m
. 
 
3.
3.
 E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l p
ro
ce
du
re
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T
h
e 
co
n
di
ti
on
s 
of
 a
 t
yp
ic
al
 e
xp
er
im
en
t 
ar
e:
 ! ! != 
8 
ba
r,
 T
 =
 3
37
 K
, 
20
00
 
rp
m
, ! ! !! 
=
 8
 g
, ! !"#$
%&' =
 7
5 
g,
 ! !"#"$
%&# ~
 0
.5
 g
. 
F
il
l 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
su
bs
tr
at
e 
di
ss
ol
ve
d 
in
 t
h
e 
so
lv
en
t.
 
T
h
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
d 
ca
ta
ly
st
 
is
 
cu
t 
in
 
re
ct
an
gu
la
r 
pi
ec
es
 
an
d 
pl
ac
ed
 
be
tw
ee
n
 
tw
o 
m
et
al
 
ga
u
ze
s 
fi
xe
d 
on
 
th
e 
se
lf
-g
as
si
n
g 
h
ol
lo
w
 
sh
af
t 
st
ir
re
r.
 M
ak
e 
su
re
 t
h
e 
en
ti
re
 c
at
al
ys
t 
su
rf
ac
e 
is
 f
re
el
y 
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
 a
n
d 
n
ot
 b
lo
ck
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
m
et
al
 f
ra
m
e.
 W
ei
gh
t 
th
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 b
ef
or
e 
pl
ac
in
g 
it
 
to
 t
h
e 
gr
id
. 
O
pe
n
 t
h
e 
pr
og
ra
m
 i
n
 t
h
e 
co
m
pu
te
r 
(D
es
k
to
p 
bl
s 
2.
1)
 a
n
d 
cr
ea
te
 a
 n
ew
 
fi
le
 (
F
il
e 
 
 N
ew
  
 R
ea
ct
io
n
 N
am
e/
N
u
m
be
r 
 
 S
av
e)
. 
P
la
ce
 t
h
e 
ru
bb
er
 O
-r
in
g 
in
to
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r.
 P
la
ce
 t
h
e 
ag
it
at
or
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
 i
n
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
li
d.
 P
u
sh
 u
p 
u
n
ti
l 
it
 s
n
ap
s 
in
to
 p
la
ce
. M
ak
e 
su
re
 
th
at
 a
ll
 l
in
es
 t
o 
an
d 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
ar
e 
cl
os
ed
. A
ss
em
bl
e 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r.
 
T
o 
te
st
 s
cr
at
ch
in
g 
n
oi
se
s 
sw
it
ch
 o
n
 t
h
e 
st
ir
ri
n
g.
 B
e 
su
re
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
ag
it
at
or
 d
oe
s 
n
ot
 s
cr
at
ch
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
w
al
ls
 a
t 
lo
w
 s
ti
rr
in
g 
ra
te
. 
If
 i
t 
do
es
, r
ea
dj
u
st
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
an
d 
li
d.
 W
h
en
 y
ou
 f
in
is
h
, m
ak
e 
su
re
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
st
ir
re
r 
is
 s
w
it
ch
ed
 o
ff
. 
P
u
rg
e 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
ox
yg
en
 b
y 
in
er
t 
(N
2)
 U
se
 t
h
e 
pr
og
ra
m
. 
(1
) 
cl
ic
k
 
"b
cp
";
 (
2)
 c
li
ck
 "
in
er
t"
; 
(3
) 
le
t 
N
2 
to
 f
il
l 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r;
 (
4)
 s
ti
r 
fo
r 
30
 
se
co
n
ds
; 
(5
) 
op
en
 
th
e 
va
lv
e 
to
 
re
le
as
e 
th
e 
pr
es
su
re
. 
R
ep
ea
t 
th
e 
pr
oc
ed
u
re
 2
 m
or
e 
ti
m
es
. 
T
h
en
 d
ep
re
ss
u
ri
ze
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
an
d 
sw
it
ch
 o
n
 
th
e 
st
ir
ri
n
g.
 
H
ea
t 
u
p 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r.
 M
ak
e 
su
re
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
ta
n
k
 o
f 
w
at
er
 i
s 
fu
ll
 (
to
 c
ov
er
 
al
l 
th
e 
co
il
s)
 a
n
d 
th
e 
va
lv
e 
fo
r 
th
er
m
os
ta
t 
co
ol
in
g 
is
 o
pe
n
. 
S
et
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
: 
(1
) 
sw
it
ch
 o
n
 t
h
e 
ba
th
; 
(2
) 
pr
es
s 
"s
et
";
 (
3)
 a
dj
u
st
 
th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 b
y 
tu
rn
in
g 
th
e 
bl
ac
k
 k
n
ob
; 
(4
) 
O
n
ce
 t
h
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 
is
 s
et
, 
pu
sh
 t
h
e 
"s
et
" 
bu
tt
on
; 
(5
) 
T
u
rn
 t
h
e 
bl
ac
k
 k
n
ob
 c
lo
ck
w
is
e 
an
d 
th
en
 c
ou
n
te
rc
lo
ck
w
is
e 
to
 s
w
it
ch
 t
h
e 
co
n
tr
ol
 o
n
. 
O
n
ce
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 i
s 
fi
n
is
h
ed
 r
ep
ea
t 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
pr
oc
ed
u
re
 b
u
t 
se
t 
th
e 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 a
t 
29
8 
K
. 
T
o 
co
ol
 d
ow
n
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
tl
y 
k
ee
p 
th
e 
st
ir
ri
n
g 
on
. 
O
n
ce
 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 
is
 
re
ac
h
ed
 
pu
rg
e 
th
e 
sy
st
em
 
w
it
h
 
h
yd
ro
ge
n
 (
th
is
 p
ar
t 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
do
n
e 
as
 f
as
t 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e)
: 
(1
) 
st
op
 t
h
e 
st
ir
ri
n
g;
 (
2)
 s
et
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 p
re
ss
u
re
 u
si
n
g 
th
e 
bl
s 
2.
1 
pr
og
ra
m
; 
(3
) 
pu
sh
 "
bc
p"
 b
u
tt
on
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
og
ra
m
 m
en
u
; 
(4
) 
pr
es
s 
th
e 
"a
ct
iv
e"
 b
u
tt
on
; 
(5
) 
re
le
as
e 
th
e 
pr
es
su
re
 b
y 
op
en
in
g 
th
e 
va
lv
e.
 R
ep
ea
t 
th
e 
st
ep
s 
(2
)-
(5
) 
tw
o 
ti
m
es
. 
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T
o 
st
ar
t 
re
ac
ti
on
, 
pr
es
s 
"C
h
ar
ge
" 
bu
tt
on
 i
n
 t
h
e 
pr
og
ra
m
 m
en
u
. 
O
n
ce
 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 p
re
ss
u
re
 i
s 
re
ac
h
ed
 t
h
e 
H
2 
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
 h
as
 t
o 
be
 r
es
et
 t
o 
ze
ro
: 
(1
) 
pr
es
s 
"s
to
p"
 b
u
tt
on
 i
n
 t
h
e 
pr
og
ra
m
 p
an
el
; 
(2
) 
pr
es
s 
"r
es
et
" 
bu
tt
on
; 
(3
) 
pr
es
s 
"r
u
n
" 
an
d 
"o
k
".
 T
o 
st
ar
t 
re
co
rd
in
g 
th
e 
da
ta
 p
re
ss
 t
h
e 
gr
ee
n
 
"p
la
y"
 
bu
tt
on
 
an
d 
th
e 
"t
im
e 
st
ar
t"
 
bu
tt
on
. 
S
ta
rt
 
st
ir
ri
n
g 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
. 
T
ak
e 
a 
sa
m
pl
e 
(a
bo
u
t 
0.
3 
m
l)
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
au
to
cl
av
e 
vi
a 
th
e 
va
lv
e 
on
 t
h
e 
to
p 
of
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
an
d 
tr
an
sf
er
 i
t 
to
 t
h
e 
G
C
 v
ia
l.
 B
ef
or
e 
ta
k
in
g 
a 
sa
m
pl
e,
 c
le
an
 a
 s
am
pl
in
g 
tu
be
. 
A
 s
m
al
l 
de
pr
es
su
ri
za
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r 
is
 n
or
m
al
. 
T
h
e 
ti
m
e 
in
te
rv
al
s 
be
tw
ee
n
 s
am
pl
es
 d
ep
en
d 
on
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 
ra
te
. 
T
ak
e 
7-
9 
sa
m
pl
es
 
du
ri
n
g 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 
(~
4 
at
 
m
ax
im
u
m
 
co
n
ve
rs
io
n
).
 
O
n
ce
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 i
s 
fi
n
is
h
ed
 p
re
ss
: 
(1
) 
"b
cp
";
 (
2)
 "
st
op
" 
bu
tt
on
 o
f 
th
e 
"b
pc
" 
m
en
u
 (
to
 s
to
p 
th
e 
H
2 
su
pp
ly
);
 (
3)
 "
st
op
" 
bu
tt
on
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ai
n
 
pr
og
ra
m
 s
cr
ee
n
 (
to
 s
to
p 
th
e 
re
co
rd
in
g)
; 
(4
) 
st
op
 s
ti
rr
in
g;
 (
5)
 r
el
ea
se
 t
h
e 
pr
es
su
re
; 
(6
) 
se
t 
th
e 
ba
th
 t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 a
t 
29
8 
K
; 
(7
) 
sw
it
ch
 o
n
 s
ti
rr
in
g 
an
d 
k
ee
p 
it
 u
n
ti
l 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r 
is
 c
oo
le
d 
do
w
n
 t
o 
ro
om
 t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
. 
W
h
en
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
is
 c
oo
le
d 
do
w
n
 s
to
p 
th
e 
st
ir
re
r 
an
d 
th
e 
th
er
m
os
ta
t.
 
C
lo
se
 t
h
e 
H
2 
su
pp
ly
-l
in
e 
an
d 
de
pr
es
su
ri
ze
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r.
 R
em
ov
e 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r 
fr
om
 t
h
e 
li
d.
 
C
le
an
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
w
it
h
 e
th
an
ol
 (
re
m
em
be
r 
to
 o
pe
n
 t
h
e 
sa
m
pl
in
g 
tu
be
),
 
ag
it
at
or
 
an
d 
li
d.
 
R
em
em
be
r 
to
 
re
m
ov
e 
th
e 
O
-r
in
g 
be
fo
re
. 
D
ry
 
th
e 
re
ac
to
r 
w
it
h
 a
ir
. 
C
le
an
 t
h
e 
vi
al
s 
w
it
h
 e
th
an
ol
 i
n
 u
lt
ra
so
n
ic
 b
at
h
 a
n
d 
dr
y 
th
em
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ov
en
. 
3.
4.
 D
at
a 
tr
ea
tm
en
t.
 
T
h
e 
sa
m
pl
es
 
ta
k
en
 
du
ri
n
g 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
s 
ar
e 
an
al
yz
ed
 
by
 
ga
s 
ch
ro
m
at
og
ra
ph
y 
(G
C
).
 F
or
 t
h
is
, 
sm
al
l 
sa
m
pl
es
 o
f 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 m
ix
tu
re
s 
ar
e 
pe
ri
od
ic
al
ly
 w
it
h
dr
aw
n
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
re
ac
to
r 
vi
a 
a 
sa
m
pl
in
g 
tu
be
 a
n
d 
an
al
yz
ed
 b
y 
ga
s 
ch
ro
m
at
og
ra
ph
y 
(G
C
).
 T
h
e 
G
C
 a
n
al
ys
is
 i
s 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 
u
si
n
g 
A
u
to
 S
ys
te
m
 X
L
 (
P
er
k
in
 E
lm
er
) 
eq
u
ip
pe
d 
w
it
h
 a
 3
0 
m
 S
ta
bi
lw
ax
 
(C
ro
ss
bo
n
d 
C
ar
bo
w
ax
-P
E
G
, 
R
es
te
k
, 
U
S
A
) 
0.
32
 m
m
 c
ap
il
la
ry
 c
ol
u
m
n
 
w
it
h
 a
 0
.2
5 
m
m
 c
oa
ti
n
g.
 T
h
e 
ca
rr
ie
r 
ga
s 
(H
e)
 p
re
ss
u
re
 i
s 
10
1 
k
P
a.
 
In
je
ct
or
 a
n
d 
F
ID
 t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
s 
ar
e 
47
3 
K
 a
n
d 
52
3 
K
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
. 
T
h
e 
ov
en
 t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 i
s 
h
ol
d 
fo
r 
4 
m
in
 a
t 
32
3 
K
, 
th
en
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d 
to
 4
73
 K
 
at
 a
 r
am
p 
of
 3
0 
K
/m
in
. 
A
ll
 t
h
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 m
ix
tu
re
 c
om
po
n
en
ts
 h
av
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
G
C
-r
es
po
n
se
 f
ac
to
rs
, 
i.
e.
, 
th
e 
pe
ak
 a
re
a 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
or
re
sp
on
ds
 
to
 t
h
e 
w
ei
gh
t 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
a 
co
m
po
n
en
t.
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4.
 D
E
T
A
IL
E
D
 P
L
A
N
 O
F
 E
X
P
E
R
IM
E
N
T
S
 
T
h
e 
“c
on
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 v
er
su
s 
ti
m
e”
 p
ro
fi
le
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
re
ac
ti
on
 c
om
po
n
en
t.
 
A
s 
a 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ac
ti
vi
ty
, 
th
e 
in
it
ia
l 
re
ac
ti
on
 r
at
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d 
(p
er
 a
m
ou
n
t 
of
 c
at
al
ys
t 
an
d/
or
 a
ct
iv
e 
ph
as
e,
 e
.g
. !"# ! !
!/(m
ol
P
d
·s
))
. 
S
el
ec
ti
vi
ty
 
(i
n
te
gr
al
 
se
le
ct
iv
it
y)
, 
yi
el
d 
an
d 
co
n
ve
rs
io
n
 
sh
ou
ld
 
be
 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d.
 T
h
es
e 
re
su
lt
s 
co
u
ld
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
as
 p
lo
ts
 o
f 
“S
el
ec
ti
vi
ty
 t
o 
B
2D
 v
s.
 B
3D
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n
” 
an
d 
“B
2D
 y
ie
ld
 v
s.
 B
3D
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n
”.
 
T
h
e 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
pl
an
 o
f 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
 i
s 
pr
op
os
ed
: 
A
. 
P
re
li
m
in
a
ry
 t
es
ts
. 
In
 a
 s
er
ie
s 
of
 b
la
n
k
 t
es
ts
 y
ou
 w
il
l 
ca
rr
y 
ou
t 
th
e 
re
ac
ti
on
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ab
se
n
ce
 
of
 t
h
e 
ca
ta
ly
st
. 
T
h
e 
su
pp
or
t 
w
it
h
ou
t 
th
e 
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C.3 Constable Group
Organization University of Basel
Research Group Group of Catalytic Reaction Engineering
Laboratory 215
Group head Prof. Edwin Constable
Safety delegate Nik Hostettler
Responsible scientist Nik Hostettler
Analysis moderator David Nicolas Pluess
Date 22.08.14
Description of the evaluation Solar cell preparation
General worsening factors present Too hot/too cold (Climate)
Outdated electrical systems/equipment (Electrical)
Warnings not hearable (Safety)
Repetitional tasks (Work)
Distortions (Work organization)
Pressure of time (Work organization)
Evaluation Constable Group
210
Responsible scientist: Nik Hostettler Laboratory 215 22.08.14
Activity Step-Nr. 
Preparation of electrode 1 1 Cleaning of the glass with ultrasonic
2 Treatment with UV-O3 system
3 Immersion in TiCl4 solution (70°C)
4 Washing with water and ethanol
5 Doctorblading with TiO2 paste
6 Heating under air flow (various temperatures upt to 500°C)
7 Treatment with TiCl4 solution
8 Rinsing with water and ethanol
9 Sintering for 30 min at 500°C
10 Cooling down to 80°C
11 Imersion in ligand (dilluted in DMSO)
12 Washing with DMSO and ethanol
13 Immersion in ZnCl2 EtOH solution
14 Washing with EtOH
15 Immersion in ligand solution (CH2Cl2)
Preparation of counterelectrode 1 Drilling a hole in the glass
2 Heating to 450°C
3 Washing with water and ethanol
4 Deposit H2PtCl6 in propan-2-ol
5 Heating to 400°C
Assembling of the solar cell 1 Heating and sealing the electrodes with sealing foil
2 Application of electrolyte (LiI, I2, 1-methylbenzimidazole and 1-butyl-3-methylimidazolinium, MeCN)
3 Sealing if the hole with sealing foil
4 Irridiation with SolarSim 150 light source (100 mW cm-2)
Evaluation Constable Group
Date
Step 
C.3. Constable Group
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Responsible scientist: Nik Hostettler Laboratory 22.08.14¨
Activity Origin Nr. Hazard LCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Preparation of electrode 1 Acetone 1 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.5
2 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.2
3 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 4.3
EtOH 4 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! ! ! ! ! ! 5.2
Hellmanex surfactant 5 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.8
6 H318 Causes serious eye damage ! 5.4
UV-O3 (Ozone) 7 H270 May cause or intensify fire; oxidizer ! 4.3
8 H330 Fatal if inhaled ! 5.5
9 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.2
10 H370 Causes damage to organs ! 4.4
11 H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 4.4
TiCl4 12 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! ! 4.7
Heating 13 Hot media ! ! 5.0
ZnCl2 14 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.6
15 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 5.2
16 H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects ! 6.0
DCM 17 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 4.1
18 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.4
19 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.7
20 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 4.1
21 H351 Suspected of causing cancer ! 4.7
22 H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 4.7
Preparation of counterelectrode Heating 23 Hot media ! ! 5.2
Drilling 24 Pinch points ! 4.3
EtOH 25 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.5
H2PtCl6 26 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.9
27 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage ! 5.6
28 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction ! 4.3
29 H334 May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties ! 4.1
Propan-2-ol 30 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.5
31 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.4
32 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness ! 4.3
Assembling of the solar cell Heating 33 Hot media ! 4.7
LiI 34 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 4.3
35 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.2
Iodine 36 H312 Harmful in contact with skin ! 3.9
37 H332 Harmful if inhaled ! 3.9
38 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 4.3
39 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.4
40 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 3.9
41 H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure ! 4.9
42 H400 Very toxic to aquatic life ! 4.5
1-methylbenzimidazole 43 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 4.1
44 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 4.1
45 H318 Causes serious eye damage ! 5.4
46 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.1
1-butyl-3-methylimidazolinium iodide47 H315 Causes skin irritation ! 3.9
48 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.4
49 H335 May cause respiratory irritation ! 4.1
MeCN 50 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour ! 4.7
51 H302 Harmful if swallowed ! 3.9
52 H312 Harmful in contact with skin ! 4.1
53 H332 Harmful if inhaled ! 4.1
54 H319 Causes serious eye irritation ! 5.4
Light source 55 UV-IR Radiation ! 5.0
215 Date
Evaluation Constable group
Step 
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Nik Hostettler Laboratory 22.08.14
Nr Hazard Impact LCI
Exposure Occurence	   Involvement Reliability Selectivity Availability GWF HSWF SWF4
1 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 5 2 1 3 3 3 3 1 2 4.5
2 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 1 5 5 5 3 2 1 5.2
3 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 5 3 1 3 3 5 3 2 2 4.3
4 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 5 2 5 3 3 5 3 1 1 5.2
5 H315 Causes skin irritation 1 5 3 1 3 5 5 3 2 1 3.8
6 H318 Causes serious eye damage 4 5 3 1 5 5 5 3 2 1 5.4
7 H270 May cause or intensify fire; oxidizer 3 5 2 1 3 3 5 3 1 1 4.3
8 H330 Fatal if inhaled 5 5 1 1 5 3 5 3 1 2 5.5
9 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 1 5 5 3 3 2 1 5.2
10 H370 Causes damage to organs 4 5 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 4.4
11 H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 5 2 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 4.4
12 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 3 5 2 2 5 5 5 3 2 1 4.7
13 Hot media 2 5 3 3 5 3 5 3 3 2 5.0
14 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 5 1 2 5 5 3 3 1 1 3.6
15 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 5 2 2 3 5 5 3 1 1 5.2
16 H410 Very toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects 5 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 6.0
17 H315 Causes skin irritation 2 5 3 2 5 5 3 3 1 1 4.1
18 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 2 3 5 3 3 2 1 5.4
19 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 3 5 2 2 3 3 5 3 1 2 4.7
20 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 5 3 2 5 3 3 3 1 1 4.1
21 H351 Suspected of causing cancer 4 5 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 1 4.7
22 H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 5 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 1 4.7
23 Hot media 2 5 3 4 3 3 5 3 3 2 5.2
24 Pinch points 2 5 3 2 5 3 5 3 2 1 4.3
25 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 5 2 2 5 3 3 3 1 1 4.5
26 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 5 2 2 5 5 5 3 1 1 3.9
27 H314 Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 5 2 2 3 5 5 3 2 2 5.6
28 H317 May cause an allergic skin reaction 2 5 3 2 3 3 5 3 2 1 4.3
29 H334 May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties 2 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 4.1
30 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 5 2 2 5 3 3 3 1 1 4.5
31 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 2 3 5 5 3 2 1 5.4
32 H336 May cause drowsiness or dizziness 2 5 3 2 5 3 5 3 2 1 4.3
33 Hot media 2 5 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 2 4.7
34 H315 Causes skin irritation 2 5 3 2 3 5 5 3 2 1 4.3
35 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 2 5 5 3 3 1 1 5.2
36 H312 Harmful in contact with skin 2 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 3.9
37 H332 Harmful if inhaled 2 5 2 2 3 5 3 3 1 1 3.9
38 H315 Causes skin irritation 2 5 3 2 3 5 5 3 1 2 4.3
39 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 2 3 5 3 3 2 1 5.4
40 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 2 5 2 2 5 5 5 3 1 1 3.9
41 H372 Causes damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure 4 5 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 4.9
42 H400 Very toxic to aquatic life 3 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 4.5
43 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 2 4.1
44 H315 Causes skin irritation 2 5 3 2 3 5 3 3 1 1 4.1
45 H318 Causes serious eye damage 4 5 2 2 3 5 5 3 2 1 5.4
46 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 2 5 2 2 5 3 3 3 2 1 4.1
47 H315 Causes skin irritation 2 5 2 2 5 3 5 3 1 1 3.9
48 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 2 3 5 3 3 2 1 5.4
49 H335 May cause respiratory irritation 2 5 2 2 5 3 5 3 1 2 4.1
50 H225 Highly Flammable liquid and vapour 3 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 4.7
51 H302 Harmful if swallowed 2 5 2 2 5 3 3 3 1 1 3.9
52 H312 Harmful in contact with skin 2 5 3 2 3 5 3 3 1 1 4.1
53 H332 Harmful if inhaled 2 5 2 2 3 3 5 3 2 1 4.1
54 H319 Causes serious eye irritation 4 5 2 2 5 5 3 3 2 1 5.4
55 UV-IR Radiation 2 5 3 2 5 3 3 3 3 3 5.0
DateResponsible scientist:
Evaluation Constable group
Detectability WFProbability
215
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Nik Hostettler Laboratory 22.08.14
Corrective Measure LCI LCI ΔLCI
before after Costs	  [CHF] Reduction/costs A S C V F§ 4 F
55 Improvement of shielding 5.0 4.3 0.7 2'000 35.6 3 3 3 2 0.57
23 Warning signs 5.2 4.0 1.2 150 803.3 5 3 3 2 0.74
23 Temperature indication 5.2 3.9 1.3 3'000 44.1 5 4 2 1 0.74
4 Reduction of storage quantitites 5.2 5.0 0.2 10'000 2.0 2 2 3 4 0.49
45 Discilpinary regulations to enforce PPE use 5.4 3.6 1.8 5'000 35.2 1 2 3 5 0.44
45 Improvement of safety training 5.4 3.6 1.8 15'000 11.7 3 2 3 5 0.61
54 Discilpinary regulations to enforce PPE use 5.4 3.6 1.8 5'000 35.2 1 2 3 5 0.44
54 Improvement of safety training 5.4 3.6 1.8 15'000 11.7 3 2 3 5 0.61
8 O3-Dector 5.5 4.4 1.1 2'000 53.6 5 5 3 1 0.82
27 Improvement of safety training 5.6 3.8 1.8 15'000 11.7 3 2 3 5 0.61
27 Discilpinary regulations to enforce PPE use 5.6 3.8 1.8 5'000 35.1 1 2 3 5 0.44
16 Improved waste management including controls 6.0 4.3 1.7 20'000 8.4 3 2 2 3 0.52
Feasibility Financial aspect
Evaluation Constable group
Responsible scientist: Date
Refering Hazard
215
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C.4. IMSB: Aebersold Group
C.4 IMSB: Aebersold Group
Organization ETHZ
Research Group Institute of Molecular Systems Biology (IMSB)
Laboratory HPT E 56
Group head Prof. Ruedi Aebersold
Safety delegate
Responsible scientist George Rosenberger
Analysis moderator David Nicolas Pluess
Date 17.09.14
Description of the evaluation Proteolic digestion
General worsening factors present Pressure of time (Work organization)
Repetitional tasks (Static work)
Different spoken languages (Work organization)
Evaluation IMSB
215
Responsible scientist: George Rosenberger Laboratory HPT E 56 17.09.14
Activity Step-Nr. 
Proteolic digestion (Trypsin) 1 Reduction of the protein samples with TCEP
2 Alkylation with iodoacetamide 
3 Overnight trypsinization
4 Lowering of the pH to 2 
5 Immobilization with C18 column chromatography
6 Multiple washings
7 Elution of the peptides
8 Evaporation of the solvents
9 Resuspension and sonication
PCT-assisted lysis and digestion 1 Proteins are lysed in the buffer
2 Barocycler programm at 35°C
3 Sonication of samples
4 Centrifugation
5 Protein digestion with Lys-C and trypsin
6 Acceleration under different PCT schemes
7 Lowering of the pH to 2 
8 C18 desalting
Evaluation IMSB
Date
Step 
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Responsible scientist: George Rosenberger Laboratory 17.09.14¨
Activity Origin Nr. Hazard LCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Proteolic digestion (Trypsin) Iodoacetamid 1 H301: Toxic if swallowed  2.0
2 H317: May cause an allergic skin reaction  2.0
3 H301: Toxic if swallowed  2.0
4 H334: May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties  2.0
5 H413: May cause long lasting harmful effects to aquatic life  2.6
Acetonitrile 6 H225: Highly flammable liquid and vapour  2.6
7 H332: Harmful if inhaled  2.0
8 H302: Harmful if swallowed  2.0
9 H312: Harmful in contact with skin  2.0
10 H319: Causes serious eye irritation  3.3
Formic acid 11 H226: Flammable liquid and vapour  2.6
12 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage  3.3
Trifluoroacetic acid 13 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage  3.5
14 H332: Harmful if inhaled  2.1
15 H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects  3.5
Sonication 16 Ultrasonic vibrations 1.7
PCT-assisted lysis and digestion Ammonium bicarbonate 17 H302: Harmful if swallowed  2.0
Sonication 18 Ultrasonic vibrations  1.7
Lys-C 19 H315: Causes skin irritation  2.1
20 H317: May cause an allergic skin reaction  2.1
21 H319: Causes serious eye irritation  2.1
22 H334: May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties  2.1
23 H335: May cause respiratory irritation  2.1
Trifluoroacetic acid 24 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage  3.5
25 H332: Harmful if inhaled  2.1
26 H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects  2.8
HPT E 56 Date
Evaluation IMSB
Step 
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George Rosenberger Laboratory 17.09.14
Nr Hazard Impact LCI
Exposure Occurence	   Involvement Reliability Selectivity Availability GWF HSWF SWF4
1 H301: Toxic if swallowed 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
2 H317: May cause an allergic skin reaction 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
3 H301: Toxic if swallowed 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
4 H334: May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
5 H413: May cause long lasting harmful effects to aquatic life 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.6
6 H225: Highly flammable liquid and vapour 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.6
7 H332: Harmful if inhaled 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
8 H302: Harmful if swallowed 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
9 H312: Harmful in contact with skin 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
10 H319: Causes serious eye irritation 4 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 3.3
11 H226: Flammable liquid and vapour 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.6
12 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 3.3
13 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 3.5
14 H332: Harmful if inhaled 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
15 H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects 4 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 3.5
16 Ultrasonic vibrations 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1.7
17 H302: Harmful if swallowed 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.0
18 Ultrasonic vibrations 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 1.7
19 H315: Causes skin irritation 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
20 H317: May cause an allergic skin reaction 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
21 H319: Causes serious eye irritation 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
22 H334: May cause allergy or asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
23 H335: May cause respiratory irritation 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
24 H314: Causes severe skin burns and eye damage 4 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 3.5
25 H332: Harmful if inhaled 2 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.1
26 H412: Harmful to aquatic life with long lasting effects 3 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 2.8
DateResponsible scientist:
Evaluation ISMB
Detectability WFProbability
HPT E 56
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Acronyms
ACS American Chemical Society. 38, 39, 49
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process. 75
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable. 15, 71, 73, 93, 94, 102, 107, 108, 113, 119, 123
CHR Chemical Hazard Review. 37, 38
CSB Chemical Safety Board. 38
EAWAG Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology. 99
EMPA Swiss Federal Laboratories for Materials Science and Technology. 99
EPFL Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne. 87, 99, 105, 117
ETA Event Tree Analysis. 25–28, 31–34, 49
ETHZ Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. 99, 117, 123
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. 21
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis. 21–23, 31–34, 65
FSB Faculty of Basic Sciences. 99
FTA Fault Tree Analysis. 23–28, 31–34, 49
GGRC Group of Catalytic Reaction Engineering. 105
GHS Globally Harmonized System of Classification, Labeling and Packaging of Chemicals. 50,
51, 104, 108, 122
GSCP Group of Chemical and Physical Safety. 4
GWF General Worsening Factors. 62, 63
HAZOP Hazard and Operability analysis. 4, 18–21, 23, 31–34, 38, 48
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HSWF Hazard-Specific Worsening Factors. 62, 63
ICI Institute of Chemical Industry. 18
ICPR International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine. 2
IMSB Institute of Molecular Systems Biology. 117
JSA Job Safety Analysis. 28, 29, 31–34, 48, 49
Lab-HIRA Laboratory Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis. 37, 38
LCI Laboratory Criticality Index. 56, 66–68, 71, 76, 84, 88, 100, 101, 104, 106–108, 113, 119, 123
LSCI Laboratory of Inorganic Synthesis and Catalysis. 99
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheets. 50
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 21
OSH Occupational Safety and Health. 36, 46, 53, 81, 111, 117
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Act. 36
PCT pressure cycling technology. 119
PPE Personal Protection Equipment. 78
PSI Paul Scherrer Institute. 99
RPN Risk Priority Number. 22, 65
SB-SST Occupational Safety and Health Service of the School of Basic Sciences. 99
SOP Standard Operating Procedure. 29, 31, 100, 105
SSUV Statistical Service of Swiss Insurance Companies. 59
STEL Short-Term Exposure Limit. 76
STOP Strategical, Technical, Organizational and Personal. 15, 72, 77, 128
SUVA Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund. 59
SWF Synergetic Worsening Factors. 62, 63
TWA Time-Weighted Average Exposure. 76
WSL Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research. 99
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